[Buildroot] [PATCH] package/util-linux: security bump to 2.41.5

[Buildroot] [PATCH] package/util-linux: security bump to 2.41.5

[Giulio Benetti]

Security fixes:

 CVE-2026-53613 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on target path.
   The SUID mount does not pin the mount target directory, allowing a
   race between path resolution and the actual mount syscall.  A local
   attacker can swap an ancestor directory component between these
   steps to redirect a mount to an arbitrary location.
   Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 CVE-2026-53612 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on post-mount owner/mode change.
   The X-mount.owner, X-mount.group, and X-mount.mode options use
   path-based lchown()/chmod() after mounting.  An attacker can swap
   the target between mount and the ownership/mode change to gain
   control of arbitrary files.
   Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 CVE-2026-53614 - mount(8) SUID bypass via LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2.
   The environment variable LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 is not filtered
   via safe_getenv() in SUID context.  A local attacker can force
   the legacy mount(2) code path, which uses a two-step bind+remount
   or propagation sequence with a window where security flags (nosuid,
   noexec, ...) are not yet applied.
   Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

Full release notes: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.41/v2.41.5-ReleaseNotes

Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>
---
 package/util-linux/util-linux.hash | 2 +-
 package/util-linux/util-linux.mk   | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/package/util-linux/util-linux.hash b/package/util-linux/util-linux.hash
index 5a5656212c..b6393d6ec0 100644
--- a/package/util-linux/util-linux.hash
+++ b/package/util-linux/util-linux.hash
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # From https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.41/sha256sums.asc
-sha256  a8c213cc06048862602a42b2d299b340001f6d05c4407b549f3e03521df83688  util-linux-2.41.4.tar.xz
+sha256  f586e35d320ff537aab3ffeca37e9ecd482ccbe013590db4429a414d8aa6a728  util-linux-2.41.5.tar.xz
 # License files, locally calculated
 sha256  4c2db318192bda62f3f8fcf71488bb5e602ae4385eba281d711b46cc13a40bb3  README.licensing
 sha256  527f738966ca396cd5a68c1509390de2a780c6b614d9ee57f7544a6161938ed1  Documentation/licenses/COPYING.BSD-2-Clause
diff --git a/package/util-linux/util-linux.mk b/package/util-linux/util-linux.mk
index fcce9a7dc8..20bdcc5c3f 100644
--- a/package/util-linux/util-linux.mk
+++ b/package/util-linux/util-linux.mk
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 # util-linux-libs/util-linux-libs.mk needs to be updated accordingly as well.
 
 UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR = 2.41
-UTIL_LINUX_VERSION = $(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR).4
+UTIL_LINUX_VERSION = $(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR).5
 UTIL_LINUX_SOURCE = util-linux-$(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION).tar.xz
 UTIL_LINUX_SITE = $(BR2_KERNEL_MIRROR)/linux/utils/util-linux/v$(UTIL_LINUX_VERSION_MAJOR)
 
-- 
2.47.3

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Re: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/util-linux: security bump to 2.41.5

[Peter Korsgaard]

>>>>> "Giulio" == Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com> writes:

 > Security fixes:
 >  CVE-2026-53613 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on target path.
 >    The SUID mount does not pin the mount target directory, allowing a
 >    race between path resolution and the actual mount syscall.  A local
 >    attacker can swap an ancestor directory component between these
 >    steps to redirect a mount to an arbitrary location.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 >  CVE-2026-53612 - mount(8) TOCTOU race on post-mount owner/mode change.
 >    The X-mount.owner, X-mount.group, and X-mount.mode options use
 >    path-based lchown()/chmod() after mounting.  An attacker can swap
 >    the target between mount and the ownership/mode change to gain
 >    control of arbitrary files.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 >  CVE-2026-53614 - mount(8) SUID bypass via LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2.
 >    The environment variable LIBMOUNT_FORCE_MOUNT2 is not filtered
 >    via safe_getenv() in SUID context.  A local attacker can force
 >    the legacy mount(2) code path, which uses a two-step bind+remount
 >    or propagation sequence with a window where security flags (nosuid,
 >    noexec, ...) are not yet applied.
 >    Reported-by: Xinyao Hu

 > Full release notes: https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/util-linux/v2.41/v2.41.5-ReleaseNotes

 > Signed-off-by: Giulio Benetti <giulio.benetti@benettiengineering.com>

Committed, thanks.

-- 
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
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