From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: vladimir.oltean@nxp.com
Cc: imx@lists.linux.dev, Frank.Li@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 net 1/8] net: enetc: consistently track dropped frames in enetc_xdp_xmit()
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 10:56:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-174210@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261015105536.1692348-2-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] enetc: Use-After-Free in enetc_xdp_xmit() racing with enetc_close() teardown
- [High] enetc: OOB array access if CPUs exceed hardware TX rings
- [High] enetc: TX ring corruption when XDP_REDIRECT overlaps with network stack
--
commit 805311ddad67da52149365adfc7772abd1f8ca5b
Author: vladimir.oltean@nxp.com <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
net: enetc: consistently track dropped frames in enetc_xdp_xmit()
This patch updates enetc_xdp_xmit() to consistently increment the xdp_tx_drops
counter for all silently dropped frames. It routes early failures and batch
failures to a common exit path to ensure statistics are updated accurately.
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c
> index 80f0082f6c633..26abc5fafd188 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc.c
> @@ -1814,15 +1814,18 @@ int enetc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *ndev, int num_frames,
> struct enetc_bdr *tx_ring;
> int xdp_tx_bd_cnt, i, k;
> int xdp_tx_frm_cnt = 0;
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + tx_ring = priv->xdp_tx_ring[smp_processor_id()];
[Severity: High]
Can tx_ring point to out-of-bounds memory here if the system has more
possible CPUs than hardware TX rings?
During initialization, the driver configures:
first_xdp_tx_ring = priv->num_tx_rings - num_possible_cpus();
priv->xdp_tx_ring = &priv->tx_ring[first_xdp_tx_ring];
If num_possible_cpus() is greater than priv->num_tx_rings,
first_xdp_tx_ring becomes negative, leaving priv->xdp_tx_ring pointing
out-of-bounds.
Because this patch moves the tx_ring assignment before the ENETDOWN check
and adds an unconditional dereference of tx_ring->stats in the goto out
path, an XDP_REDIRECT to this interface will now dereference this invalid
pointer and crash, whereas previously it would safely return -ENETDOWN.
[Severity: High]
Does this setup cause concurrent, lockless modifications of a TX ring
that is already in use by the network stack?
When no local XDP program is loaded, enetc_num_stack_tx_queues() allocates
all priv->num_tx_rings to the network stack. However, the driver also
unconditionally assigns priv->xdp_tx_ring to point to the uppermost
hardware queues.
If another interface uses XDP_REDIRECT to send frames to this device,
enetc_xdp_xmit() executes locklessly here, concurrently modifying the
same TX ring that the standard network stack is using under the Qdisc
__netif_tx_lock, leading to queue corruption.
>
> if (unlikely(test_bit(ENETC_TX_DOWN, &priv->flags) ||
> - !netif_carrier_ok(ndev)))
> - return -ENETDOWN;
> + !netif_carrier_ok(ndev))) {
> + err = -ENETDOWN;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> enetc_lock_mdio();
>
> - tx_ring = priv->xdp_tx_ring[smp_processor_id()];
> -
> prefetchw(ENETC_TXBD(*tx_ring, tx_ring->next_to_use));
[ ... ]
> @@ -1853,11 +1855,13 @@ int enetc_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *ndev, int num_frames,
> if (unlikely((flags & XDP_XMIT_FLUSH) || k != xdp_tx_frm_cnt))
> enetc_update_tx_ring_tail(tx_ring);
>
> - tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx += xdp_tx_frm_cnt;
> -
> enetc_unlock_mdio();
>
> - return xdp_tx_frm_cnt;
> +out:
> + tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx += xdp_tx_frm_cnt;
[Severity: High]
Will this result in a use-after-free if it races with the interface teardown?
In the teardown path, enetc_close() does not wait for RCU or hold a
synchronization lock against remote XDP_REDIRECT threads before freeing
the TX rings:
enetc_close()
enetc_stop()
set_bit(ENETC_TX_DOWN, &priv->flags);
...
enetc_assign_tx_resources(priv, NULL);
Since this patch changes the early ENETDOWN check to jump to the out
label instead of returning immediately, the code will now unconditionally
dereference tx_ring->stats here even if the interface is going down
and the resources have already been freed.
> + tx_ring->stats.xdp_tx_drops += num_frames - xdp_tx_frm_cnt;
> +
> + return err ?: xdp_tx_frm_cnt;
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261015105536.1692348-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-16 10:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-15 10:55 [PATCH v4 net 0/8] Fix short frame transmission in enetc vladimir.oltean
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 1/8] net: enetc: consistently track dropped frames in enetc_xdp_xmit() vladimir.oltean
2026-10-16 10:56 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 2/8] net: enetc: serialize access to the same TX ring from NAPI XDP_TX and ndo_xdp_xmit() vladimir.oltean
2026-10-16 10:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 3/8] net: enetc: fix bogus TX ring consumer index after reinitialization vladimir.oltean
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 4/8] net: enetc: do not rely on mEMAC hardware frame padding vladimir.oltean
2026-10-16 10:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 5/8] net: enetc: ensure head buffer has at least 16 octets vladimir.oltean
2026-10-16 10:56 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 6/8] net: enetc: pad short XDP frames in software vladimir.oltean
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 7/8] net: enetc: fix leak of pending XDP_TX frames when going down vladimir.oltean
2026-10-15 10:55 ` [PATCH v4 net 8/8] net: enetc: ensure enetc_xdp_xmit() calls enetc_update_tx_ring_tail() vladimir.oltean
2026-10-16 10:56 ` sashiko-bot
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