* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/libssh2: fix CVE-2019-17498
@ 2020-02-29 11:31 Fabrice Fontaine
2020-02-29 16:32 ` Yann E. MORIN
2020-03-14 17:32 ` Peter Korsgaard
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Fabrice Fontaine @ 2020-02-29 11:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
In libssh2 v1.9.0 and earlier versions, the SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT logic in
packet.c has an integer overflow in a bounds check, enabling an attacker
to specify an arbitrary (out-of-bounds) offset for a subsequent memory
read. A crafted SSH server may be able to disclose sensitive information
or cause a denial of service condition on the client system when a user
connects to the server.
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
---
...003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch | 127 ++++++++++++++++++
package/libssh2/libssh2.mk | 3 +
2 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
diff --git a/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch b/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b73520021
--- /dev/null
+++ b/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+From dedcbd106f8e52d5586b0205bc7677e4c9868f9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Will Cosgrove <will@panic.com>
+Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 09:57:38 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] packet.c: improve message parsing (#402)
+
+* packet.c: improve parsing of packets
+
+file: packet.c
+
+notes:
+Use _libssh2_get_string API in SSH_MSG_DEBUG/SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT. Additional uint32 bounds check in SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST.
+[Retrieved from:
+https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/dedcbd106f8e52d5586b0205bc7677e4c9868f9c]
+Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
+---
+ src/packet.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
+index 38ab6294..2e01bfc5 100644
+--- a/src/packet.c
++++ b/src/packet.c
+@@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen, int macstate)
+ {
+ int rc = 0;
+- char *message = NULL;
+- char *language = NULL;
++ unsigned char *message = NULL;
++ unsigned char *language = NULL;
+ size_t message_len = 0;
+ size_t language_len = 0;
+ LIBSSH2_CHANNEL *channelp = NULL;
+@@ -472,33 +472,23 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
+
+ case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+ if(datalen >= 5) {
+- size_t reason = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 1);
++ uint32_t reason = 0;
++ struct string_buf buf;
++ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
++ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
++ buf.len = datalen;
++ buf.dataptr++; /* advance past type */
+
+- if(datalen >= 9) {
+- message_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 5);
++ _libssh2_get_u32(&buf, &reason);
++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &message, &message_len);
++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &language, &language_len);
+
+- if(message_len < datalen-13) {
+- /* 9 = packet_type(1) + reason(4) + message_len(4) */
+- message = (char *) data + 9;
+-
+- language_len =
+- _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 9 + message_len);
+- language = (char *) data + 9 + message_len + 4;
+-
+- if(language_len > (datalen-13-message_len)) {
+- /* bad input, clear info */
+- language = message = NULL;
+- language_len = message_len = 0;
+- }
+- }
+- else
+- /* bad size, clear it */
+- message_len = 0;
+- }
+ if(session->ssh_msg_disconnect) {
+- LIBSSH2_DISCONNECT(session, reason, message,
+- message_len, language, language_len);
++ LIBSSH2_DISCONNECT(session, reason, (const char *)message,
++ message_len, (const char *)language,
++ language_len);
+ }
++
+ _libssh2_debug(session, LIBSSH2_TRACE_TRANS,
+ "Disconnect(%d): %s(%s)", reason,
+ message, language);
+@@ -539,24 +529,24 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
+ int always_display = data[1];
+
+ if(datalen >= 6) {
+- message_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 2);
+-
+- if(message_len <= (datalen - 10)) {
+- /* 6 = packet_type(1) + display(1) + message_len(4) */
+- message = (char *) data + 6;
+- language_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 6 +
+- message_len);
+-
+- if(language_len <= (datalen - 10 - message_len))
+- language = (char *) data + 10 + message_len;
+- }
++ struct string_buf buf;
++ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
++ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
++ buf.len = datalen;
++ buf.dataptr += 2; /* advance past type & always display */
++
++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &message, &message_len);
++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &language, &language_len);
+ }
+
+ if(session->ssh_msg_debug) {
+- LIBSSH2_DEBUG(session, always_display, message,
+- message_len, language, language_len);
++ LIBSSH2_DEBUG(session, always_display,
++ (const char *)message,
++ message_len, (const char *)language,
++ language_len);
+ }
+ }
++
+ /*
+ * _libssh2_debug will actually truncate this for us so
+ * that it's not an inordinate about of data
+@@ -579,7 +569,7 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
+ uint32_t len = 0;
+ unsigned char want_reply = 0;
+ len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 1);
+- if(datalen >= (6 + len)) {
++ if((len <= (UINT_MAX - 6)) && (datalen >= (6 + len))) {
+ want_reply = data[5 + len];
+ _libssh2_debug(session,
+ LIBSSH2_TRACE_CONN,
diff --git a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
index bd8517dac4..3819c1aa31 100644
--- a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
+++ b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ LIBSSH2_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
LIBSSH2_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
LIBSSH2_CONF_OPTS = --disable-examples-build
+# 0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
+LIBSSH2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-17498
+
# building from a git clone
LIBSSH2_AUTORECONF = YES
--
2.25.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/libssh2: fix CVE-2019-17498
2020-02-29 11:31 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/libssh2: fix CVE-2019-17498 Fabrice Fontaine
@ 2020-02-29 16:32 ` Yann E. MORIN
2020-03-14 17:32 ` Peter Korsgaard
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Yann E. MORIN @ 2020-02-29 16:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
Fabrice, All,
On 2020-02-29 12:31 +0100, Fabrice Fontaine spake thusly:
> In libssh2 v1.9.0 and earlier versions, the SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT logic in
> packet.c has an integer overflow in a bounds check, enabling an attacker
> to specify an arbitrary (out-of-bounds) offset for a subsequent memory
> read. A crafted SSH server may be able to disclose sensitive information
> or cause a denial of service condition on the client system when a user
> connects to the server.
>
> Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Applied to master, thanks.
Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.
> ---
> ...003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch | 127 ++++++++++++++++++
> package/libssh2/libssh2.mk | 3 +
> 2 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
>
> diff --git a/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch b/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..2b73520021
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/package/libssh2/0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
> +From dedcbd106f8e52d5586b0205bc7677e4c9868f9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Will Cosgrove <will@panic.com>
> +Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 09:57:38 -0700
> +Subject: [PATCH] packet.c: improve message parsing (#402)
> +
> +* packet.c: improve parsing of packets
> +
> +file: packet.c
> +
> +notes:
> +Use _libssh2_get_string API in SSH_MSG_DEBUG/SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT. Additional uint32 bounds check in SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST.
> +[Retrieved from:
> +https://github.com/libssh2/libssh2/commit/dedcbd106f8e52d5586b0205bc7677e4c9868f9c]
> +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
> +---
> + src/packet.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
> + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/src/packet.c b/src/packet.c
> +index 38ab6294..2e01bfc5 100644
> +--- a/src/packet.c
> ++++ b/src/packet.c
> +@@ -419,8 +419,8 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
> + size_t datalen, int macstate)
> + {
> + int rc = 0;
> +- char *message = NULL;
> +- char *language = NULL;
> ++ unsigned char *message = NULL;
> ++ unsigned char *language = NULL;
> + size_t message_len = 0;
> + size_t language_len = 0;
> + LIBSSH2_CHANNEL *channelp = NULL;
> +@@ -472,33 +472,23 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
> +
> + case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
> + if(datalen >= 5) {
> +- size_t reason = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 1);
> ++ uint32_t reason = 0;
> ++ struct string_buf buf;
> ++ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
> ++ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
> ++ buf.len = datalen;
> ++ buf.dataptr++; /* advance past type */
> +
> +- if(datalen >= 9) {
> +- message_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 5);
> ++ _libssh2_get_u32(&buf, &reason);
> ++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &message, &message_len);
> ++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &language, &language_len);
> +
> +- if(message_len < datalen-13) {
> +- /* 9 = packet_type(1) + reason(4) + message_len(4) */
> +- message = (char *) data + 9;
> +-
> +- language_len =
> +- _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 9 + message_len);
> +- language = (char *) data + 9 + message_len + 4;
> +-
> +- if(language_len > (datalen-13-message_len)) {
> +- /* bad input, clear info */
> +- language = message = NULL;
> +- language_len = message_len = 0;
> +- }
> +- }
> +- else
> +- /* bad size, clear it */
> +- message_len = 0;
> +- }
> + if(session->ssh_msg_disconnect) {
> +- LIBSSH2_DISCONNECT(session, reason, message,
> +- message_len, language, language_len);
> ++ LIBSSH2_DISCONNECT(session, reason, (const char *)message,
> ++ message_len, (const char *)language,
> ++ language_len);
> + }
> ++
> + _libssh2_debug(session, LIBSSH2_TRACE_TRANS,
> + "Disconnect(%d): %s(%s)", reason,
> + message, language);
> +@@ -539,24 +529,24 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
> + int always_display = data[1];
> +
> + if(datalen >= 6) {
> +- message_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 2);
> +-
> +- if(message_len <= (datalen - 10)) {
> +- /* 6 = packet_type(1) + display(1) + message_len(4) */
> +- message = (char *) data + 6;
> +- language_len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 6 +
> +- message_len);
> +-
> +- if(language_len <= (datalen - 10 - message_len))
> +- language = (char *) data + 10 + message_len;
> +- }
> ++ struct string_buf buf;
> ++ buf.data = (unsigned char *)data;
> ++ buf.dataptr = buf.data;
> ++ buf.len = datalen;
> ++ buf.dataptr += 2; /* advance past type & always display */
> ++
> ++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &message, &message_len);
> ++ _libssh2_get_string(&buf, &language, &language_len);
> + }
> +
> + if(session->ssh_msg_debug) {
> +- LIBSSH2_DEBUG(session, always_display, message,
> +- message_len, language, language_len);
> ++ LIBSSH2_DEBUG(session, always_display,
> ++ (const char *)message,
> ++ message_len, (const char *)language,
> ++ language_len);
> + }
> + }
> ++
> + /*
> + * _libssh2_debug will actually truncate this for us so
> + * that it's not an inordinate about of data
> +@@ -579,7 +569,7 @@ _libssh2_packet_add(LIBSSH2_SESSION * session, unsigned char *data,
> + uint32_t len = 0;
> + unsigned char want_reply = 0;
> + len = _libssh2_ntohu32(data + 1);
> +- if(datalen >= (6 + len)) {
> ++ if((len <= (UINT_MAX - 6)) && (datalen >= (6 + len))) {
> + want_reply = data[5 + len];
> + _libssh2_debug(session,
> + LIBSSH2_TRACE_CONN,
> diff --git a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
> index bd8517dac4..3819c1aa31 100644
> --- a/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
> +++ b/package/libssh2/libssh2.mk
> @@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ LIBSSH2_LICENSE_FILES = COPYING
> LIBSSH2_INSTALL_STAGING = YES
> LIBSSH2_CONF_OPTS = --disable-examples-build
>
> +# 0003-packet-c-improve-message-parsing.patch
> +LIBSSH2_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2019-17498
> +
> # building from a git clone
> LIBSSH2_AUTORECONF = YES
>
> --
> 2.25.0
>
> _______________________________________________
> buildroot mailing list
> buildroot at busybox.net
> http://lists.busybox.net/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
--
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| Yann E. MORIN | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN | ___ |
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/libssh2: fix CVE-2019-17498
2020-02-29 11:31 [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/libssh2: fix CVE-2019-17498 Fabrice Fontaine
2020-02-29 16:32 ` Yann E. MORIN
@ 2020-03-14 17:32 ` Peter Korsgaard
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Peter Korsgaard @ 2020-03-14 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: buildroot
>>>>> "Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> writes:
> In libssh2 v1.9.0 and earlier versions, the SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT logic in
> packet.c has an integer overflow in a bounds check, enabling an attacker
> to specify an arbitrary (out-of-bounds) offset for a subsequent memory
> read. A crafted SSH server may be able to disclose sensitive information
> or cause a denial of service condition on the client system when a user
> connects to the server.
> Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com>
Committed to 2019.02.x and 2019.11.x, thanks.
--
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2020-03-14 17:32 ` Peter Korsgaard
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