[Buildroot] [PATCH] package/busybox: fix CVE-2022-28391

[Buildroot] [PATCH] package/busybox: fix CVE-2022-28391

[Quentin Schulz]

From: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>

The patches have been used by Alpine for 5 months now and they were
posted on the Busybox mailing list mid-July with no review or comment.

According to Ariadne Conill[1] - though NVD CVSS 3.x Base Score seems to
disagree - this has a low security impact so we could probably just wait
for upstream to merge the patches or implement it the way they want.

Considering those patches have been public for 5 months and upstream
hasn't acted until now, let's take the patches from the mailing list
anyway as there's no indication the CVEs will be fixed upstream soon.

[1] https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports/-/issues/13661

Cc: Quentin Schulz <foss+buildroot@0leil.net>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
---

Cc'ing Peter for backport to stable releases
Only build tested
git context depends on
https://lore.kernel.org/buildroot/20220919114757.1076737-1-foss+buildroot@0leil.net/

 ...tr-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch | 42 +++++++++++
 ...e-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch | 69 +++++++++++++++++++
 package/busybox/busybox.mk                    |  3 +
 3 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
 create mode 100644 package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch

diff --git a/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch b/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..623b2597a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 9d825e854ef53ebbe0aea2f1a69f52b763104daf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 14:15:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] libbb: sockaddr2str: ensure only printable characters are
+ returned for the hostname part
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-28391
+Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
+Tested-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
+Backport from ML: http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2022-July/089796.html
+Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
+---
+ libbb/xconnect.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libbb/xconnect.c b/libbb/xconnect.c
+index 0e0b247b8..02c061e67 100644
+--- a/libbb/xconnect.c
++++ b/libbb/xconnect.c
+@@ -497,8 +497,9 @@ static char* FAST_FUNC sockaddr2str(const struct sockaddr *sa, int flags)
+ 	);
+ 	if (rc)
+ 		return NULL;
++	/* ensure host contains only printable characters */
+ 	if (flags & IGNORE_PORT)
+-		return xstrdup(host);
++		return xstrdup(printable_string(host));
+ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_IPV6
+ 	if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+ 		if (strchr(host, ':')) /* heh, it's not a resolved hostname */
+@@ -509,7 +510,7 @@ static char* FAST_FUNC sockaddr2str(const struct sockaddr *sa, int flags)
+ #endif
+ 	/* For now we don't support anything else, so it has to be INET */
+ 	/*if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET)*/
+-		return xasprintf("%s:%s", host, serv);
++		return xasprintf("%s:%s", printable_string(host), serv);
+ 	/*return xstrdup(host);*/
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.37.3
+
diff --git a/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch b/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bfa58465e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From bd463a5564a2c0618317448c3f965d389534c3df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
+Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 14:15:12 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] nslookup: sanitize all printed strings with printable_string
+
+Otherwise, terminal sequences can be injected, which enables various terminal injection
+attacks from DNS results.
+
+CVE: CVE-2022-28391
+Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
+Tested-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
+Backport from ML: http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2022-July/089795.html
+Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
+---
+ networking/nslookup.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/networking/nslookup.c b/networking/nslookup.c
+index 6da97baf4..4bdcde1b8 100644
+--- a/networking/nslookup.c
++++ b/networking/nslookup.c
+@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
+ 				//printf("Unable to uncompress domain: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+-			printf(format, ns_rr_name(rr), dname);
++			printf(format, ns_rr_name(rr), printable_string(dname));
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case ns_t_mx:
+@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
+ 				//printf("Cannot uncompress MX domain: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+-			printf("%s\tmail exchanger = %d %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr), n, dname);
++			printf("%s\tmail exchanger = %d %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr), n, printable_string(dname));
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case ns_t_txt:
+@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
+ 			if (n > 0) {
+ 				memset(dname, 0, sizeof(dname));
+ 				memcpy(dname, ns_rr_rdata(rr) + 1, n);
+-				printf("%s\ttext = \"%s\"\n", ns_rr_name(rr), dname);
++				printf("%s\ttext = \"%s\"\n", ns_rr_name(rr), printable_string(dname));
+ 			}
+ 			break;
+ 
+@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
+ 			}
+ 
+ 			printf("%s\tservice = %u %u %u %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr),
+-				ns_get16(cp), ns_get16(cp + 2), ns_get16(cp + 4), dname);
++				ns_get16(cp), ns_get16(cp + 2), ns_get16(cp + 4), printable_string(dname));
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case ns_t_soa:
+@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
+ 				return -1;
+ 			}
+ 
+-			printf("\tmail addr = %s\n", dname);
++			printf("\tmail addr = %s\n", printable_string(dname));
+ 			cp += n;
+ 
+ 			printf("\tserial = %lu\n", ns_get32(cp));
+-- 
+2.37.3
+
diff --git a/package/busybox/busybox.mk b/package/busybox/busybox.mk
index 0f887c9734..ef628e90e9 100644
--- a/package/busybox/busybox.mk
+++ b/package/busybox/busybox.mk
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ BUSYBOX_CPE_ID_VENDOR = busybox
 
 # 0003-awk-fix-use-after-free-CVE-2022-30065.patch
 BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-30065
+# 0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
+# 0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
+BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-28391
 
 BUSYBOX_CFLAGS = \
 	$(TARGET_CFLAGS)
-- 
2.37.3

_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
buildroot@buildroot.org
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot

Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/busybox: fix CVE-2022-28391

[Yann E. MORIN]

Quentin, All,

On 2022-09-19 14:31 +0200, Quentin Schulz spake thusly:
> From: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
> 
> The patches have been used by Alpine for 5 months now and they were
> posted on the Busybox mailing list mid-July with no review or comment.
> 
> According to Ariadne Conill[1] - though NVD CVSS 3.x Base Score seems to
> disagree - this has a low security impact so we could probably just wait
> for upstream to merge the patches or implement it the way they want.
> 
> Considering those patches have been public for 5 months and upstream
> hasn't acted until now, let's take the patches from the mailing list
> anyway as there's no indication the CVEs will be fixed upstream soon.
> 
> [1] https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports/-/issues/13661
> 
> Cc: Quentin Schulz <foss+buildroot@0leil.net>
> Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>

Applied to master, thanks.

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

> ---
> 
> Cc'ing Peter for backport to stable releases
> Only build tested
> git context depends on
> https://lore.kernel.org/buildroot/20220919114757.1076737-1-foss+buildroot@0leil.net/
> 
>  ...tr-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch | 42 +++++++++++
>  ...e-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch | 69 +++++++++++++++++++
>  package/busybox/busybox.mk                    |  3 +
>  3 files changed, 114 insertions(+)
>  create mode 100644 package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
>  create mode 100644 package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
> 
> diff --git a/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch b/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..623b2597a2
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/package/busybox/0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
> +From 9d825e854ef53ebbe0aea2f1a69f52b763104daf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
> +Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 14:15:12 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH] libbb: sockaddr2str: ensure only printable characters are
> + returned for the hostname part
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2022-28391
> +Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
> +Tested-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
> +Backport from ML: http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2022-July/089796.html
> +Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
> +---
> + libbb/xconnect.c | 5 +++--
> + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/libbb/xconnect.c b/libbb/xconnect.c
> +index 0e0b247b8..02c061e67 100644
> +--- a/libbb/xconnect.c
> ++++ b/libbb/xconnect.c
> +@@ -497,8 +497,9 @@ static char* FAST_FUNC sockaddr2str(const struct sockaddr *sa, int flags)
> + 	);
> + 	if (rc)
> + 		return NULL;
> ++	/* ensure host contains only printable characters */
> + 	if (flags & IGNORE_PORT)
> +-		return xstrdup(host);
> ++		return xstrdup(printable_string(host));
> + #if ENABLE_FEATURE_IPV6
> + 	if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
> + 		if (strchr(host, ':')) /* heh, it's not a resolved hostname */
> +@@ -509,7 +510,7 @@ static char* FAST_FUNC sockaddr2str(const struct sockaddr *sa, int flags)
> + #endif
> + 	/* For now we don't support anything else, so it has to be INET */
> + 	/*if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET)*/
> +-		return xasprintf("%s:%s", host, serv);
> ++		return xasprintf("%s:%s", printable_string(host), serv);
> + 	/*return xstrdup(host);*/
> + }
> + 
> +-- 
> +2.37.3
> +
> diff --git a/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch b/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..bfa58465e7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/package/busybox/0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
> +From bd463a5564a2c0618317448c3f965d389534c3df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
> +Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 14:15:12 +0200
> +Subject: [PATCH] nslookup: sanitize all printed strings with printable_string
> +
> +Otherwise, terminal sequences can be injected, which enables various terminal injection
> +attacks from DNS results.
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2022-28391
> +Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@dereferenced.org>
> +Tested-by: Radoslav Kolev <radoslav.kolev@suse.com>
> +Backport from ML: http://lists.busybox.net/pipermail/busybox/2022-July/089795.html
> +Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
> +---
> + networking/nslookup.c | 10 +++++-----
> + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/networking/nslookup.c b/networking/nslookup.c
> +index 6da97baf4..4bdcde1b8 100644
> +--- a/networking/nslookup.c
> ++++ b/networking/nslookup.c
> +@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
> + 				//printf("Unable to uncompress domain: %s\n", strerror(errno));
> + 				return -1;
> + 			}
> +-			printf(format, ns_rr_name(rr), dname);
> ++			printf(format, ns_rr_name(rr), printable_string(dname));
> + 			break;
> + 
> + 		case ns_t_mx:
> +@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
> + 				//printf("Cannot uncompress MX domain: %s\n", strerror(errno));
> + 				return -1;
> + 			}
> +-			printf("%s\tmail exchanger = %d %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr), n, dname);
> ++			printf("%s\tmail exchanger = %d %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr), n, printable_string(dname));
> + 			break;
> + 
> + 		case ns_t_txt:
> +@@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
> + 			if (n > 0) {
> + 				memset(dname, 0, sizeof(dname));
> + 				memcpy(dname, ns_rr_rdata(rr) + 1, n);
> +-				printf("%s\ttext = \"%s\"\n", ns_rr_name(rr), dname);
> ++				printf("%s\ttext = \"%s\"\n", ns_rr_name(rr), printable_string(dname));
> + 			}
> + 			break;
> + 
> +@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
> + 			}
> + 
> + 			printf("%s\tservice = %u %u %u %s\n", ns_rr_name(rr),
> +-				ns_get16(cp), ns_get16(cp + 2), ns_get16(cp + 4), dname);
> ++				ns_get16(cp), ns_get16(cp + 2), ns_get16(cp + 4), printable_string(dname));
> + 			break;
> + 
> + 		case ns_t_soa:
> +@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static NOINLINE int parse_reply(const unsigned char *msg, size_t len)
> + 				return -1;
> + 			}
> + 
> +-			printf("\tmail addr = %s\n", dname);
> ++			printf("\tmail addr = %s\n", printable_string(dname));
> + 			cp += n;
> + 
> + 			printf("\tserial = %lu\n", ns_get32(cp));
> +-- 
> +2.37.3
> +
> diff --git a/package/busybox/busybox.mk b/package/busybox/busybox.mk
> index 0f887c9734..ef628e90e9 100644
> --- a/package/busybox/busybox.mk
> +++ b/package/busybox/busybox.mk
> @@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ BUSYBOX_CPE_ID_VENDOR = busybox
>  
>  # 0003-awk-fix-use-after-free-CVE-2022-30065.patch
>  BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-30065
> +# 0004-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch
> +# 0005-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch
> +BUSYBOX_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2022-28391
>  
>  BUSYBOX_CFLAGS = \
>  	$(TARGET_CFLAGS)
> -- 
> 2.37.3
> 
> _______________________________________________
> buildroot mailing list
> buildroot@buildroot.org
> https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot

-- 
.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 561 099 427 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL    |   v   conspiracy.  |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
buildroot@buildroot.org
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot

Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/busybox: fix CVE-2022-28391

[Peter Korsgaard]

>>>>> "Quentin" == Quentin Schulz <foss+buildroot@0leil.net> writes:

 > From: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
 > The patches have been used by Alpine for 5 months now and they were
 > posted on the Busybox mailing list mid-July with no review or comment.

 > According to Ariadne Conill[1] - though NVD CVSS 3.x Base Score seems to
 > disagree - this has a low security impact so we could probably just wait
 > for upstream to merge the patches or implement it the way they want.

 > Considering those patches have been public for 5 months and upstream
 > hasn't acted until now, let's take the patches from the mailing list
 > anyway as there's no indication the CVEs will be fixed upstream soon.

 > [1] https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports/-/issues/13661

 > Cc: Quentin Schulz <foss+buildroot@0leil.net>
 > Signed-off-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@theobroma-systems.com>
 > ---

 > Cc'ing Peter for backport to stable releases
 > Only build tested
 > git context depends on
 > https://lore.kernel.org/buildroot/20220919114757.1076737-1-foss+buildroot@0leil.net/


This is not a great situation, but OK - Given that it has been in alpine
for so long already.

Committed to 2022.02.x, 2022.05.x and 2022.08.x, thanks.

-- 
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
buildroot@buildroot.org
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot