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From: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
To: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Cc: "dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org" <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] drm: enable render-nodes by default
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2014 09:29:31 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <532BF86B.7030101@vmware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKMK7uF_FPeYESk-01zUgxZ=bd=2_N_FpvTn4rwOOMeqrxOsug@mail.gmail.com>

On 03/21/2014 08:10 AM, Daniel Vetter wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 20, 2014 at 10:13 PM, Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Ie. an app that was using the gpu for something secure could
>>>> simply choose not to if the hw/driver could not guarantee that another
>>>> process using the gpu could not get access to the buffers..
>>> IMO that should work fine, but we need to provide a way for user-space
>>> to determine whether
>>> the render node is secure or not. Perhaps a sysfs attribute and / or a
>>> drm getparam() parameter?
>> I'd *assume* that that sort of thing would just be some sort of CL extension?
>>
>> But no objection to exposing it in a more common way.
>>
>> I guess it is also an option to keep the bootarg to override default
>> (with the default being 'enabled' for hw w/ per-context/process vm and
>> 'disabled' otherwise).
> Imo if we expose this through sysfs we should always enable
> rendernodes. The udev scripts can then decide what permissions to set
> on them.

Agreed.
Thomas


> -Daniel

      reply	other threads:[~2014-03-21  8:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-03-16 13:43 [PATCH] drm: enable render-nodes by default David Herrmann
2014-03-17 10:07 ` Daniel Vetter
2014-03-17 16:43 ` [PATCH v2] " David Herrmann
2014-03-20  6:43   ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20  7:36     ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20  8:48       ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20  9:05         ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20  9:27           ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20  9:43             ` David Herrmann
2014-03-20 10:28               ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20 14:36                 ` Jerome Glisse
2014-03-20 14:44                   ` Ilia Mirkin
2014-03-20 15:35                     ` Jerome Glisse
2014-03-20 17:39                     ` Ilia Mirkin
2014-03-20 14:59                   ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20 15:34                     ` Jerome Glisse
2014-03-20 15:49                       ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20 17:04                         ` Jerome Glisse
2014-03-20 17:34                 ` Rob Clark
2014-03-20 20:54                   ` Thomas Hellstrom
2014-03-20 21:13                     ` Rob Clark
2014-03-21  7:10                       ` Daniel Vetter
2014-03-21  8:29                         ` Thomas Hellstrom [this message]

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