From: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Kernel Team <kernel-team@fb.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 2/9] bpf: Allow private stack to have each subprog having stack size of 512 bytes
Date: Sun, 3 Nov 2024 16:05:30 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e9bc96f9-5c65-4b25-b719-2fcb6e16c119@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAADnVQL3ZrMPjt5exuvRD7_+fLvCzn_=3A9VXy7sbSFD2f09qA@mail.gmail.com>
On 11/1/24 12:46 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 8:12 PM Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> wrote:
>> With private stack support, each subprog can have stack with up to 512
>> bytes. The limit of 512 bytes per subprog is kept to avoid increasing
>> verifier complexity since greater than 512 bytes will cause big verifier
>> change and increase memory consumption and verification time.
>>
>> If private stack is supported and certain stack size threshold is reached,
>> that subprog will have its own private stack allocated.
>>
>> In this patch, some tracing programs are allowed to use private
>> stack since tracing prog may be triggered in the middle of some other
>> prog runs. The supported tracing programs already have recursion check
>> such that if the same prog is running on the same cpu again, the nested
>> prog run will be skipped. This ensures bpf prog private stack is not
>> over-written.
>>
>> Note that if any tail_call is called in the prog (including all subprogs),
>> then private stack is not used.
>>
>> Function bpf_enable_priv_stack() return values include NO_PRIV_STACK,
>> PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE, PRIV_STACK_ALWAYS and negative errors. The
>> NO_PRIV_STACK represents priv stack not enable, PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE for
>> priv stack enabled with some conditions (e.g. stack size threshold), and
>> PRIV_STACK_ALWAYS for priv stack always enabled. The negative error
>> represents a verification failure. The PRIV_STACK_ALWAYS and negative error
>> will be used by later struct_ops progs.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
>> ---
>> include/linux/bpf.h | 1 +
>> include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 +
>> include/linux/filter.h | 1 +
>> kernel/bpf/core.c | 5 +++
>> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> 5 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> index c3ba4d475174..8db3c5d7404b 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
>> @@ -1523,6 +1523,7 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {
>> bool exception_cb;
>> bool exception_boundary;
>> bool is_extended; /* true if extended by freplace program */
>> + bool use_priv_stack;
>> u64 prog_array_member_cnt; /* counts how many times as member of prog_array */
>> struct mutex ext_mutex; /* mutex for is_extended and prog_array_member_cnt */
>> struct bpf_arena *arena;
>> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> index 4513372c5bc8..bc28ce7996ac 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
>> @@ -668,6 +668,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
>> bool args_cached: 1;
>> /* true if bpf_fastcall stack region is used by functions that can't be inlined */
>> bool keep_fastcall_stack: 1;
>> + bool use_priv_stack: 1;
>>
>> u8 arg_cnt;
>> struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS];
>> diff --git a/include/linux/filter.h b/include/linux/filter.h
>> index 7d7578a8eac1..3a21947f2fd4 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/filter.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/filter.h
>> @@ -1119,6 +1119,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_exceptions(void);
>> bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void);
>> bool bpf_jit_supports_arena(void);
>> bool bpf_jit_supports_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn, bool in_arena);
>> +bool bpf_jit_supports_private_stack(void);
>> u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void);
>> void arch_bpf_stack_walk(bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp), void *cookie);
>> bool bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(void *func);
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index 233ea78f8f1b..14d9288441f2 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -3045,6 +3045,11 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_exceptions(void)
>> return false;
>> }
>>
>> +bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_private_stack(void)
>> +{
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> void __weak arch_bpf_stack_walk(bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp), void *cookie)
>> {
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index 89b0a980d0f9..d3f4cbab97bc 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -194,6 +194,8 @@ struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem {
>>
>> #define BPF_GLOBAL_PERCPU_MA_MAX_SIZE 512
>>
>> +#define BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE 64
>> +
>> static int acquire_reference_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx);
>> static int release_reference(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int ref_obj_id);
>> static void invalidate_non_owning_refs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env);
>> @@ -6015,6 +6017,40 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>> strict);
>> }
>>
>> +#define NO_PRIV_STACK 0
>> +#define PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE 1
>> +#define PRIV_STACK_ALWAYS 2
> Please use enum.
will do.
>
>> +
>> +static int bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> +{
>> + struct bpf_subprog_info *si;
>> +
>> + if (!bpf_jit_supports_private_stack())
>> + return NO_PRIV_STACK;
>> +
>> + switch (env->prog->type) {
>> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
>> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
>> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
>> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
>> + break;
>> + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING:
>> + if (env->prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_ITER)
>> + break;
>> + fallthrough;
>> + default:
>> + return NO_PRIV_STACK;
>> + }
> Probably worth adding:
> if (!bpf_prog_check_recur(env->prog))
> return NO_PRIV_STACK;
>
> and remove case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING entry
> with comment that bpf_prog_check_recur() checks all prog types
> that use bpf trampoline while kprobe/tp/raw_tp don't use trampoline
> hence checked explicitly.
Yes. I can do this. But to use bpf_prog_check_recur() effective,
I need to make the following change:
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 4513372c5bc8..ad887c68d3e1 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -889,9 +889,8 @@ static inline bool bpf_prog_check_recur(const struct bpf_prog *prog)
return prog->expected_attach_type != BPF_TRACE_ITER;
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM:
- return false;
default:
- return true;
+ return false;
}
}
So it return true *ONLY* if the trampoline recursion detection is implemented
for specific prog types.
With that, the ultimiate bpf_enable_priv_stack() func (after the whole patch set)
will look like:
static enum priv_stack_mode bpf_enable_priv_stack(struct bpf_prog *prog)
{
if (!bpf_jit_supports_private_stack())
return NO_PRIV_STACK;
/* bpf_prog_check_recur() checks all prog types that use bpf trampoline
* while kprobe/tp/perf_event/raw_tp don't use trampoline hence checked
* explicitly.
*/
switch (prog->type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT:
return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
default:
break;
}
if (!bpf_prog_check_recur(prog))
return NO_PRIV_STACK;
if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
return PRIV_STACK_ALWAYS;
return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
}
>
>> +
>> + si = env->subprog_info;
>> + for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
>> + if (si[i].has_tail_call)
>> + return NO_PRIV_STACK;
>> + }
>> +
>> + return PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE;
>> +}
>> +
>> static int round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int stack_depth)
>> {
>> if (env->prog->jit_requested)
>> @@ -6033,11 +6069,12 @@ static int round_up_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int stack_depth)
>> * only needs a local stack of MAX_CALL_FRAMES to remember callsites
>> */
>> static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
>> - int *subtree_depth, int *depth_frame)
>> + int *subtree_depth, int *depth_frame,
>> + int priv_stack_supported)
>> {
>> struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = env->subprog_info;
>> struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
>> - int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end;
>> + int depth = 0, frame = 0, i, subprog_end, subprog_depth;
>> bool tail_call_reachable = false;
>> int ret_insn[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
>> int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
>> @@ -6070,11 +6107,23 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,
>> depth);
>> return -EACCES;
>> }
>> - depth += round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth);
>> + subprog_depth = round_up_stack_depth(env, subprog[idx].stack_depth);
>> + depth += subprog_depth;
>> if (depth > MAX_BPF_STACK && !*subtree_depth) {
>> *subtree_depth = depth;
>> *depth_frame = frame + 1;
>> }
>> + if (priv_stack_supported != NO_PRIV_STACK) {
>> + if (!subprog[idx].use_priv_stack) {
>> + if (subprog_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
>> + verbose(env, "stack size of subprog %d is %d. Too large\n",
>> + idx, subprog_depth);
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + }
>> + if (subprog_depth >= BPF_PRIV_STACK_MIN_SIZE)
>> + subprog[idx].use_priv_stack = true;
>> + }
>> + }
>> continue_func:
>> subprog_end = subprog[idx + 1].start;
>> for (; i < subprog_end; i++) {
>> @@ -6174,19 +6223,29 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>> {
>> struct bpf_subprog_info *si = env->subprog_info;
>> int ret, subtree_depth = 0, depth_frame;
>> + int priv_stack_supported;
>> +
>> + priv_stack_supported = bpf_enable_priv_stack(env);
>> + if (priv_stack_supported < 0)
>> + return priv_stack_supported;
> if it was enum, the compiler would have warned that the above is meaningless.
>
>> for (int i = 0; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) {
>> if (!i || si[i].is_async_cb) {
>> - ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i, &subtree_depth, &depth_frame);
>> + ret = check_max_stack_depth_subprog(env, i, &subtree_depth, &depth_frame,
>> + priv_stack_supported);
>> if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>> }
>> }
>> - if (subtree_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
>> - verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
>> - depth_frame, subtree_depth);
>> - return -EACCES;
>> + if (priv_stack_supported == NO_PRIV_STACK) {
>> + if (subtree_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
> no need for extra indent. Use:
> if (priv_stack_supported == NO_PRIV_STACK &&
> subtree_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK) {
The reason is to accommodate future changes since there will be multiple if statements
inside 'priv_stack_supported == NO_PRIV_STACK' condition. But I agree that we do
not need extra indent here and I can do it in later patch when necessary.
>
>> + verbose(env, "combined stack size of %d calls is %d. Too large\n",
>> + depth_frame, subtree_depth);
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + }
>> }
>> + if (si[0].use_priv_stack)
>> + env->prog->aux->use_priv_stack = true;
>> return 0;
>> }
> pw-bot: cr
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-04 0:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-01 3:09 [PATCH bpf-next v8 0/9] bpf: Support private stack for bpf progs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:09 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 1/9] bpf: Check stack depth limit after visiting all subprogs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 2/9] bpf: Allow private stack to have each subprog having stack size of 512 bytes Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 19:46 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:05 ` Yonghong Song [this message]
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 3/9] bpf: Check potential private stack recursion for progs with async callback Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 19:55 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:08 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 4/9] bpf: Allocate private stack for eligible main prog or subprogs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 20:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:10 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 5/9] bpf, x86: Avoid repeated usage of bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 6/9] bpf, x86: Support private stack in jit Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 7/9] selftests/bpf: Add tracing prog private stack tests Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 8/9] bpf: Support private stack for struct_ops progs Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 20:13 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-11-04 0:35 ` Yonghong Song
2024-11-01 3:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 9/9] selftests/bpf: Add struct_ops prog private stack tests Yonghong Song
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