From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
kpsingh@kernel.org, mic@digikod.net, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
brauner@kernel.org, kees@kernel.org, gnoack@google.com,
jack@suse.cz, song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev,
martin.lau@linux.dev, m@maowtm.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 17:49:57 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <anOvpFMIuwNqDHfA@zenbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <anOnaGmBTlBW9xwj@zenbox>
On Wed, Aug 05, 2026 at 05:37:07PM -0400, Justin Suess wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 04:30:39PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Thu, Jul 30, 2026 at 10:21 PM Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com> wrote:
> > [...]
> > As you may, or may not have seen, there is currently an ongoing debate
> > regarding the location of LSM kfuncs that will impact this patchset.
> > Sadly, we don't appear to be approaching an agreement on this issue
> > which introduces some additional risk to this patchset. We'll have to
> > see how that ends up, but I just wanted you to be aware of the
> > situation.
>
> Quick aside question: Would security/bpf/ be a better place for these
> type of kfuncs?
>
*lsm-specific kfuncs, sorry should have been more clear.
Justin
> security/bpf/bpf_lsm_kfuncs.c could be for LSM framework kfuncs,
> and each LSM could maintain their own security/bpf/<lsm>_kfuncs.c
> for kfuncs dealing with lsm-specific types.
>
> One issue with just security/ is it's not CONFIG_SECURITY_BPF. But
> security/bpf is. Right now security/bpf only has hooks.c so it's free
> real estate.
>
> That way things are more greppable... (important!) and we can have
> proper MAINTAINERS entries per file so emails get routed properly.
>
> (linux-security-module, bpf, and whatever lsm list)
>
> Justin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 21:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-31 2:20 [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 01/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_from_fd Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 02/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_policy_kptr_put Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:44 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 03/13] lsm: Add LSM hook security_bprm_enforce_policy_kptr Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 04/13] landlock: Expose the ruleset fd lookup to the rest of Landlock Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 05/13] landlock: Factor the credential restriction out of landlock_restrict_self() Justin Suess
2026-07-31 22:24 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 06/13] landlock: Implement the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 07/13] bpf: Add the LSM policy kfunc infrastructure Justin Suess
2026-07-31 22:24 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 08/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_put_ruleset kfunc and ruleset destructor Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 09/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_get_ruleset_from_fd kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 10/13] bpf: Add the bpf_landlock_restrict_binprm kfunc Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-31 19:40 ` Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 11/13] selftests/bpf: Add tests for the Landlock policy kfuncs Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 12/13] landlock: Document the BPF kfunc interface Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-31 19:25 ` Justin Suess
2026-07-31 2:20 ` [PATCH bpf-next 13/13] lsm: Document the LSM policy kptr hooks Justin Suess
2026-07-31 20:30 ` [PATCH bpf-next 00/13] BPF interface for applying Landlock rulesets Paul Moore
2026-07-31 21:15 ` Justin Suess
2026-07-31 21:28 ` Paul Moore
2026-08-05 21:37 ` Justin Suess
2026-08-05 21:49 ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-08-05 22:51 ` Paul Moore
2026-08-06 0:32 ` Justin Suess
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