From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>,
bpf@vger.kernel.org, andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com,
sunhao.th@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access
Date: Wed, 06 Dec 2023 02:27:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <827fe415707d215f8f0f2363c8692b2ce7898c1e.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231205193250.260862-2-andreimatei1@gmail.com>
On Tue, 2023-12-05 at 14:32 -0500, Andrei Matei wrote:
> This patch fixes a bug around the verification of possibly-zero-sized
> stack accesses. When the access was done through a var-offset stack
> pointer, check_stack_access_within_bounds was incorrectly computing the
> maximum-offset of a zero-sized read to be the same as the register's min
> offset. Instead, we have to take in account the register's maximum
> possible value.
>
> The bug was allowing accesses to erroneously pass the
> check_stack_access_within_bounds() checks, only to later crash in
> check_stack_range_initialized() when all the possibly-affected stack
> slots are iterated (this time with a correct max offset).
> check_stack_range_initialized() is relying on
> check_stack_access_within_bounds() for its accesses to the
> stack-tracking vector to be within bounds; in the case of zero-sized
> accesses, we were essentially only verifying that the lowest possible
> slot was within bounds. We would crash when the max-offset of the stack
> pointer was >= 0 (which shouldn't pass verification, and hopefully is
> not something anyone's code attempts to do in practice).
>
> Thanks Hao for reporting!
>
> Reported-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
> Fixes: 01f810ace9ed3 ("bpf: Allow variable-offset stack access")
> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsZGEUaRCHsmaX=h-efVogsRfK1FPxmkgb0Os_frnHiNdw@mail.gmail.com/
> Signed-off-by: Andrei Matei <andreimatei1@gmail.com>
> ---
Seems good, thank you for fixing this.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-06 0:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-12-05 19:32 [PATCH bpf v3 0/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access Andrei Matei
2023-12-05 19:32 ` [PATCH bpf v3 1/2] " Andrei Matei
2023-12-06 0:27 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2023-12-05 19:32 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/2] bpf: guard stack limits against 32bit overflow Andrei Matei
2023-12-05 23:35 ` [PATCH bpf v3 0/2] bpf: fix verification of indirect var-off stack access Eduard Zingerman
2023-12-06 0:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2023-12-06 16:57 ` Andrei Matei
2023-12-06 17:14 ` Eduard Zingerman
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