BPF List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org,  andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com,
	sunhao.th@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2023 02:27:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <827fe415707d215f8f0f2363c8692b2ce7898c1e.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231205193250.260862-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com>

On Tue, 2023-12-05 at 14:32 -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> This patch fixes a bug around the verification of possibly-zero-sized
> stack accesses. When the access was done through a var-offset stack
> pointer, check_stack_access_within_bounds was incorrectly computing the
> maximum-offset of a zero-sized read to be the same as the register's min
> offset. Instead, we have to take in account the register's maximum
> possible value.
> 
> The bug was allowing accesses to erroneously pass the
> check_stack_access_within_bounds() checks, only to later crash in
> check_stack_range_initialized() when all the possibly-affected stack
> slots are iterated (this time with a correct max offset).
> check_stack_range_initialized() is relying on
> check_stack_access_within_bounds() for its accesses to the
> stack-tracking vector to be within bounds; in the case of zero-sized
> accesses, we were essentially only verifying that the lowest possible
> slot was within bounds. We would crash when the max-offset of the stack
> pointer was >= 0 (which shouldn't pass verification, and hopefully is
> not something anyone's code attempts to do in practice).
> 
> Thanks Hao for reporting!
> 
> Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
> Fixes: 01f810ace9ed3 ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access")
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsZGEUaRCHsmaX=h-efVogsRfK1FPxmkgb0Os_frnHiNdw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
> ---

Seems good, thank you for fixing this.

Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-12-06  0:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-12-05 19:32 [PATCH bpf v3 0/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access Andrei Matei
2023-12-05 19:32 ` [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] " Andrei Matei
2023-12-06  0:27   ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-12-05 19:32 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/2] bpf: guard stack limits against 32bit overflow Andrei Matei
2023-12-05 23:35 ` [PATCH bpf v3 0/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access Eduard Zingerman
2023-12-06  0:08   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-06 16:57   ` Andrei Matei
2023-12-06 17:14     ` Eduard Zingerman

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=827fe415707d215f8f0f2363c8692b2ce7898c1e.camel@gmail.com \
    --to=eddyz87@gmail.com \
    --cc=andreimatei1@gmail.com \
    --cc=andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com \
    --cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=sunhao.th@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox