From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
To: Oren Laadan <orenl@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: Linux Containers <containers@lists.osdl.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] cr: capabilities: define checkpoint and restore fns
Date: Tue, 26 May 2009 12:33:24 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090526173324.GC13991@us.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090526173242.GA13757@us.ibm.com>
An application checkpoint image will store capability sets
(and the bounding set) as __u64s. Define checkpoint and
restart functions to translate between those and kernel_cap_t's.
Define a common function do_capset_tocred() which applies capability
set changes to a passed-in struct cred.
The restore function uses do_capset_tocred() to apply the restored
capabilities to the struct cred being crafted, subject to the
current task's (task executing sys_restart()) permissions.
TODO: one day we'll want to c/r the securebits as well.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 5 ++
kernel/capability.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index c302110..572b5a0 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -536,6 +536,11 @@ extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set;
extern const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set;
+extern void checkpoint_save_cap(__u64 *dest, kernel_cap_t src);
+struct cred;
+extern int checkpoint_restore_cap(__u64 e, __u64 i, __u64 p, __u64 x,
+ struct cred *cred);
+
/**
* has_capability - Determine if a task has a superior capability available
* @t: The task in question
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 4e17041..d2c9bb3 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -217,6 +217,45 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
return ret;
}
+static int do_capset_tocred(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted, struct cred *new)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * for checkpoint-restart, do we want to wait until end of restart?
+ * not sure we care */
+ audit_log_capset(current->pid, new, current_cred());
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_capset(kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ struct cred *new;
+ int ret;
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = do_capset_tocred(effective, inheritable, permitted, new);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ return commit_creds(new);
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/**
* sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
@@ -240,7 +279,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i, tocopy;
kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
- struct cred *new;
int ret;
pid_t pid;
@@ -271,22 +309,52 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
i++;
}
- new = prepare_creds();
- if (!new)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return do_capset(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
- ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
- &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+}
- audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred());
- return commit_creds(new);
+void checkpoint_save_cap(__u64 *dest, kernel_cap_t src)
+{
+ *dest = src.cap[0] | (src.cap[1] << sizeof(__u32));
+}
-error:
- abort_creds(new);
- return ret;
+static void do_capbset_drop(struct cred *cred, int cap)
+{
+ cap_lower(cred->cap_bset, cap);
+}
+
+int checkpoint_restore_cap(__u64 newe, __u64 newi, __u64 newp, __u64 newx,
+ struct cred *cred)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t effective, inheritable, permitted, bset;
+ int may_dropbcap = capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
+ int ret, i;
+
+ effective.cap[0] = newe;
+ effective.cap[1] = (newe >> sizeof(__u32));
+ inheritable.cap[0] = newi;
+ inheritable.cap[1] = (newi >> sizeof(__u32));
+ permitted.cap[0] = newp;
+ permitted.cap[1] = (newp >> sizeof(__u32));
+ bset.cap[0] = newx;
+ bset.cap[1] = (newx >> sizeof(__u32));
+
+ ret = do_capset_tocred(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted, cred);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CAP_LAST_CAP; i++) {
+ if (cap_raised(bset, i))
+ continue;
+ if (!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_bset, i))
+ continue;
+ if (!may_dropbcap)
+ return -EPERM;
+ do_capbset_drop(cred, i);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/**
--
1.6.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-05-26 17:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-05-26 17:32 [PATCH 0/8] a start to credentials c/r Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 17:33 ` [PATCH 1/8] cr: break out new_user_ns() Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 17:33 ` [PATCH 2/8] cr: split core function out of some set*{u,g}id functions Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 17:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2009-05-26 17:33 ` [PATCH 4/8] groups: move code to kernel/groups.c Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 17:33 ` [PATCH 5/8] groups: allow compilation on s390x Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 23:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20090526173242.GA13757-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2009-05-26 17:33 ` [PATCH 6/8] cr: checkpoint and restore task credentials Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-27 18:36 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-05-28 14:01 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-28 14:36 ` Alexey Dobriyan
2009-05-26 17:34 ` [PATCH 7/8] cr: restore file->f_cred Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-26 17:34 ` [PATCH 8/8] user namespaces: debug refcounts Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-27 3:05 ` [PATCH 0/8] a start to credentials c/r Casey Schaufler
2009-05-27 12:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-05-27 16:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-05-27 18:24 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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