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From: "Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi" <memxor@gmail.com>
To: "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
	"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: "Andrii Nakryiko" <andrii@kernel.org>,
	"Eduard Zingerman" <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
	"John Fastabend" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	<bpf@vger.kernel.org>, "David Vernet" <void@manifault.com>,
	"Andrea Righi" <arighi@nvidia.com>,
	"Changwoo Min" <changwoo@igalia.com>,
	"Emil Tsalapatis" <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
	<sched-ext@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted
Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 16:32:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <DKTUEUJ343P7.2ULJ2RYGV6XZZ@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <95d7ccc17681aa3a4a2eeb1b073f00f7@kernel.org>

On Thu Aug 20, 2026 at 7:20 AM CEST, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Walking an unannotated pointer field of a trusted struct yields a bare
> PTR_TO_BTF_ID in non-sleepable programs, which kfuncs and helpers accept,
> but PTR_UNTRUSTED in sleepable programs, which they reject. This gets in the
> way of making ops.init_task() sleepable, which schedulers want for
> allocations. For example, passing args->cgroup into bpf_cgrp_storage_get()
> then fails verification and the only recourse is round-tripping through the
> cgroup ID with bpf_cgroup_from_id().
>
> The pointer fields in the sched_ext ops argument containers are all pinned
> by the callers for the duration of the ops calls and are never NULL. Add
> them to the verifier's trusted-fields whitelist so that they are PTR_TRUSTED
> in both sleepable and non-sleepable programs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
> ---

Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>

I (or others) will add Fixes tag when applying, no need to respin.

> [...]

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-20 14:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-20  5:20 [PATCH bpf-next] bpf: sched_ext: Mark ops argument container pointer fields as trusted Tejun Heo
2026-08-20  6:16 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-20  8:11   ` Tejun Heo
2026-08-20 14:32 ` Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi [this message]
2026-08-20 17:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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