* [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/atftp: add security fix for CVE-2020-6097
@ 2021-02-05 9:01 Peter Korsgaard
2021-02-05 12:49 ` Yann E. MORIN
2021-02-10 18:55 ` Peter Korsgaard
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Peter Korsgaard @ 2021-02-05 9:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Fixed the following security issue:
- CVE-2020-6097: An exploitable denial of service vulnerability exists in
the atftpd daemon functionality of atftp 0.7.git20120829-3.1+b1. A
specially crafted sequence of RRQ-Multicast requests trigger an assert()
call resulting in denial-of-service. An attacker can send a sequence of
malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability.
For more details, see the report:
https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1029
Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
---
...0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
package/atftp/atftp.mk | 3 +
2 files changed, 107 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
diff --git a/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch b/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe59325e57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 96409ef3b9ca061f9527cfaafa778105cf15d994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Kaestle <peter.kaestle@nokia.com>
+Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 14:02:41 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix for DoS issue CVE-2020-6097
+
+"sockaddr_print_addr" of tftpd can be triggered remotely to call
+assert(), which will crash the tftpd daemon. See:
+https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1029
+
+"sockaddr_print_addr" originaly had two features:
+1) returning pointer to string of the incoming ip address
+2) checking whether ss_family of the connection is supported
+
+To fix the issue, a separate function "sockaddr_family_supported" is
+used to take care of 2) and "sockaddr_print_addr" returns an error
+message string for unsupported cases when using 1) insert of calling
+assert().
+
+[Upstream:
+ https://sourceforge.net/u/peterkaestle/atftp/ci/96409ef3b9ca061f9527cfaafa778105cf15d994/]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
+---
+ tftp_def.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ tftp_def.h | 1 +
+ tftpd.c | 5 +++++
+ tftpd_mtftp.c | 5 +++++
+ 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tftp_def.c b/tftp_def.c
+index d457c2a..428a930 100644
+--- a/tftp_def.c
++++ b/tftp_def.c
+@@ -180,6 +180,15 @@ int Gethostbyname(char *addr, struct hostent *host)
+ return OK;
+ }
+
++int
++sockaddr_family_supported(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss)
++{
++ if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET || ss->ss_family == AF_INET6)
++ return 1;
++ else
++ return 0;
++}
++
+ char *
+ sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, char *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -189,7 +198,7 @@ sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, char *buf, size_t len)
+ else if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ addr = &((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)ss)->sin6_addr;
+ else
+- assert(!"sockaddr_print: unsupported address family");
++ return "sockaddr_print: unsupported address family";
+ return (char *)inet_ntop(ss->ss_family, addr, buf, len);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/tftp_def.h b/tftp_def.h
+index 0841746..458e310 100644
+--- a/tftp_def.h
++++ b/tftp_def.h
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int print_eng(double value, char *string, int size, char *format);
+ inline char *Strncpy(char *to, const char *from, size_t size);
+ int Gethostbyname(char *addr, struct hostent *host);
+
++int sockaddr_family_supported(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss);
+ char *sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *, char *, size_t);
+ #define SOCKADDR_PRINT_ADDR_LEN INET6_ADDRSTRLEN
+ uint16_t sockaddr_get_port(const struct sockaddr_storage *);
+diff --git a/tftpd.c b/tftpd.c
+index 0b6f6a5..a7561a5 100644
+--- a/tftpd.c
++++ b/tftpd.c
+@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ void *tftpd_receive_request(void *arg)
+ }
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_WRAP
++ if (!abort && !sockaddr_family_supported(&data->client_info->client))
++ {
++ logger(LOG_ERR, "Connection from unsupported network address family refused");
++ abort = 1;
++ }
+ if (!abort)
+ {
+ /* Verify the client has access. We don't look for the name but
+diff --git a/tftpd_mtftp.c b/tftpd_mtftp.c
+index d420d10..0032905 100644
+--- a/tftpd_mtftp.c
++++ b/tftpd_mtftp.c
+@@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ void *tftpd_mtftp_server(void *arg)
+ &data_size, data->data_buffer);
+
+ #ifdef HAVE_WRAP
++ if (!sockaddr_family_supported(&sa))
++ {
++ logger(LOG_ERR, "mtftp: Connection from unsupported network address family refused");
++ continue;
++ }
+ /* Verify the client has access. We don't look for the name but
+ rely only on the IP address for that. */
+ sockaddr_print_addr(&sa, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str));
+--
+2.20.1
+
diff --git a/package/atftp/atftp.mk b/package/atftp/atftp.mk
index cbe05ba7e0..a4b461fda5 100644
--- a/package/atftp/atftp.mk
+++ b/package/atftp/atftp.mk
@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ ATFTP_LIBS = -lpthread
ATFTP_CONF_ENV = LIBS="$(ATFTP_LIBS)" \
CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -fgnu89-inline"
+# 0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
+ATFTP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6097
+
ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_READLINE),y)
ATFTP_DEPENDENCIES += readline
ATFTP_CONF_OPTS += --enable-libreadline
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/atftp: add security fix for CVE-2020-6097
2021-02-05 9:01 [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/atftp: add security fix for CVE-2020-6097 Peter Korsgaard
@ 2021-02-05 12:49 ` Yann E. MORIN
2021-02-10 18:55 ` Peter Korsgaard
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2021-02-05 12:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Peter, All,
On 2021-02-05 10:01 +0100, Peter Korsgaard spake thusly:
> Fixed the following security issue:
>
> - CVE-2020-6097: An exploitable denial of service vulnerability exists in
> the atftpd daemon functionality of atftp 0.7.git20120829-3.1+b1. A
> specially crafted sequence of RRQ-Multicast requests trigger an assert()
> call resulting in denial-of-service. An attacker can send a sequence of
> malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability.
>
> For more details, see the report:
> https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1029
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
> ---
> ...0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
> package/atftp/atftp.mk | 3 +
> 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
>
> diff --git a/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch b/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..fe59325e57
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/package/atftp/0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
> +From 96409ef3b9ca061f9527cfaafa778105cf15d994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Peter Kaestle <peter.kaestle@nokia.com>
> +Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 14:02:41 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH] Fix for DoS issue CVE-2020-6097
> +
> +"sockaddr_print_addr" of tftpd can be triggered remotely to call
> +assert(), which will crash the tftpd daemon. See:
> +https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1029
> +
> +"sockaddr_print_addr" originaly had two features:
> +1) returning pointer to string of the incoming ip address
> +2) checking whether ss_family of the connection is supported
> +
> +To fix the issue, a separate function "sockaddr_family_supported" is
> +used to take care of 2) and "sockaddr_print_addr" returns an error
> +message string for unsupported cases when using 1) insert of calling
> +assert().
> +
> +[Upstream:
> + https://sourceforge.net/u/peterkaestle/atftp/ci/96409ef3b9ca061f9527cfaafa778105cf15d994/]
> +Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
> +---
> + tftp_def.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> + tftp_def.h | 1 +
> + tftpd.c | 5 +++++
> + tftpd_mtftp.c | 5 +++++
> + 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/tftp_def.c b/tftp_def.c
> +index d457c2a..428a930 100644
> +--- a/tftp_def.c
> ++++ b/tftp_def.c
> +@@ -180,6 +180,15 @@ int Gethostbyname(char *addr, struct hostent *host)
> + return OK;
> + }
> +
> ++int
> ++sockaddr_family_supported(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss)
> ++{
> ++ if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET || ss->ss_family == AF_INET6)
> ++ return 1;
> ++ else
> ++ return 0;
> ++}
> ++
> + char *
> + sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, char *buf, size_t len)
> + {
> +@@ -189,7 +198,7 @@ sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss, char *buf, size_t len)
> + else if (ss->ss_family == AF_INET6)
> + addr = &((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)ss)->sin6_addr;
> + else
> +- assert(!"sockaddr_print: unsupported address family");
> ++ return "sockaddr_print: unsupported address family";
> + return (char *)inet_ntop(ss->ss_family, addr, buf, len);
> + }
> +
> +diff --git a/tftp_def.h b/tftp_def.h
> +index 0841746..458e310 100644
> +--- a/tftp_def.h
> ++++ b/tftp_def.h
> +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ int print_eng(double value, char *string, int size, char *format);
> + inline char *Strncpy(char *to, const char *from, size_t size);
> + int Gethostbyname(char *addr, struct hostent *host);
> +
> ++int sockaddr_family_supported(const struct sockaddr_storage *ss);
> + char *sockaddr_print_addr(const struct sockaddr_storage *, char *, size_t);
> + #define SOCKADDR_PRINT_ADDR_LEN INET6_ADDRSTRLEN
> + uint16_t sockaddr_get_port(const struct sockaddr_storage *);
> +diff --git a/tftpd.c b/tftpd.c
> +index 0b6f6a5..a7561a5 100644
> +--- a/tftpd.c
> ++++ b/tftpd.c
> +@@ -644,6 +644,11 @@ void *tftpd_receive_request(void *arg)
> + }
> +
> + #ifdef HAVE_WRAP
> ++ if (!abort && !sockaddr_family_supported(&data->client_info->client))
> ++ {
> ++ logger(LOG_ERR, "Connection from unsupported network address family refused");
> ++ abort = 1;
> ++ }
> + if (!abort)
> + {
> + /* Verify the client has access. We don't look for the name but
> +diff --git a/tftpd_mtftp.c b/tftpd_mtftp.c
> +index d420d10..0032905 100644
> +--- a/tftpd_mtftp.c
> ++++ b/tftpd_mtftp.c
> +@@ -393,6 +393,11 @@ void *tftpd_mtftp_server(void *arg)
> + &data_size, data->data_buffer);
> +
> + #ifdef HAVE_WRAP
> ++ if (!sockaddr_family_supported(&sa))
> ++ {
> ++ logger(LOG_ERR, "mtftp: Connection from unsupported network address family refused");
> ++ continue;
> ++ }
> + /* Verify the client has access. We don't look for the name but
> + rely only on the IP address for that. */
> + sockaddr_print_addr(&sa, addr_str, sizeof(addr_str));
> +--
> +2.20.1
> +
> diff --git a/package/atftp/atftp.mk b/package/atftp/atftp.mk
> index cbe05ba7e0..a4b461fda5 100644
> --- a/package/atftp/atftp.mk
> +++ b/package/atftp/atftp.mk
> @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ ATFTP_LIBS = -lpthread
> ATFTP_CONF_ENV = LIBS="$(ATFTP_LIBS)" \
> CFLAGS="$(TARGET_CFLAGS) -fgnu89-inline"
>
> +# 0004-Fix-for-DoS-issue-CVE-2020-6097.patch
> +ATFTP_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2020-6097
> +
> ifeq ($(BR2_PACKAGE_READLINE),y)
> ATFTP_DEPENDENCIES += readline
> ATFTP_CONF_OPTS += --enable-libreadline
> --
> 2.20.1
>
> _______________________________________________
> buildroot mailing list
> buildroot at busybox.net
> http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
--
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
| Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------: X AGAINST | \e/ There is no |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL | v conspiracy. |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/atftp: add security fix for CVE-2020-6097
2021-02-05 9:01 [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/atftp: add security fix for CVE-2020-6097 Peter Korsgaard
2021-02-05 12:49 ` Yann E. MORIN
@ 2021-02-10 18:55 ` Peter Korsgaard
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Peter Korsgaard @ 2021-02-10 18:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
>>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com> writes:
> Fixed the following security issue:
> - CVE-2020-6097: An exploitable denial of service vulnerability exists in
> the atftpd daemon functionality of atftp 0.7.git20120829-3.1+b1. A
> specially crafted sequence of RRQ-Multicast requests trigger an assert()
> call resulting in denial-of-service. An attacker can send a sequence of
> malicious packets to trigger this vulnerability.
> For more details, see the report:
> https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2020-1029
> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
Committed to 2020.02.x and 2020.11.x, thanks.
--
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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