From: Thomas Perale via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>
To: buildroot@buildroot.org
Cc: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/mbedtls: security bump to v3.6.6
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 22:20:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260420202031.210609-1-thomas.perale@mind.be> (raw)
For more information about the release, see:
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.6
- https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/compare/mbedtls-3.6.5..mbedtls-3.6.6
Fixes the following vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2025-66442
In Mbed TLS through 4.0.0, there is a compiler-induced timing side
channel (in RSA and CBC/ECB decryption) that only occurs with LLVM's
select-optimize feature. TF-PSA-Crypto through 1.0.0 is also affected.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-66442
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-compiler-induced-constant-time-violations/
- CVE-2026-25833:
Mbed TLS 3.5.0 to 3.6.5 fixed in 3.6.6 and 4.1.0 has a buffer overflow
in the x509_inet_pton_ipv6() function
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25833
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-inet-pton/
- CVE-2026-25834:
Mbed TLS v3.3.0 up to 3.6.5 and 4.0.0 allows Algorithm Downgrade.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25834
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-sigalg-injection/
- CVE-2026-25835:
Mbed TLS before 3.6.6 and TF-PSA-Crypto before 1.1.0 misuse seeds in a
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25835
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-rng-cloning/
- CVE-2026-34871:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 3.6.6 and 4.x before 4.1.0
and TF-PSA-Crypto before 1.1.0. There is a Predictable Seed in a
Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34871
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-dev-random/
- CVE-2026-34872:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.x and 3.6.x through 3.6.5 and
TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0. There is a lack of contributory behavior in FFDH
due to improper input validation. Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman,
the other party can force the shared secret into a small set of values
(lack of contributory behavior). This is a problem for protocols that
depend on contributory behavior (which is not the case for TLS). The
attack can be carried by the peer, or depending on the protocol by an
active network attacker (person in the middle).
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34872
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ffdh-peerkey-checks/
- CVE-2026-34873:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.0 through 4.0.0. Client
impersonation can occur while resuming a TLS 1.3 session.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34873
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-client-impersonation-while-resuming-tls13-session/
- CVE-2026-34874:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS through 3.6.5 and 4.x through
4.0.0. There is a NULL pointer dereference in distinguished name
parsing that allows an attacker to write to address 0.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34874
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-null-pointer-dereference-x509/
- CVE-2026-34875:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS through 3.6.5 and TF-PSA-Crypto
1.0.0. A buffer overflow can occur in public key export for FFDH keys.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34875
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ffdh-buffer-overflow/
- CVE-2026-34876:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.x before 3.6.6. An out-of-bounds
read vulnerability in mbedtls_ccm_finish() in library/ccm.c allows
attackers to obtain adjacent CCM context data via invocation of the
multipart CCM API with an oversized tag_len parameter. This is caused
by missing validation of the tag_len parameter against the size of the
internal 16-byte authentication buffer. The issue affects the public
multipart CCM API in Mbed TLS 3.x, where mbedtls_ccm_finish() can be
invoked directly by applications. In Mbed TLS 4.x versions prior to
the fix, the same missing validation exists in the internal
implementation; however, the function is not exposed as part of the
public API. Exploitation requires application-level invocation of the
multipart CCM API.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34876
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ccm-finish-boundary-check/
- CVE-2026-34877:
An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS versions from 2.19.0 up to 3.6.5,
Mbed TLS 4.0.0. Insufficient protection of serialized SSL context or
session structures allows an attacker who can modify the serialized
structures to induce memory corruption, leading to arbitrary code
execution. This is caused by Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs.
For more information, see:
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34877
- https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-serialized-data/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
---
package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash | 4 ++--
package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
index b86c66af3e..f1be074e08 100644
--- a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
+++ b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.5:
-sha256 4a11f1777bb95bf4ad96721cac945a26e04bf19f57d905f241fe77ebeddf46d8 mbedtls-3.6.5.tar.bz2
+# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.6:
+sha256 8fb65fae8dcae5840f793c0a334860a411f884cc537ea290ce1c52bb64ca007a mbedtls-3.6.6.tar.bz2
# Locally calculated
sha256 9b405ef4c89342f5eae1dd828882f931747f71001cfba7d114801039b52ad09b LICENSE
diff --git a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
index c1aa9f0850..e8bb0a71b9 100644
--- a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
+++ b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#
################################################################################
-MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.5
+MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.6
MBEDTLS_SITE = https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/download/mbedtls-$(MBEDTLS_VERSION)
MBEDTLS_SOURCE = mbedtls-$(MBEDTLS_VERSION).tar.bz2
MBEDTLS_CONF_OPTS = \
--
2.53.0
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next reply other threads:[~2026-04-20 20:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-20 20:20 Thomas Perale via buildroot [this message]
2026-04-20 21:02 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/mbedtls: security bump to v3.6.6 Julien Olivain via buildroot
2026-05-04 14:47 ` Thomas Perale via buildroot
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