From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@fb.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 4/9] bpf: Allocate private stack for eligible main prog or subprogs
Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 16:10:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f30a28d-0c30-48be-99a8-6018e3ea92b6@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQ+3XKiR4YNjZUbZd-UA8pcc697m0-D9x_oNTjo2iCd6QQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 11/1/24 1:18 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 8:10 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>> For any main prog or subprogs, allocate private stack space if requested
>> by subprog info or main prog. The alignment for private stack is 16
>> since maximum stack alignment is 16 for bpf-enabled archs.
>>
>> For x86_64 arch, the allocated private stack is freed in arch specific
>> implementation of bpf_jit_free().
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 1 +
>> include/linux/bpf.h | 1 +
>> kernel/bpf/core.c | 10 ++++++++++
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>> 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> index 06b080b61aa5..59d294b8dd67 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
>> @@ -3544,6 +3544,7 @@ void bpf_jit_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
>> prog->bpf_func = (void *)prog->bpf_func - cfi_get_offset();
>> hdr = bpf_jit_binary_pack_hdr(prog);
>> bpf_jit_binary_pack_free(hdr, NULL);
>> + free_percpu(prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr);
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_prog_kallsyms_verify_off(prog));
> I'm 99% certain there are memory leaks when free and alloc
> are imbalanced like this:
> arch code doing free while generic code doing alloc.
Indeed, there are memory leaks. See below.
>
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> index 8db3c5d7404b..8a3ea7440a4a 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> @@ -1507,6 +1507,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
>> u32 max_rdwr_access;
>> struct btf *attach_btf;
>> const struct bpf_ctx_arg_aux *ctx_arg_info;
>> + void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
>> struct mutex dst_mutex; /* protects dst_* pointers below, *after* prog becomes visible */
>> struct bpf_prog *dst_prog;
>> struct bpf_trampoline *dst_trampoline;
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index 14d9288441f2..6905f250738b 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -2396,6 +2396,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp)
>> */
>> struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
>> {
>> + void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
>> /* In case of BPF to BPF calls, verifier did all the prep
>> * work with regards to JITing, etc.
>> */
>> @@ -2421,6 +2422,15 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_prog *fp, int *err)
>> if (*err)
>> return fp;
>>
>> + if (fp->aux->use_priv_stack && fp->aux->stack_depth) {
>> + priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(fp->aux->stack_depth, 16, GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
>> + *err = -ENOMEM;
>> + return fp;
>> + }
>> + fp->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
>> + }
>> +
>> fp = bpf_int_jit_compile(fp);
> what happens if this jit_compile fails?
> Which part will free priv_stack_ptr?
> I suspect it's a memory leak.
Indeed. There will be a memory leak if jit failed. The same for below
jit_subprogs() case. Will fix in the next revision.
>
>> bpf_prog_jit_attempt_done(fp);
>> if (!fp->jited && jit_needed) {
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index 596afd29f088..30e74db6a85f 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -20080,6 +20080,7 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> {
>> struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog, **func, *tmp;
>> int i, j, subprog_start, subprog_end = 0, len, subprog;
>> + void __percpu *priv_stack_ptr;
>> struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
>> struct bpf_insn *insn;
>> void *old_bpf_func;
>> @@ -20176,6 +20177,17 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>>
>> func[i]->aux->name[0] = 'F';
>> func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth;
>> +
>> + if (env->subprog_info[i].use_priv_stack && func[i]->aux->stack_depth) {
>> + priv_stack_ptr = __alloc_percpu_gfp(func[i]->aux->stack_depth, 16,
>> + GFP_KERNEL);
>> + if (!priv_stack_ptr) {
>> + err = -ENOMEM;
>> + goto out_free;
>> + }
>> + func[i]->aux->priv_stack_ptr = priv_stack_ptr;
>> + }
>> +
>> func[i]->jit_requested = 1;
>> func[i]->blinding_requested = prog->blinding_requested;
>> func[i]->aux->kfunc_tab = prog->aux->kfunc_tab;
>> --
>> 2.43.5
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-04 0:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-01 3:09 [PATCH bpf-next v8 0/9] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:09 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/9] bpf: Check stack depth limit after visiting all subprogs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 2/9] bpf: Allow private stack to have each subprog having stack size of 512 bytes Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 19:46 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:05 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 3/9] bpf: Check potential private stack recursion for progs with async callback Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 19:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:08 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 4/9] bpf: Allocate private stack for eligible main prog or subprogs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 20:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:10 ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 5/9] bpf, x86: Avoid repeated usage of bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 6/9] bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 7/9] selftests/bpf: Add tracing prog private stack tests Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 8/9] bpf: Support private stack for struct_ops progs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 20:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:35 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add struct_ops prog private stack tests Yonghong Song
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