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  • * RFC(V3): Audit Kernel Container IDs
    @ 2018-01-09 12:16 Richard Guy Briggs
      0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
    From: Richard Guy Briggs @ 2018-01-09 12:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
      To: cgroups-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, Linux Containers, Linux API,
    	Linux Audit, Linux FS Devel, Linux Kernel,
    	Linux Network Development
      Cc: mszeredi-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, Steve Grubb, Andy Lutomirski,
    	jlayton-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, Carlos O'Donell, Daniel Walsh,
    	Paul Moore, Al Viro, David Howells, Madz Car, Simo Sorce,
    	trondmy-7I+n7zu2hftEKMMhf/gKZA, Eric Paris, Eric W. Biederman
    
    Containers are a userspace concept.  The kernel knows nothing of them.
    
    The Linux audit system needs a way to be able to track the container
    provenance of events and actions.  Audit needs the kernel's help to do
    this.
    
    Since the concept of a container is entirely a userspace concept, a
    registration from the userspace container orchestration system initiates
    this.  This will define a point in time and a set of resources
    associated with a particular container with an audit container
    identifier.
    
    The registration is a u64 representing the audit container identifier
    written to a special file in a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree
    already exists) representing a process that will become a parent process
    in that container.  This write might place restrictions on mount
    namespaces required to define a container, or at least careful checking
    of namespaces in the kernel to verify permissions of the orchestrator so
    it can't change its own container ID.  A bind mount of nsfs may be
    necessary in the container orchestrator's mount namespace.  This write
    can only happen once per process.
    
    Note: The justification for using a u64 is that it minimizes the
    information printed in every audit record, reducing bandwidth and limits
    comparisons to a single u64 which will be faster and less error-prone.
    
    Require CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to be able to carry out the registration.  At
    that time, record the target container's user-supplied audit container
    identifier along with a target container's parent process (which may
    become the target container's "init" process) process ID (referenced
    from the initial PID namespace) in a new record AUDIT_CONTAINER with a
    qualifying op=$action field.
    
    Issue a new auxilliary record AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO for each valid
    container ID present on an auditable action or event.
    
    Forked and cloned processes inherit their parent's audit container
    identifier, referenced in the process' task_struct.  Since the audit
    container identifier is inherited rather than written, it can still be
    written once.  This will prevent tampering while allowing nesting.
    (This can be implemented with an internal settable flag upon
    registration that does not get copied across a fork/clone.)
    
    Mimic setns(2) and return an error if the process has already initiated
    threading or forked since this registration should happen before the
    process execution is started by the orchestrator and hence should not
    yet have any threads or children.  If this is deemed overly restrictive,
    switch all of the target's threads and children to the new containerID.
    
    Trust the orchestrator to judiciously use and restrict CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
    
    When a container ceases to exist because the last process in that
    container has exited log the fact to balance the registration action.  
    (This is likely needed for certification accountability.)
    
    At this point it appears unnecessary to add a container session
    identifier since this is all tracked from loginuid and sessionid to
    communicate with the container orchestrator to spawn an additional
    session into an existing container which would be logged.  It can be
    added at a later date without breaking API should it be deemed
    necessary.
    
    The following namespace logging actions are not needed for certification
    purposes at this point, but are helpful for tracking namespace activity.
    These are auxilliary records that are associated with namespace
    manipulation syscalls unshare(2), clone(2) and setns(2), so the records
    will only show up if explicit syscall rules have been added to document
    this activity.
    
    Log the creation of every namespace, inheriting/adding its spawning
    process' audit container identifier(s), if applicable.  Include the
    spawning and spawned namespace IDs (device and inode number tuples).
    [AUDIT_NS_CREATE, AUDIT_NS_DESTROY] [clone(2), unshare(2), setns(2)]
    Note: At this point it appears only network namespaces may need to track
    container IDs apart from processes since incoming packets may cause an
    auditable event before being associated with a process.  Since a
    namespace can be shared by processes in different containers, the
    namespace will need to track all containers to which it has been
    assigned.
    
    Upon registration, the target process' namespace IDs (in the form of a
    nsfs device number and inode number tuple) will be recorded in an
    AUDIT_NS_INFO auxilliary record.
    
    Log the destruction of every namespace that is no longer used by any
    process, including the namespace IDs (device and inode number tuples).
    [AUDIT_NS_DESTROY] [process exit, unshare(2), setns(2)]
    
    Issue a new auxilliary record AUDIT_NS_CHANGE listing (opt: op=$action)
    the parent and child namespace IDs for any changes to a process'
    namespaces. [setns(2)]
    Note: It may be possible to combine AUDIT_NS_* record formats and
    distinguish them with an op=$action field depending on the fields
    required for each message type.
    
    The audit container identifier will need to be reaped from all
    implicated namespaces upon the destruction of a container.
    
    This namespace information adds supporting information for tracking
    events not attributable to specific processes.
    
    Changelog:
    
    (Upstream V3)
    - switch back to u64 (from pmoore, can be expanded to u128 in future if
      need arises without breaking API.  u32 was originally proposed, up to
      c36 discussed)
    - write-once, but children inherit audit container identifier and can
      then still be written once
    - switch to CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL
    - group namespace actions together, auxilliary records to namespace
      operations.
    
    (Upstream V2)
    - switch from u64 to u128 UUID
    - switch from "signal" and "trigger" to "register"
    - restrict registration to single process or force all threads and
      children into same container
    
    - RGB
    
    --
    Richard Guy Briggs <rgb-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
    Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
    Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
    IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
    Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
    
    ^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread

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    2018-01-10  6:54     ` RFC(V3): Audit Kernel Container IDs Richard Guy Briggs
         [not found] ` <20180109121620.wi7dq2423ugsraqv-bcJWsdo4jJjeVoXN4CMphl7TgLCtbB0G@public.gmane.org>
    2018-01-09 16:18   ` Simo Sorce
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    2018-01-10  7:00       ` Richard Guy Briggs
    2018-02-02 21:18       ` Paul Moore
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    2018-02-02 21:24         ` Paul Moore
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    2018-02-02 22:19           ` Simo Sorce
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    2018-02-02 23:24             ` Paul Moore
         [not found]           ` <CAHC9VhTg0ocArSek03A-XrbjgR4iGeysxXWaA8HknKBD_5ZRkA@mail.gmail.com>
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    2018-02-03 19:05               ` Casey Schaufler
    2018-02-05 13:47               ` Simo Sorce
    2018-01-10  1:05   ` Eric W. Biederman
    2018-02-02 22:05   ` Paul Moore
         [not found] ` <CAHC9VhQ5ciUZDhrsb6S4YxwuzQEY-ra2RTDceWXOdjHEBoZ0BQ@mail.gmail.com>
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    2018-02-03  1:57     ` Serge E. Hallyn
    2018-01-09 12:16 Richard Guy Briggs
    

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