* [PATCH v5 0/2] perf: Add some null ptr checks
@ 2026-09-01 21:19 Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access Vinay Belgaumkar
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Vinay Belgaumkar @ 2026-09-01 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: intel-xe; +Cc: dri-devel, Vinay Belgaumkar, Dapeng Mi
This series fixes a crash seen when the PMU ptr is freed while
there is an open perf connection.
Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
Vinay Belgaumkar (2):
perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event()
perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access
kernel/events/core.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.38.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event()
2026-09-01 21:19 [PATCH v5 0/2] perf: Add some null ptr checks Vinay Belgaumkar
@ 2026-09-01 21:19 ` Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-02 0:54 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access Vinay Belgaumkar
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Vinay Belgaumkar @ 2026-09-01 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: intel-xe; +Cc: dri-devel, Vinay Belgaumkar, Alexander Kanevskiy, Dapeng Mi
A typical module unload occurring event when there is an active perf
connection leads to freeing of the pmu pointer. The call log is something
like:
..
__pmu_detach_event
pmu_detach_event
pmu_detach_events
perf_pmu_unregister
..
__pmu_detach_event() sets event->pmu to null. When the perf connection
finally is closed, the following stack trace is observed:
Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference
...
RIP: 0010:_free_event+0x3e/0x370
...
Call Trace:
...
perf_event_release_kernel+0x260/0x2d0
perf_release+0x12/0x20
A call to mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() inside _free_event() is the root
cause of this crash. Adding a check to is_include_guest_event() ensures
we don't accidentally access a null ptr.
v2: Add another check to prevent null access (sashiko)
v3: Use READ_ONCE for checking pmu state (sashiko)
v4: READ_ONCE for the pmu check as well (sashiko)
v5: Improve commit message and split patch into 2 (Dapeng)
Fixes: eff95e170275 ("perf: Add APIs to create/release mediated guest vPMUs")
Cc: Alexander Kanevskiy <alexander.kanevskiy@intel.com>
Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:Claude-Sonnet-5
Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 94ca277e0819..f19d27ac411d 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -6350,6 +6350,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(perf_mediated_pmu_mutex);
/* !exclude_guest event of PMU with PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU */
static inline bool is_include_guest_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
+ if (!event->pmu)
+ return false;
+
if ((event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU) &&
!event->attr.exclude_guest)
return true;
@@ -12977,6 +12980,7 @@ static void __pmu_detach_event(struct pmu *pmu, struct perf_event *event,
exclusive_event_destroy(event);
module_put(pmu->module);
+ mediated_pmu_unaccount_event(event);
event->pmu = NULL; /* force fault instead of UAF */
}
--
2.38.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access
2026-09-01 21:19 [PATCH v5 0/2] perf: Add some null ptr checks Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() Vinay Belgaumkar
@ 2026-09-01 21:19 ` Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 0:55 ` Mi, Dapeng
1 sibling, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Vinay Belgaumkar @ 2026-09-01 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: intel-xe; +Cc: dri-devel, Vinay Belgaumkar, Dapeng Mi
Sashiko recommended some additional checks to prevent null pointer
access. Check for revoked states inside perf_event_read_local(), as
the pmu event may have already been freed at this point. Add a null
check inside __perf_event_read_cpu() as well before accessing the pmu
ptr.
Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index f19d27ac411d..bb90034a2054 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4788,14 +4788,19 @@ static inline const struct cpumask *perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(unsigned int
static int __perf_event_read_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int event_cpu)
{
+ struct pmu *pmu = READ_ONCE(event->pmu);
int local_cpu = smp_processor_id();
u16 local_pkg, event_pkg;
if ((unsigned)event_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
return event_cpu;
+ if (!pmu)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
if (event->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_READ_SCOPE) {
- const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(event->pmu->scope, event_cpu);
+ const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(pmu->scope,
+ event_cpu);
if (cpumask && cpumask_test_cpu(local_cpu, cpumask))
return local_cpu;
@@ -4917,6 +4922,11 @@ int perf_event_read_local(struct perf_event *event, u64 *value,
goto out;
}
+ if (READ_ONCE(event->state) <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_REVOKED) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
/*
* Get the event CPU numbers, and adjust them to local if the event is
* a per-package event that can be read locally
--
2.38.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access Vinay Belgaumkar
@ 2026-09-01 21:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 0:55 ` Mi, Dapeng
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-09-01 21:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Vinay Belgaumkar; +Cc: dri-devel, intel-xe
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] The added checks for `event->pmu` and `event->state` are insufficient to prevent Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) races during concurrent PMU unregistration, leading to potential NULL pointer dereferences or Use-After-Free.
--
commit af8b37d090911ccca2049c1eddb3328a00155104
Author: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access
This commit adds checks in __perf_event_read_cpu() and perf_event_read_local()
to verify that the PMU pointer is valid and the event state is not revoked
before proceeding. This aims to prevent null pointer access when reading PMU
events.
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index 7777e82aad5e7..059f82f0cadd4 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -4788,14 +4788,19 @@ static inline const struct cpumask *perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(unsigned int
>
> static int __perf_event_read_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int event_cpu)
> {
> + struct pmu *pmu = READ_ONCE(event->pmu);
> int local_cpu = smp_processor_id();
> u16 local_pkg, event_pkg;
>
> if ((unsigned)event_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
> return event_cpu;
>
> + if (!pmu)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> if (event->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_READ_SCOPE) {
> - const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(event->pmu->scope, event_cpu);
> + const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(pmu->scope,
> + event_cpu);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does caching the PMU pointer here leave us
vulnerable to a Use-After-Free?
If the PMU driver is concurrently unloaded (e.g., via module unload),
perf_pmu_unregister() executes synchronize_rcu() before detaching events. A
BPF program starting after the RCU sync might still find the event in its map
and race with __pmu_detach_event().
Even though we pass the new !pmu check, if the concurrent unregistration
completes and frees the driver's memory immediately after, accessing
pmu->scope could result in a Use-After-Free.
[ ... ]
> @@ -4917,6 +4922,11 @@ int perf_event_read_local(struct perf_event *event, u64 *value,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + if (READ_ONCE(event->state) <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_REVOKED) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this check completely prevent the NULL
pointer dereference further down in the function?
Later in perf_event_read_local(), there is this call:
if (event_oncpu == smp_processor_id())
event->pmu->read(event);
If a BPF program invokes perf_event_read_local() concurrently with PMU
unregistration, the READ_ONCE(event->state) check might pass. However,
__pmu_detach_event() forcefully sets event->pmu = NULL without waiting for
perf_event_read_local() to finish. This could cause the subsequent
event->pmu->read(event) to dereference a NULL pointer.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260901211915.127704-1-vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event()
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() Vinay Belgaumkar
@ 2026-09-02 0:54 ` Mi, Dapeng
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Mi, Dapeng @ 2026-09-02 0:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Vinay Belgaumkar, intel-xe; +Cc: dri-devel, Alexander Kanevskiy
On 9/2/2026 5:19 AM, Vinay Belgaumkar wrote:
> A typical module unload occurring event when there is an active perf
> connection leads to freeing of the pmu pointer. The call log is something
> like:
> ..
> __pmu_detach_event
> pmu_detach_event
> pmu_detach_events
> perf_pmu_unregister
> ..
>
> __pmu_detach_event() sets event->pmu to null. When the perf connection
> finally is closed, the following stack trace is observed:
>
> Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference
> ...
> RIP: 0010:_free_event+0x3e/0x370
> ...
> Call Trace:
> ...
> perf_event_release_kernel+0x260/0x2d0
> perf_release+0x12/0x20
>
> A call to mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() inside _free_event() is the root
> cause of this crash. Adding a check to is_include_guest_event() ensures
> we don't accidentally access a null ptr.
Better mention adding an extra mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() call before
clearing event->pmu to ensure the nr_include_guest_events count is
correctly decreased.
>
> v2: Add another check to prevent null access (sashiko)
> v3: Use READ_ONCE for checking pmu state (sashiko)
> v4: READ_ONCE for the pmu check as well (sashiko)
> v5: Improve commit message and split patch into 2 (Dapeng)
Please remove this version history in the formal patch.
Others look good to me. Thanks.
>
> Fixes: eff95e170275 ("perf: Add APIs to create/release mediated guest vPMUs")
> Cc: Alexander Kanevskiy <alexander.kanevskiy@intel.com>
> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
> Assisted-by: Claude:Claude-Sonnet-5
> Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index 94ca277e0819..f19d27ac411d 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -6350,6 +6350,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(perf_mediated_pmu_mutex);
> /* !exclude_guest event of PMU with PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU */
> static inline bool is_include_guest_event(struct perf_event *event)
> {
> + if (!event->pmu)
> + return false;
> +
> if ((event->pmu->capabilities & PERF_PMU_CAP_MEDIATED_VPMU) &&
> !event->attr.exclude_guest)
> return true;
> @@ -12977,6 +12980,7 @@ static void __pmu_detach_event(struct pmu *pmu, struct perf_event *event,
> exclusive_event_destroy(event);
> module_put(pmu->module);
>
> + mediated_pmu_unaccount_event(event);
> event->pmu = NULL; /* force fault instead of UAF */
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:41 ` sashiko-bot
@ 2026-09-02 0:55 ` Mi, Dapeng
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Mi, Dapeng @ 2026-09-02 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Vinay Belgaumkar, intel-xe; +Cc: dri-devel
LGTM. Thanks.
On 9/2/2026 5:19 AM, Vinay Belgaumkar wrote:
> Sashiko recommended some additional checks to prevent null pointer
> access. Check for revoked states inside perf_event_read_local(), as
> the pmu event may have already been freed at this point. Add a null
> check inside __perf_event_read_cpu() as well before accessing the pmu
> ptr.
>
> Cc: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Vinay Belgaumkar <vinay.belgaumkar@intel.com>
> ---
> kernel/events/core.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index f19d27ac411d..bb90034a2054 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -4788,14 +4788,19 @@ static inline const struct cpumask *perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(unsigned int
>
> static int __perf_event_read_cpu(struct perf_event *event, int event_cpu)
> {
> + struct pmu *pmu = READ_ONCE(event->pmu);
> int local_cpu = smp_processor_id();
> u16 local_pkg, event_pkg;
>
> if ((unsigned)event_cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
> return event_cpu;
>
> + if (!pmu)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> if (event->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_READ_SCOPE) {
> - const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(event->pmu->scope, event_cpu);
> + const struct cpumask *cpumask = perf_scope_cpu_topology_cpumask(pmu->scope,
> + event_cpu);
>
> if (cpumask && cpumask_test_cpu(local_cpu, cpumask))
> return local_cpu;
> @@ -4917,6 +4922,11 @@ int perf_event_read_local(struct perf_event *event, u64 *value,
> goto out;
> }
>
> + if (READ_ONCE(event->state) <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_REVOKED) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * Get the event CPU numbers, and adjust them to local if the event is
> * a per-package event that can be read locally
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-02 0:55 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-09-01 21:19 [PATCH v5 0/2] perf: Add some null ptr checks Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-02 0:54 ` Mi, Dapeng
2026-09-01 21:19 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] perf: Add checks to prevent null ptr access Vinay Belgaumkar
2026-09-01 21:41 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 0:55 ` Mi, Dapeng
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox