From: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
To: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: "Jia Yao" <jia.yao@intel.com>,
"Matthew Brost" <matthew.brost@intel.com>,
"Shuicheng Lin" <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>,
"Himal Prasad Ghimiray" <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>,
"Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>,
"Rodrigo Vivi" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
"Matthew Auld" <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise
Date: Tue, 3 Feb 2026 21:06:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260203210659.1194480-1-jia.yao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260203172045.1154546-1-jia.yao@intel.com>
When user provides a bogus pat_index value through the madvise IOCTL, the
xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() function performs an array access without
validating bounds. This allows a malicious user to trigger an out-of-bounds
kernel read from the xe->pat.table array.
The vulnerability exists because the validation in madvise_args_are_sane()
directly calls xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val) without
first checking if pat_index is within [0, xe->pat.n_entries).
Although xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() has a WARN_ON to catch this in debug
builds, it still performs the unsafe array access in production kernels.
v2(Matthew Auld)
- Using array_index_nospec() to mitigate spectre attacks when the value
is used
Fixes: ada7486c5668 ("drm/xe: Implement madvise ioctl for xe")
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>
Cc: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>
Cc: "Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
index add9a6ca2390..3564e1442694 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
@@ -291,7 +291,12 @@ static bool madvise_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe, const struct drm_xe_madv
break;
case DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PAT:
{
- u16 coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val);
+ if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, args->pat_index.val >= xe->pat.n_entries))
+ return false;
+
+ u16 pat_index = array_index_nospec(args->pat_index.val, xe->pat.n_entries);
+
+ u16 coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, pat_index);
if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, !coh_mode))
return false;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-03 21:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-03 17:20 [PATCH] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise Jia Yao
2026-02-03 17:27 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for " Patchwork
2026-02-03 17:29 ` [PATCH] " Matthew Auld
2026-02-03 18:02 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure for " Patchwork
2026-02-03 21:06 ` Jia Yao [this message]
2026-02-04 15:44 ` [PATCH v2] " Matthew Auld
2026-02-04 18:15 ` Yao, Jia
2026-02-05 10:21 ` Matthew Auld
2026-02-03 21:14 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev2) Patchwork
2026-02-03 21:47 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-03 22:33 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev3) Patchwork
2026-02-03 23:06 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-04 13:05 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: " Patchwork
2026-02-05 0:10 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev4) Patchwork
2026-02-05 0:43 ` ✓ Xe.CI.BAT: " Patchwork
2026-02-05 15:38 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-05 16:15 ` [PATCH v3] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise Jia Yao
2026-02-05 16:30 ` Matthew Auld
2026-02-05 16:22 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev5) Patchwork
2026-02-05 17:03 ` ✓ Xe.CI.BAT: " Patchwork
2026-02-06 15:19 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: failure " Patchwork
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