From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] About CVE-2016-4484: - Cryptsetup Initrd root Shell
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 14:27:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161115132757.GA9706@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cb11d447-7fae-f153-b1f4-1872807f5314@gmail.com>
Interesting. Does not very seem relevant, except in special
situations, where an attacker can boot the system and can
access the console, but cannot change the boot-process
or boot image itself.
This would immediately exclude any normal PC
from consideration, because there, if you can boot,
you can also boot something else which gives you the
same capabilities (or better) than this exploit.
If you can get BIOS access, the same might be possible,
so servers with ILO should also not be affected.
My take would be that of this vulnerabilituy allowas
an attack, then the security model used is broken in
the first place. Of course, there are environments that
need two (or more) effective security mechanisms, so
fixing this is a good idea, but (almost) nobody needs
to be very concerned about it.
Regards,
Arno
On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 13:34:49 CET, Milan Broz wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> just little bit clarification about CVE-2016-4484
> http://hmarco.org/bugs/CVE-2016-4484/CVE-2016-4484_cryptsetup_initrd_shell.html
>
> This bug is *NOT* cryptsetup/LUKS upstream bug, it is a minor problem in scripts
> unlocking an encrypted system.
>
> It allows attacker to drop to initramdisk shell (without decryption of LUKS data).
>
> The scripts are part of Debian cryptsetup package (as an addition to upstream)
> or part of dracut package (if dracut is used).
>
> (The info about the problem was embargoed until the talk and only Debian maintainers
> were informed in advance.)
>
> Milan
> _______________________________________________
> dm-crypt mailing list
> dm-crypt@saout.de
> http://www.saout.de/mailman/listinfo/dm-crypt
--
Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., Email: arno@wagner.name
GnuPG: ID: CB5D9718 FP: 12D6 C03B 1B30 33BB 13CF B774 E35C 5FA1 CB5D 9718
----
A good decision is based on knowledge and not on numbers. -- Plato
If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of
"news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-15 13:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-15 12:34 [dm-crypt] About CVE-2016-4484: - Cryptsetup Initrd root Shell Milan Broz
2016-11-15 13:27 ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2016-11-15 13:32 ` Sven Eschenberg
2016-11-15 15:18 ` Robert Nichols
2016-11-15 18:40 ` Sven Eschenberg
2016-11-15 19:19 ` Robert Nichols
2016-11-15 19:42 ` Sven Eschenberg
2016-11-15 22:51 ` Robert Nichols
2016-11-15 23:15 ` Michael Kjörling
2016-11-15 23:28 ` Sven Eschenberg
2016-11-15 23:52 ` Arno Wagner
2016-11-16 0:08 ` Jonas Meurer
2016-11-16 1:15 ` Sven Eschenberg
2016-11-16 7:32 ` Milan Broz
2016-11-16 13:48 ` Arno Wagner
2016-11-29 14:56 ` David Niklas
2016-12-07 11:37 ` Jonas Meurer
2016-12-07 13:00 ` Arno Wagner
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