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From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	 Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com, brauner@kernel.org,
	 john.fastabend@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	matt@bobrowski.net,  bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: Let BPF LSM provide xattrs at inode creation
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 12:14:42 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <arVKSpezisxe3pkr@suesslenovo> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAEXv5_g1XQAwsydnbu9SUvxNBdYQf+xXjPaZMeC8hxgfThP+pw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 03:14:28PM -0400, David Windsor wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 23, 2026 at 12:57 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > @David, simply for my own understanding, did you ask Daniel to do
> > this, or was Daniel operating on his own with this patchset?
> >
> 
> Daniel and I work together and both have things written on top of this
> kfunc. He reached out to collaborate, I agreed. We're also going to
> send bpf_set_file_xattr shortly.
> 
> This implementation was chosen due to its immediate mergeability (it
> only touches security/bpf), but was actually suggested by Kumar in v1
> or so of my original series.
> 
> That said, sorry for any confusion about this appearing as a new
> series rather than as v7 of my previous one.
>
Howdy all,

Hope you all are doing well and having a good Thursday.

These patches are excellent and useful, and have been in the pipeline
for a while. 

In the interest of moving forward:

Would you both be able to live with the following: provide a security hook
for lsm_get_xattr_slot or another proper interface with the necessary
abstraction, and keep the kfunc where it is in fs/?

This addresses the primary concern about calling into LSM internals by
providing a blessed interface. I'd be happy to detail what I had in mind.

I think the end users care extremely little about what directory the
source code ends up in. They care about: getting useful features.

We all work in the same kernel and it's easier to walk when both legs
are going in the same direction. I think that this hill would be an
unfitting, uninteresting place for these useful patches to die on :) 

Let me know if this is something you both could stomach.

Sincerely,
Justin

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-24 16:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-15 15:07 [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] BPF LSM xattrs at inode creation support Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 1/8] ocfs2: Copy the xattr name in ocfs2_initxattrs Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-15 16:26   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-16  2:47   ` Heming Zhao
2026-09-16  7:07     ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-16  7:28       ` Heming Zhao
2026-09-16  7:28   ` Joseph Qi
2026-09-16  7:37     ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-16  7:49       ` Joseph Qi
2026-09-16  7:29   ` Heming Zhao
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 2/8] bpf, lsm: Reject writes into the BPF LSM program context Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 3/8] bpf: Support passing context output arguments to kfuncs Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf, lsm: Let BPF LSM provide xattrs at inode creation Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-23 16:57   ` Paul Moore
2026-09-23 19:11     ` Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-23 20:51       ` Paul Moore
2026-09-23 19:14     ` David Windsor
2026-09-23 20:56       ` Paul Moore
2026-09-23 21:07       ` Paul Moore
2026-09-24 16:14       ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-09-24 16:23         ` Paul Moore
2026-09-24 18:37           ` Justin Suess
2026-09-24 19:33             ` Paul Moore
2026-09-24 19:34               ` Paul Moore
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 5/8] bpf, lsm: Mark the BPF LSM hook overrides noinline Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 6/8] selftests/bpf: Test that the BPF LSM context is read-only Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 7/8] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for the __ctx_out plumbing Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-15 16:26   ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-09-15 15:07 ` [PATCH bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF LSM inode init labelling Daniel Borkmann
2026-09-19 19:10 ` [PATCH bpf-next 0/8] BPF LSM xattrs at inode creation support patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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