public inbox for bpf@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
To: sashiko@lists.linux.dev
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf, tcx: reject offloaded programs on attach
Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 14:53:59 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7ceb9dda-16af-4fcc-a47a-2099408c0e10@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260424033751.61B00C19425@smtp.kernel.org>


On 4/24/26 11:37 AM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
> - [High] Incomplete fix: Offloaded programs can still be attached to software paths via BPF_LINK_UPDATE
> - [High] Missing device-bound validation in TCX and Netkit attach paths
> --
>
> commit ea2bbf8a59b47b06842fc8c920b0debcc1bed553
> Author: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
>
> bpf, tcx: reject offloaded programs on attach
>      
> An offloaded prog's bpf_func is replaced by bpf_prog_warn_on_exec(),
> since it's supposed to run on the NIC, not the host. But tcx doesn't
> check this and happily attaches it to the software path, so the first
> packet hits the WARN.
>
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/64d8e2b5-a214-4f3c-b9e8-bcedbcb2c602@hust.edu.cn/
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
>> index 02db0113b8e7c..86f4636d5a677 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/tcx.c
>> @@ -16,6 +16,9 @@ int tcx_prog_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>   	struct net_device *dev;
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>> +	if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
> The commit message mentions using bpf_prog_is_offloaded() instead of
> bpf_prog_is_dev_bound() so that dev-bound-only programs keep working for TCX
> and Netkit.
>
> XDP validates device matching in dev_xdp_attach():
>
>      if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(new_prog->aux) &&
>          !bpf_offload_dev_match(new_prog, dev)) {
>          ...
>      }
>
> The kernel relies on attach-time validation to guarantee safety for hardware
> metadata kfuncs, as documented in bpf_dev_bound_resolve_kfunc():
>
> "We rely on bpf_dev_bound_match() check at attach to render this program
> unusable"
>
> If a program is device-bound, shouldn't we still verify it is being attached
> to the correct device?
>
> Without a similar bpf_offload_dev_match() check here in the TCX and Netkit
> attach paths, could a user attach a program bound to device A onto device B?
>
> Could this cause driver-specific kfuncs to execute on device B's SKBs while
> blindly assuming device A's internal data layout, leading to out-of-bounds
> memory accesses and kernel panics?


On bpf_offload_dev_match(): SCHED_CLS doesn't allow dev-bound-only 
(rejected in bpf_prog_dev_bound_init()),

so bpf_prog_is_offloaded() already covers every case: A program offloaded
to device A attached to device B is rejected unconditionally.

>>   	rtnl_lock();
>>   	dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, attr->target_ifindex);
> [ ... ]
>
>> @@ -315,6 +318,9 @@ int tcx_link_attach(const union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_prog *prog)
>>   	struct tcx_link *tcx;
>>   	int ret;
>>   
>> +	if (bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
> While this prevents offloaded programs from being attached initially, do
> we need to protect the link update paths against this regression as well?
>
> It appears tcx_link_update() and netkit_link_update() pass the new program
> directly to bpf_mprog_attach() without validating its offload status:
>
> kernel/bpf/tcx.c:tcx_link_update() {
>      ...
>      ret = bpf_mprog_attach(entry, &entry_new, nprog, oprog, NULL,
>                             link->flags, 0, 0);
>      ...
> }
>
> If a user creates a valid link with a standard program, could they use
> BPF_LINK_UPDATE to replace it with an offloaded program?
You're right about the update path — will fix in v2.
> Similarly, does bpf_xdp_link_update() lack the bpf_prog_is_offloaded() check
> present in dev_xdp_attach(), allowing it to install an offloaded program into
> an SKB or native mode XDP link?
>
> If an offloaded program is attached via these update paths, its bpf_func is
> replaced by bpf_prog_warn_on_exec().
>
> Would executing this on the host datapath trigger the WARN(1) panic this
> patch intended to fix, potentially allowing a local DoS if panic_on_warn
> is set?

The same hole exists on the XDP side (bpf_xdp_link_update() bypasses 
dev_xdp_attach()'s offload check); I'll send a separate patch for that.


>>   	rtnl_lock();
>>   	dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, attr->link_create.target_ifindex);

  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-24  6:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-23  3:36 [PATCH bpf 0/2] bpf: prevent offloaded programs from running on host via tcx/netkit Jiayuan Chen
2026-04-23  3:36 ` [PATCH bpf 1/2] bpf, tcx: reject offloaded programs on attach Jiayuan Chen
2026-04-24  3:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-04-24  6:53     ` Jiayuan Chen [this message]
2026-04-23  3:36 ` [PATCH bpf 2/2] bpf, netkit: " Jiayuan Chen
2026-04-24  3:37   ` sashiko-bot
2026-04-24  6:53     ` Jiayuan Chen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=7ceb9dda-16af-4fcc-a47a-2099408c0e10@linux.dev \
    --to=jiayuan.chen@linux.dev \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sashiko@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox