From: Thomas Perale via buildroot <buildroot@buildroot.org>
To: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Cc: buildroot@buildroot.org
Subject: Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/mbedtls: security bump to v3.6.6
Date: Mon, 4 May 2026 16:47:34 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260504144734.9733-1-thomas.perale@mind.be> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260420202031.210609-1-thomas.perale@mind.be>
In reply of:
> For more information about the release, see:
>
> - https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.6
> - https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/compare/mbedtls-3.6.5..mbedtls-3.6.6
>
> Fixes the following vulnerabilities:
>
> - CVE-2025-66442
> In Mbed TLS through 4.0.0, there is a compiler-induced timing side
> channel (in RSA and CBC/ECB decryption) that only occurs with LLVM's
> select-optimize feature. TF-PSA-Crypto through 1.0.0 is also affected.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-66442
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-compiler-induced-constant-time-violations/
>
> - CVE-2026-25833:
> Mbed TLS 3.5.0 to 3.6.5 fixed in 3.6.6 and 4.1.0 has a buffer overflow
> in the x509_inet_pton_ipv6() function
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25833
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-inet-pton/
>
> - CVE-2026-25834:
> Mbed TLS v3.3.0 up to 3.6.5 and 4.0.0 allows Algorithm Downgrade.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25834
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-sigalg-injection/
>
> - CVE-2026-25835:
> Mbed TLS before 3.6.6 and TF-PSA-Crypto before 1.1.0 misuse seeds in a
> Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-25835
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-rng-cloning/
>
> - CVE-2026-34871:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS before 3.6.6 and 4.x before 4.1.0
> and TF-PSA-Crypto before 1.1.0. There is a Predictable Seed in a
> Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34871
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-dev-random/
>
> - CVE-2026-34872:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.x and 3.6.x through 3.6.5 and
> TF-PSA-Crypto 1.0. There is a lack of contributory behavior in FFDH
> due to improper input validation. Using finite-field Diffie-Hellman,
> the other party can force the shared secret into a small set of values
> (lack of contributory behavior). This is a problem for protocols that
> depend on contributory behavior (which is not the case for TLS). The
> attack can be carried by the peer, or depending on the protocol by an
> active network attacker (person in the middle).
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34872
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ffdh-peerkey-checks/
>
> - CVE-2026-34873:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.5.0 through 4.0.0. Client
> impersonation can occur while resuming a TLS 1.3 session.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34873
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-client-impersonation-while-resuming-tls13-session/
>
> - CVE-2026-34874:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS through 3.6.5 and 4.x through
> 4.0.0. There is a NULL pointer dereference in distinguished name
> parsing that allows an attacker to write to address 0.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34874
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-null-pointer-dereference-x509/
>
> - CVE-2026-34875:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS through 3.6.5 and TF-PSA-Crypto
> 1.0.0. A buffer overflow can occur in public key export for FFDH keys.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34875
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ffdh-buffer-overflow/
>
> - CVE-2026-34876:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS 3.x before 3.6.6. An out-of-bounds
> read vulnerability in mbedtls_ccm_finish() in library/ccm.c allows
> attackers to obtain adjacent CCM context data via invocation of the
> multipart CCM API with an oversized tag_len parameter. This is caused
> by missing validation of the tag_len parameter against the size of the
> internal 16-byte authentication buffer. The issue affects the public
> multipart CCM API in Mbed TLS 3.x, where mbedtls_ccm_finish() can be
> invoked directly by applications. In Mbed TLS 4.x versions prior to
> the fix, the same missing validation exists in the internal
> implementation; however, the function is not exposed as part of the
> public API. Exploitation requires application-level invocation of the
> multipart CCM API.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34876
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-ccm-finish-boundary-check/
>
> - CVE-2026-34877:
> An issue was discovered in Mbed TLS versions from 2.19.0 up to 3.6.5,
> Mbed TLS 4.0.0. Insufficient protection of serialized SSL context or
> session structures allows an attacker who can modify the serialized
> structures to induce memory corruption, leading to arbitrary code
> execution. This is caused by Incorrect Use of Privileged APIs.
>
> For more information, see:
> - https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-34877
> - https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2026-03-serialized-data/
>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Perale <thomas.perale@mind.be>
Applied to 2025.02.x & 2026.02.x. Thanks
> ---
> package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash | 4 ++--
> package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
> index b86c66af3e..f1be074e08 100644
> --- a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
> +++ b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.hash
> @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
> -# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.5:
> -sha256 4a11f1777bb95bf4ad96721cac945a26e04bf19f57d905f241fe77ebeddf46d8 mbedtls-3.6.5.tar.bz2
> +# From https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/mbedtls-3.6.6:
> +sha256 8fb65fae8dcae5840f793c0a334860a411f884cc537ea290ce1c52bb64ca007a mbedtls-3.6.6.tar.bz2
> # Locally calculated
> sha256 9b405ef4c89342f5eae1dd828882f931747f71001cfba7d114801039b52ad09b LICENSE
> diff --git a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
> index c1aa9f0850..e8bb0a71b9 100644
> --- a/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
> +++ b/package/mbedtls/mbedtls.mk
> @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
> #
> ################################################################################
>
> -MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.5
> +MBEDTLS_VERSION = 3.6.6
> MBEDTLS_SITE = https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/download/mbedtls-$(MBEDTLS_VERSION)
> MBEDTLS_SOURCE = mbedtls-$(MBEDTLS_VERSION).tar.bz2
> MBEDTLS_CONF_OPTS = \
> --
> 2.53.0
>
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-04 14:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-20 20:20 [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/mbedtls: security bump to v3.6.6 Thomas Perale via buildroot
2026-04-20 21:02 ` Julien Olivain via buildroot
2026-05-04 14:47 ` Thomas Perale via buildroot [this message]
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