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From: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
To: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: "Jia Yao" <jia.yao@intel.com>,
	"Matthew Auld" <matthew.auld@intel.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, "Matthew Brost" <matthew.brost@intel.com>,
	"Shuicheng Lin" <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>,
	"Himal Prasad Ghimiray" <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>,
	"Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>,
	"Rodrigo Vivi" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise
Date: Thu,  5 Feb 2026 16:15:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260205161529.1819276-1-jia.yao@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260203172045.1154546-1-jia.yao@intel.com>

When user provides a bogus pat_index value through the madvise IOCTL, the
xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() function performs an array access without
validating bounds. This allows a malicious user to trigger an out-of-bounds
kernel read from the xe->pat.table array.

The vulnerability exists because the validation in madvise_args_are_sane()
directly calls xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val) without
first checking if pat_index is within [0, xe->pat.n_entries).

Although xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode() has a WARN_ON to catch this in debug
builds, it still performs the unsafe array access in production kernels.

v2(Matthew Auld)
- Using array_index_nospec() to mitigate spectre attacks when the value
is used

v3(Matthew Auld)
- Put the declarations at the start of the block

Fixes: ada7486c5668 ("drm/xe: Implement madvise ioctl for xe")
Reviewed-by: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.18+
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Shuicheng Lin <shuicheng.lin@intel.com>
Cc: Himal Prasad Ghimiray <himal.prasad.ghimiray@intel.com>
Cc: "Thomas Hellström" <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jia Yao <jia.yao@intel.com>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
index add9a6ca2390..091e450b781c 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_vm_madvise.c
@@ -246,6 +246,10 @@ static int xe_vm_invalidate_madvise_range(struct xe_vm *vm, u64 start, u64 end)
 
 static bool madvise_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe, const struct drm_xe_madvise *args)
 {
+	s32 fd;
+	u16 pat_index;
+	u16 coh_mode;
+
 	if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, !args))
 		return false;
 
@@ -261,7 +265,7 @@ static bool madvise_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe, const struct drm_xe_madv
 	switch (args->type) {
 	case DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PREFERRED_LOC:
 	{
-		s32 fd = (s32)args->preferred_mem_loc.devmem_fd;
+		fd = (s32)args->preferred_mem_loc.devmem_fd;
 
 		if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, fd < DRM_XE_PREFERRED_LOC_DEFAULT_SYSTEM))
 			return false;
@@ -291,8 +295,11 @@ static bool madvise_args_are_sane(struct xe_device *xe, const struct drm_xe_madv
 		break;
 	case DRM_XE_MEM_RANGE_ATTR_PAT:
 	{
-		u16 coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, args->pat_index.val);
+		if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, args->pat_index.val >= xe->pat.n_entries))
+			return false;
 
+		pat_index = array_index_nospec(args->pat_index.val, xe->pat.n_entries);
+		coh_mode = xe_pat_index_get_coh_mode(xe, pat_index);
 		if (XE_IOCTL_DBG(xe, !coh_mode))
 			return false;
 
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-05 16:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-03 17:20 [PATCH] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise Jia Yao
2026-02-03 17:27 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for " Patchwork
2026-02-03 17:29 ` [PATCH] " Matthew Auld
2026-02-03 18:02 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure for " Patchwork
2026-02-03 21:06 ` [PATCH v2] " Jia Yao
2026-02-04 15:44   ` Matthew Auld
2026-02-04 18:15     ` Yao, Jia
2026-02-05 10:21       ` Matthew Auld
2026-02-03 21:14 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev2) Patchwork
2026-02-03 21:47 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-03 22:33 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev3) Patchwork
2026-02-03 23:06 ` ✗ Xe.CI.BAT: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-04 13:05 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: " Patchwork
2026-02-05  0:10 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev4) Patchwork
2026-02-05  0:43 ` ✓ Xe.CI.BAT: " Patchwork
2026-02-05 15:38 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: failure " Patchwork
2026-02-05 16:15 ` Jia Yao [this message]
2026-02-05 16:30   ` [PATCH v3] drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise Matthew Auld
2026-02-05 16:22 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success for drm/xe: Add bounds check on pat_index to prevent OOB kernel read in madvise (rev5) Patchwork
2026-02-05 17:03 ` ✓ Xe.CI.BAT: " Patchwork
2026-02-06 15:19 ` ✗ Xe.CI.FULL: failure " Patchwork

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