* [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
@ 2026-11-17 17:23 Ryan Roberts
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Ryan Roberts @ 2026-11-17 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland, Alexei Starovoitov,
Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend, Andrew Morton, Alexander Viro
Cc: Ryan Roberts, linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel, bpf, stable
The BPF verifier can accept programs with unsafe speculative paths by
inserting BPF_NOSPEC instructions instead of rejecting them. It relies
on those instructions to prevent execution of the unsafe paths.
The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
Rename spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() so that the interpreter and other
callers receive SB if supported, or DSB NSH followed by ISB otherwise.
Defining barrier_nospec() would also add barriers to the generic
copy_from_user() and copy_from_user_iter() paths. These are unnecessary
on arm64: its uaccess primitives mask user pointers so that they cannot
address kernel memory even when an access_ok() check is mispredicted.
Introduce user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr(), defaulting to true,
and have arm64 return false. Then update the uaccess sites to call
barrier_nospec() conditionally on the macro.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d6f1c85f2253 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 6 +++---
arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 +-
include/linux/uaccess.h | 7 ++++++-
kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +--------
lib/iov_iter.c | 3 ++-
6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
index 9495c4441a46..088ee29d36f4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
*/
#define dgh() asm volatile("hint #6" : : : "memory")
-#define spec_bar() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
- SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
- ARM64_HAS_SB))
+#define barrier_nospec() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
+ SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
+ ARM64_HAS_SB) : : : "memory")
#define gsb_ack() asm volatile(GSB_ACK_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
#define gsb_sys() asm volatile(GSB_SYS_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 9f5bd9c69c24..6fd03dc1ae76 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
return safe_ptr;
}
+/* __uaccess_mask_ptr() prevents speculative accesses to kernel addresses. */
+#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() false
+
/*
* The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
* space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
index 3bcf86154d95..c96e93eca3b9 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
* could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
- spec_bar();
+ barrier_nospec();
return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
index 67cdb0a4f583..5a1fa4f48c77 100644
--- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
+++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
#define mask_user_address(src) (src)
#endif
+#ifndef user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr
+#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() true
+#endif
+
/*
* Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
* and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
@@ -179,7 +183,8 @@ _inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
* lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
* finished:
*/
- barrier_nospec();
+ if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
+ barrier_nospec();
}
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 0b8456f2dce9..abd938d310bb 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -2250,14 +2250,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
/* ST, STX and LDX*/
ST_NOSPEC:
/* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
- * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
- * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
- * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
- * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
- * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
- * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
- * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
- * x86 for v4 as well.
+ * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
*/
barrier_nospec();
CONT;
diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
index fa4fe2e92383..abd27189beff 100644
--- a/lib/iov_iter.c
+++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ size_t copy_from_user_iter(void __user *iter_from, size_t progress,
* lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
* finished:
*/
- barrier_nospec();
+ if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
+ barrier_nospec();
}
to += progress;
instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, iter_from, len);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-17 17:23 [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter Ryan Roberts
@ 2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 9:26 ` Ryan Roberts
2026-11-18 14:27 ` Luis Gerhorst
2026-11-19 1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-11-17 17:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ryan Roberts; +Cc: bpf
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
issue to consider:
- [Low] bpf: non-standard multi-line comment style in ___bpf_prog_run()
--
commit ac6a06b7dc1000d82907323434c2003bed5a8873
Author: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
This commit renames spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() on arm64 so that the BPF
interpreter emits a speculation barrier for BPF_NOSPEC, while avoiding
unnecessary barriers in uaccess paths where user pointers are already masked.
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index fc8b133c15f90..adf7ba0cdb06c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -2251,14 +2251,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
> /* ST, STX and LDX*/
> ST_NOSPEC:
> /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
> - * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
> - * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
> - * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
> - * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
> - * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
> - * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
> - * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
> - * x86 for v4 as well.
> + * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
> */
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but BPF code uses the multi-line comment style where the
opening /* goes on its own line with the comment text starting on the next
line.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117172341.3152407-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-18 9:26 ` Ryan Roberts
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Ryan Roberts @ 2026-11-18 9:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: sashiko-reviews; +Cc: bpf
On 17/11/2026 17:34, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential
> issue to consider:
> - [Low] bpf: non-standard multi-line comment style in ___bpf_prog_run()
> --
>
> commit ac6a06b7dc1000d82907323434c2003bed5a8873
> Author: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
>
> arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
>
> This commit renames spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() on arm64 so that the BPF
> interpreter emits a speculation barrier for BPF_NOSPEC, while avoiding
> unnecessary barriers in uaccess paths where user pointers are already masked.
>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> index fc8b133c15f90..adf7ba0cdb06c 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
>> @@ -2251,14 +2251,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
>> /* ST, STX and LDX*/
>> ST_NOSPEC:
>> /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
>> - * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
>> - * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
>> - * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
>> - * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
>> - * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
>> - * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
>> - * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
>> - * x86 for v4 as well.
>> + * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
>> */
>
> [Severity: Low]
> This isn't a bug, but BPF code uses the multi-line comment style where the
> opening /* goes on its own line with the comment text starting on the next
> line.
All other multi-line comments in this file use this more compact style; I was
trying to be consistent.
Thanks,
Ryan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-17 17:23 [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter Ryan Roberts
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-11-18 14:27 ` Luis Gerhorst
2026-11-19 1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Luis Gerhorst @ 2026-11-18 14:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ryan Roberts
Cc: Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland, Alexei Starovoitov,
Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend, Andrew Morton, Alexander Viro,
linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel, bpf, stable
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> writes:
> The BPF verifier can accept programs with unsafe speculative paths by
> inserting BPF_NOSPEC instructions instead of rejecting them. It relies
> on those instructions to prevent execution of the unsafe paths.
>
> The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
> interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
> arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
> Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
> comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
> mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
>
> Rename spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() so that the interpreter and other
> callers receive SB if supported, or DSB NSH followed by ISB otherwise.
>
> Defining barrier_nospec() would also add barriers to the generic
> copy_from_user() and copy_from_user_iter() paths. These are unnecessary
> on arm64: its uaccess primitives mask user pointers so that they cannot
> address kernel memory even when an access_ok() check is mispredicted.
>
> Introduce user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr(), defaulting to true,
> and have arm64 return false. Then update the uaccess sites to call
> barrier_nospec() conditionally on the macro.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: d6f1c85f2253 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
> Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Thanks! Tested that this prevents the attack (just recovery of OOB
value, did not aim for real secret) on Cavium ThunderX2 (no FEAT_SB) as
expected.
Tested-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 6 +++---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
> arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/uaccess.h | 7 ++++++-
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 9 +--------
> lib/iov_iter.c | 3 ++-
> 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> index 9495c4441a46..088ee29d36f4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> @@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
> */
> #define dgh() asm volatile("hint #6" : : : "memory")
>
> -#define spec_bar() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
> - SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
> - ARM64_HAS_SB))
> +#define barrier_nospec() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n", \
> + SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n", \
> + ARM64_HAS_SB) : : : "memory")
>
> #define gsb_ack() asm volatile(GSB_ACK_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
> #define gsb_sys() asm volatile(GSB_SYS_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 9f5bd9c69c24..6fd03dc1ae76 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
> return safe_ptr;
> }
>
> +/* __uaccess_mask_ptr() prevents speculative accesses to kernel addresses. */
> +#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() false
> +
> /*
> * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
> * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> index 3bcf86154d95..c96e93eca3b9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
> * could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
> */
> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
> - spec_bar();
> + barrier_nospec();
>
> return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67cdb0a4f583..5a1fa4f48c77 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
> #define mask_user_address(src) (src)
> #endif
>
> +#ifndef user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr
> +#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() true
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
> * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
> @@ -179,7 +183,8 @@ _inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
> * finished:
> */
> - barrier_nospec();
> + if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
> + barrier_nospec();
> }
> instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
> res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index 0b8456f2dce9..abd938d310bb 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -2250,14 +2250,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
> /* ST, STX and LDX*/
> ST_NOSPEC:
> /* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
> - * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
> - * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
> - * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
> - * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
> - * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
> - * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
> - * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
> - * x86 for v4 as well.
> + * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
> */
> barrier_nospec();
> CONT;
> diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
> index fa4fe2e92383..abd27189beff 100644
> --- a/lib/iov_iter.c
> +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
> @@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ size_t copy_from_user_iter(void __user *iter_from, size_t progress,
> * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
> * finished:
> */
> - barrier_nospec();
> + if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
> + barrier_nospec();
> }
> to += progress;
> instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, iter_from, len);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-17 17:23 [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter Ryan Roberts
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18 14:27 ` Luis Gerhorst
@ 2026-11-19 1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-11-20 10:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2026-11-19 1:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ryan Roberts, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland,
Daniel Borkmann, John Fastabend, Andrew Morton, Alexander Viro
Cc: linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel, bpf, stable
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 09:23 AM Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
> The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
> interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
> arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
> Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
> comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
> mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
Nack.
In bpf-next arm64 has no interpreter when the JIT is built.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-19 1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2026-11-20 10:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2026-11-20 17:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Catalin Marinas @ 2026-11-20 10:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: Ryan Roberts, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland, Daniel Borkmann,
John Fastabend, Andrew Morton, Alexander Viro, linux-arm-kernel,
linux-kernel, bpf, stable
On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 01:18:03AM +0000, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 09:23 AM Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
> > The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
> > interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
> > arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
> > Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
> > comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
> > mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
>
> Nack.
> In bpf-next arm64 has no interpreter when the JIT is built.
And what about current mainline/stable or when one disables BPF_JIT
explicitly? Should we force BPF_JIT=y as well when ALWAYS_ON=y?
--
Catalin
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
2026-11-20 10:02 ` Catalin Marinas
@ 2026-11-20 17:38 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2026-11-20 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Catalin Marinas
Cc: Ryan Roberts, Will Deacon, Mark Rutland, Daniel Borkmann,
John Fastabend, Andrew Morton, Alexander Viro, linux-arm-kernel,
linux-kernel, bpf, stable
On Fri Nov 20, 2026 at 10:02 AM UTC, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 19, 2026 at 01:18:03AM +0000, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 09:23 AM Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> wrote:
>> > The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
>> > interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
>> > arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
>> > Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
>> > comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
>> > mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
>>
>> Nack.
>> In bpf-next arm64 has no interpreter when the JIT is built.
>
> And what about current mainline/stable or when one disables BPF_JIT
> explicitly? Should we force BPF_JIT=y as well when ALWAYS_ON=y?
Anyone who didn't have BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y were exposed to speculation
attacks forever. The security hole was wide open. We've been saying it
forever. At the next merge window we will say
"you cannot make wrong choice anymore".
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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2026-11-18 9:26 ` Ryan Roberts
2026-11-18 14:27 ` Luis Gerhorst
2026-11-19 1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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