* [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp
Cc: x86, leit, open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)
Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.
The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
their workloads.
2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
reason.
Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
Discussion about this approach:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjTHeQjsqtHcBGvy9TaJQ5uAm5HrCDuOD9v7qA9U1Xr4w@mail.gmail.com/
and
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
In order to get the missing mitigations, some clean up was done.
1) Get a namespace for mitigations, prepending MITIGATION to the Kconfig
entries.
2) Adding the missing mitigations, so, the mitigations have entries in the
Kconfig that could be easily configure by the user.
With this patchset applied, all configs have an individual entry under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, and all of them starts with CONFIG_MITIGATION.
Changelog
---------
V1:
* Creates a way to mitigate all (or none) hardware bugs
V2:
* Create KCONFIGs entries only some hardware bugs (MDS, TAA, MMIO)
V3:
* Expand the mitigations KCONFIGs to all hardware bugs that are
Linux mitigates.
V4:
* Patch rebase.
* Better documentation about the reasons of this decision.
V5:
* Create a "MITIGATION" Kconfig namespace for the entries mitigating
hardware bugs.
* Add GDS to the set of mitigations that are being covered.
* Reduce the ifdefs in the code by leveraging conditionals with omitted
operands.
Breno Leitao (12):
x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO
x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK
x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation
x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 +-
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +-
Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst | 6 +-
arch/x86/Kconfig | 141 +++++++++++++++---
arch/x86/Makefile | 8 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 8 +-
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/current.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 10 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 16 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 30 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 18 +--
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 3 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 +-
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 87 ++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 3 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 8 +-
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 4 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 26 ++--
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 10 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 2 +-
include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h | 2 +-
include/linux/module.h | 2 +-
include/linux/objtool.h | 2 +-
include/linux/pti.h | 2 +-
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h | 2 +-
include/net/tc_wrapper.h | 2 +-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c | 6 +-
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 +-
net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.lib | 8 +-
scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +-
scripts/generate_rust_target.rs | 2 +-
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +-
.../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 10 +-
66 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
2023-10-19 18:11 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
2023-10-23 2:59 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Yafang Shao
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta,
Jonathan Corbet, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Andy Lutomirski, Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, David S. Miller, David Ahern,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend,
KP Singh, Stanislav Fomichev, Hao Luo, Jiri Olsa, Wang YanQing,
Luis Chamberlain, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Jozsef Kadlecsik,
Florian Westphal, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko, Masahiro Yamada,
Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier, Miguel Ojeda,
Alex Gaynor, Wedson Almeida Filho, Boqun Feng, Gary Guo,
Björn Roy Baron, Benno Lossin, Andreas Hindborg, Alice Ryhl
Cc: leit, Paul E. McKenney, Randy Dunlap, Tejun Heo, Catalin Marinas,
Mike Rapoport (IBM), Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Juergen Gross,
Kim Phillips, Kirill A. Shutemov, Ingo Molnar, Kees Cook,
Jinghao Jia, Vincent Whitchurch, Yang Jihong, Petr Pavlu,
Andrew Morton, Sami Tolvanen, Alyssa Ross, Alexander Potapenko,
Ricardo Ribalda, Marco Elver, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:DOCUMENTATION, open list,
open list:FUNCTION HOOKS (FTRACE),
open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR X86 (KVM/x86),
open list:BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools),
open list:NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6], open list:MODULE SUPPORT,
open list:NETFILTER, open list:NETFILTER, open list:RUST
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 ++++----
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++--
arch/x86/Kconfig | 6 +++---
arch/x86/Makefile | 4 ++--
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 2 +-
include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h | 2 +-
include/linux/module.h | 2 +-
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h | 2 +-
include/net/tc_wrapper.h | 2 +-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c | 6 +++---
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
scripts/generate_rust_target.rs | 2 +-
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
37 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 32a8893e5617..cce768afec6b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
- the latest updated microcode.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs
+ to run with the latest updated microcode.
On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
@@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line.
Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
mitigation method at run time according to the
CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
- compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+ and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ba0f4fbbe57d..60faccd29a34 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5978,8 +5978,8 @@
Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
mitigation method at run time according to the
CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
- compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+ and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 46885150efd2..f3593461ce35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ config CALL_PADDING
config FINEIBT
def_bool y
- depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
+ depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
select CALL_PADDING
config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
-config RETPOLINE
+config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y
@@ -2486,7 +2486,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
config RETHUNK
bool "Enable return-thunks"
- depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y if X86_64
help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 22e41d9dbc23..3053b60f017b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
# Additionally, avoid generating expensive indirect jumps which
# are subject to retpolines for small number of switch cases.
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ vdso_install:
archprepare: checkbin
checkbin:
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
@echo "You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler." >&2
@echo "Please update your compiler." >&2
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 6a1821bd7d5e..7605f41a5454 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=small -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 \
-fno-omit-frame-pointer -foptimize-sibling-calls \
-DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
CFL += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
endif
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(call cc-option, -foptimize-sibling-calls)
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -fno-omit-frame-pointer
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fb604ec95a5f..24e4010c33b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 571fe4d2d232..c5165204c66f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -42,25 +42,25 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define RET ret; int3
#else
#define RET ret
#endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t"
#else
#define ASM_RET "ret\n\t"
#endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 64d9f0e87419..cab7c937c71b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
* instruction irrespective of kCFI.
*/
.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
__CS_PREFIX \reg
jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
.endm
.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
__CS_PREFIX \reg
call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
#define GEN(reg) \
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
/*
* Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
- * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
+ * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
ALTERNATIVE_2( \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 517ee01503be..8932f524c935 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
/*
* CALL/JMP *%\reg
@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
-#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b906ed4f3091..fc46fd6447f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
- !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 7ed7e8297ba3..0f26758c7a93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
} __attribute__((packed));
};
-#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
static unsigned long
create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index 517821b48391..36d6809c6c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
* However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
* tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
*/
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 9cdb1a7332c4..68654303c98e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ SECTIONS
__parainstructions_end = .;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/*
* List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
* __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 2dea9ec589ce..d4fba1cc3e91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index decc1f153669..bf73a121c5ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
if (!prefetch)
vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
else
r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index c2dae8ff9dc4..37295f8badee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3453,7 +3453,7 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
return msr_interception(vcpu);
else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index ef2ebabb059c..b9e08837ab96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
7: vmload %_ASM_AX
8:
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
#endif
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
pop %_ASM_DI
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 86ce9efe6c66..c782a4a46198 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
goto unexpected_vmexit;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index ea3a28e7b613..72cc9c90e9f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC) += copy_mc.o copy_mc_64.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
lib-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION) += error-inject.o
-lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
obj-y += iomem.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 8c10d9abc239..ef732f323926 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
} else {
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 429a89c5468b..efca6bd818a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
u8 *prog = *pprog;
int cnt = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
#else
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 08aa0f25f12a..bc31863c5ee6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE += -fstack-protector-strong
endif
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
endif
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 2ceba3fe4ec1..d24f29091f4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
(typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off)); \
})
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
#define __noretpoline __attribute__((__indirect_branch__("keep")))
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
index c1c76a70a6ce..fe050dab55a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
#define _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/*
* INDIRECT_CALL_$NR - wrapper for indirect calls with $NR known builtin
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index a98e188cf37b..d45e17fa7f98 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
#else
static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
index 780a5f6ad4a6..ff27cb2e1662 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_bitmap_type;
extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_type;
extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_avx2_type;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool nft_rhash_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext);
bool nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
diff --git a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
index a6d481b5bcbc..a13ba0326d5e 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <linux/static_key.h>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 515cafdb18d9..b1098ec2e7d7 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static inline u64 rb_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
u64 ts;
/* Skip retpolines :-( */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
ts = trace_clock_local();
else
ts = buffer->clock();
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
index d4958e7e7631..614815a3ed73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ endif
endif
ifdef CONFIG_NFT_CT
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
nf_tables-objs += nft_ct_fast.o
endif
endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
index 4d0ce12221f6..54f7c96b7dd9 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#include <net/netfilter/nf_log.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nft_meta.h>
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
static struct static_key_false nf_tables_skip_direct_calls;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
struct nft_regs *regs,
struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
unsigned long e;
if (nf_skip_indirect_calls())
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
X(e, nft_objref_map_eval);
#undef X
indirect_call:
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
expr->ops->eval(expr, regs, pkt);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
index 86bb9d7797d9..d3e66bcb2a91 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track,
return false;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_ct_get_fast_ops = {
.type = &nft_ct_type,
.size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_ct)),
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ nft_ct_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (tb[NFTA_CT_DREG]) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
u32 k = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_CT_KEY]));
switch (k) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
index 870e5b113d13..a0055f510e31 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct nft_lookup {
struct nft_set_binding binding;
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool nft_set_do_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext)
{
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index e9eaf637220e..d577c9e1cb42 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations psched_net_ops = {
.exit = psched_net_exit,
};
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tc_skip_wrapper);
#endif
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index cc44c95c49cc..d6e157938b5f 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT) += --mnop
endif
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += --orc
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS) += --sls
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) += --stackval
diff --git a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
index 3c6cbe2b278d..eaf524603796 100644
--- a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
+++ b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ fn main() {
"e-m:e-p270:32:32-p271:32:32-p272:64:64-i64:64-f80:128-n8:16:32:64-S128",
);
let mut features = "-3dnow,-3dnowa,-mmx,+soft-float".to_string();
- if cfg.has("RETPOLINE") {
+ if cfg.has("MITIGATION_RETPOLINE") {
features += ",+retpoline-external-thunk";
}
ts.push("features", features);
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 2f3b0fe6f68d..55dde62c07c2 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static void add_header(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod)
buf_printf(b,
"\n"
- "#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE\n"
+ "#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n"
"MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"
"#endif\n");
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index aeb3fbbbce46..d05158d8fe5f 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
2023-10-19 18:11 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-23 2:59 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Yafang Shao
2 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend,
KP Singh, Stanislav Fomichev, Hao Luo, Jiri Olsa, David S. Miller,
David Ahern, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers,
Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Vincent Whitchurch,
Jinghao Jia, Kees Cook,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT),
open list:FUNCTION HOOKS (FTRACE),
open list:BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools),
open list:NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6]
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from SLS to MITIGATION_SLS.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 ++--
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f3593461ce35..9dd2fb555973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ config CPU_SRSO
help
Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
-config SLS
+config MITIGATION_SLS
bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 3053b60f017b..1ac5d6002f5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
endif
endif
-ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index c5165204c66f..09e2d026df33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
#define RET ret; int3
#else
#define RET ret
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
#define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t"
#else
#define ASM_RET "ret\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 8932f524c935..ea9652eb455b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -624,8 +624,8 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
/*
* The compiler is supposed to EMIT an INT3 after every unconditional
* JMP instruction due to AMD BTC. However, if the compiler is too old
- * or SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after indirect JMPs
- * even on Intel.
+ * or MITIGATION_SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after
+ * indirect JMPs even on Intel.
*/
if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE && i < insn->length)
bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 0f26758c7a93..b000158b781a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
} __attribute__((packed));
};
-#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
static unsigned long
create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ef732f323926..96a63c4386a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
} else {
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, x86_return_thunk, ip);
} else {
EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index d6e157938b5f..0d5461276179 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ endif
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += --orc
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS) += --sls
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS) += --sls
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) += --stackval
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += --static-call
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION) += --uaccess
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation
2023-10-19 18:11 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-23 2:59 ` Yafang Shao
2023-10-24 9:50 ` Breno Leitao
2 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Yafang Shao @ 2023-10-23 2:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Breno Leitao
Cc: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, x86, leit,
open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)
On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 2:12 AM Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:
>
> Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> could not be controlled at build time.
>
> The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
>
> 1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
> their workloads.
>
> 2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
> the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
>
> 3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
> so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
> reason.
>
> Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
> could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
Hi Breno,
Do you have any plans to introduce utility functions for runtime
checks on whether specific mitigations are disabled? Such helpers
would be quite valuable; for instance, we could utilize them to
determine if Spectre v1 or Spectre v4 mitigations are disabled in
BPF[1].
[1]. https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231005084123.1338-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
>
> Discussion about this approach:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjTHeQjsqtHcBGvy9TaJQ5uAm5HrCDuOD9v7qA9U1Xr4w@mail.gmail.com/
> and
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
>
> In order to get the missing mitigations, some clean up was done.
>
> 1) Get a namespace for mitigations, prepending MITIGATION to the Kconfig
> entries.
>
> 2) Adding the missing mitigations, so, the mitigations have entries in the
> Kconfig that could be easily configure by the user.
>
> With this patchset applied, all configs have an individual entry under
> CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, and all of them starts with CONFIG_MITIGATION.
>
> Changelog
> ---------
> V1:
> * Creates a way to mitigate all (or none) hardware bugs
> V2:
> * Create KCONFIGs entries only some hardware bugs (MDS, TAA, MMIO)
> V3:
> * Expand the mitigations KCONFIGs to all hardware bugs that are
> Linux mitigates.
> V4:
> * Patch rebase.
> * Better documentation about the reasons of this decision.
> V5:
> * Create a "MITIGATION" Kconfig namespace for the entries mitigating
> hardware bugs.
> * Add GDS to the set of mitigations that are being covered.
> * Reduce the ifdefs in the code by leveraging conditionals with omitted
> operands.
>
> Breno Leitao (12):
> x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
> x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
> x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
> x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
> x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
> x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
> x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
> x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
> x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO
> x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK
> x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation
> x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
>
> Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 +-
> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +-
> Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst | 6 +-
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 141 +++++++++++++++---
> arch/x86/Makefile | 8 +-
> arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig | 2 +-
> arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 8 +-
> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/current.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 10 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 16 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 30 ++--
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 18 +--
> arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 3 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 14 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 87 ++++++-----
> arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 3 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 8 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 8 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 4 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
> arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 26 ++--
> arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 +-
> arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 10 +-
> arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +-
> arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
> include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/module.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/objtool.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/pti.h | 2 +-
> include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h | 2 +-
> include/net/tc_wrapper.h | 2 +-
> kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c | 6 +-
> net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 +-
> net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 2 +-
> net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
> scripts/Makefile.lib | 8 +-
> scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +-
> scripts/generate_rust_target.rs | 2 +-
> scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +-
> .../arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 10 +-
> 66 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
--
Regards
Yafang
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation
2023-10-23 2:59 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Yafang Shao
@ 2023-10-24 9:50 ` Breno Leitao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-24 9:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yafang Shao
Cc: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, x86, leit,
open list:BPF [MISC]:Keyword:(?:b|_)bpf(?:b|_)
Hello Yafang,
On Mon, Oct 23, 2023 at 10:59:13AM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 2:12 AM Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org> wrote:
> >
> > Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> > where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> > modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> > could not be controlled at build time.
> >
> > The fact of having a fine grained control can help in a few ways:
> >
> > 1) Users can choose and pick only mitigations that are important for
> > their workloads.
> >
> > 2) Users and developers can choose to disable mitigations that mangle
> > the assembly code generation, making it hard to read.
> >
> > 3) Separate configs for just source code readability,
> > so that we see *which* butt-ugly piece of crap code is for what
> > reason.
> >
> > Important to say, if a mitigation is disabled at compilation time, it
> > could be enabled at runtime using kernel command line arguments.
>
> Hi Breno,
>
> Do you have any plans to introduce utility functions for runtime
> checks on whether specific mitigations are disabled? Such helpers
> would be quite valuable; for instance, we could utilize them to
> determine if Spectre v1 or Spectre v4 mitigations are disabled in
> BPF[1].
I am not planning to. The check if a mitigation is enabled or not is a
different topic, that also might require some further refactor.
This patch set focuses in the initialization of the mitigation code
at build time. Initializating the mitigation code might not result in
the mitigation being enabled in runtime.
For instance, you can build the kernel to mitigate the GDS, but the
runtime detects that you are running in a guest VM, and depend on the
host to do the mitigation, so, the mitigation might be enabled or not,
even if it is initialized with CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION=y.
Detecting if the mitigation is enabled or not is an orthogonal problem
than the one I am trying to solve with this patch set.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-10-24 9:50 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-10-19 18:11 [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
2023-10-23 2:59 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for each mitigation Yafang Shao
2023-10-24 9:50 ` Breno Leitao
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