From: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: git@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] commit: handle large commit messages in utf8 verification
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 22:23:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260516022310.GB744303@coredump.intra.peff.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260516021343.GA174647@coredump.intra.peff.net>
Running t4205 under UBSan with the EXPENSIVE prereq enabled triggers an
error when we try to create a commit message that is over 2GB:
commit.c:1574:6: runtime error: signed integer overflow:
-2147483648 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'int'
The problem is that find_invalid_utf8() is not prepared to handle
large buffers, as it uses an "int" to represent buffer sizes and
offsets.
We can fix this with a few changes:
1. We'll take in "len" as a size_t (which is what the caller has
anyway, since it's working with a strbuf).
2. We need to return a size_t to give the offset to the invalid utf8,
but we also need a sentinel value for "no invalid value"
(previously "-1"). Let's split these to return a bool for "found
invalid utf8" and then pass back the offset as an out-parameter.
We'll switch the function name to match the new semantics.
3. The caller in verify_utf8() uses a "long" to store buffer
positions, which is a bit funny. This goes back to 08a94a145c
(commit/commit-tree: correct latin1 to utf-8, 2012-06-28) and is
perhaps trying to match our use of "unsigned long" for object sizes
(though we don't care about it ever becoming negative here). This
should be a size_t, too, as some platforms (like Windows) still use
a 32-bit long on machines with 64-bit pointers.
4. The "bytes" field within find_invalid_utf() does not have range
problems. It is the number of bytes the utf8 sequence claims to
have, so is limited by how many bits can be set in a single 8-bit
byte. However, if we leave it as an "int" then the compiler will
complain about the sign mismatch when comparing it to "len". So
let's make it unsigned, too.
All of this is a little silly, of course, because 2GB text commit
messages are clearly nonsense. So we might consider rejecting them
outright, but it is easy enough to make these helper functions more
robust in the meantime.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
---
I tried to look carefully for any reasons why these variables could ever
be negative, but beyond the sentinel value in the return type, didn't
see one. But reviewers should double check. Note that "bad_offset =
offset-1" in the context looks suspicious, but we are guaranteed that
offset has been advanced at this point.
commit.c | 31 +++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/commit.c b/commit.c
index 4385ae4329..8cf09be39d 100644
--- a/commit.c
+++ b/commit.c
@@ -1558,16 +1558,16 @@ int commit_tree(const char *msg, size_t msg_len, const struct object_id *tree,
return result;
}
-static int find_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, int len)
+static bool has_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, size_t len, size_t *bad_offset)
{
- int offset = 0;
+ size_t offset = 0;
static const unsigned int max_codepoint[] = {
0x7f, 0x7ff, 0xffff, 0x10ffff
};
while (len) {
unsigned char c = *buf++;
- int bytes, bad_offset;
+ unsigned bytes;
unsigned int codepoint;
unsigned int min_val, max_val;
@@ -1578,7 +1578,7 @@ static int find_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, int len)
if (c < 0x80)
continue;
- bad_offset = offset-1;
+ *bad_offset = offset-1;
/*
* Count how many more high bits set: that's how
@@ -1595,11 +1595,11 @@ static int find_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, int len)
* codepoints beyond U+10FFFF, which are guaranteed never to exist.
*/
if (bytes < 1 || 3 < bytes)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
/* Do we *have* that many bytes? */
if (len < bytes)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
/*
* Place the encoded bits at the bottom of the value and compute the
@@ -1617,23 +1617,23 @@ static int find_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, int len)
codepoint <<= 6;
codepoint |= *buf & 0x3f;
if ((*buf++ & 0xc0) != 0x80)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
} while (--bytes);
/* Reject codepoints that are out of range for the sequence length. */
if (codepoint < min_val || codepoint > max_val)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
/* Surrogates are only for UTF-16 and cannot be encoded in UTF-8. */
if ((codepoint & 0x1ff800) == 0xd800)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
/* U+xxFFFE and U+xxFFFF are guaranteed non-characters. */
if ((codepoint & 0xfffe) == 0xfffe)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
/* So are anything in the range U+FDD0..U+FDEF. */
if (codepoint >= 0xfdd0 && codepoint <= 0xfdef)
- return bad_offset;
+ return true;
}
- return -1;
+ return false;
}
/*
@@ -1645,15 +1645,14 @@ static int find_invalid_utf8(const char *buf, int len)
static int verify_utf8(struct strbuf *buf)
{
int ok = 1;
- long pos = 0;
+ size_t pos = 0;
for (;;) {
- int bad;
+ size_t bad;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char replace[2];
- bad = find_invalid_utf8(buf->buf + pos, buf->len - pos);
- if (bad < 0)
+ if (!has_invalid_utf8(buf->buf + pos, buf->len - pos, &bad))
return ok;
pos += bad;
ok = 0;
--
2.54.0.490.gaeb18d0c26
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-16 2:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-15 23:43 UBSan failing on expensive test(s) Junio C Hamano
2026-05-16 2:13 ` Jeff King
2026-05-16 2:16 ` [PATCH 1/2] apply: plug leak on "patch too large" error Jeff King
2026-05-16 2:23 ` Jeff King [this message]
2026-05-16 2:55 ` UBSan failing on expensive test(s) Derrick Stolee
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