From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Maarten Lankhorst" <dev@lankhorst.se>, intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 5/5] drm/i915: Introduce intel_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover()
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2026 13:22:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-212844@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261113124453.144408-12-dev@lankhorst.se>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [High] drm/xe: NULL dereference in xe_migrate_copy() on pre-12.70
stolen BO
- [Medium] drm/xe: unconditional return false in
xe_display_bo_fbdev_prefer_stolen()
- [Medium] drm/i915: deferred BIOS FB takeover in bios_fb_pick() breaks
FBC and drm_panic
- [Medium] drm/i915/fbdev: double unpin on error in
__intel_fbdev_fb_realloc()
--
commit 4b91f1cbc821e07604b613317e6ff23539bcbdbd
Author: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
drm/i915: Introduce intel_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover()
This commit defers the decision of whether to keep a BIOS framebuffer in
stolen memory from initial plane readout to fbdev probing via a new
intel_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover() helper, copying the framebuffer to system
memory on Xe when stolen memory is not preferred.
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_fbdev.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_fbdev.c
> index 219ee17de3f68..97d5e1279dbc1 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_fbdev.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_fbdev.c
> @@ -228,8 +228,8 @@ __intel_fbdev_fb_alloc(struct intel_display *display,
> struct drm_fb_helper_surface_size *sizes)
> {
> struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd = {};
> - struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
> struct drm_gem_object *obj;
> + struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
> int size;
>
> intel_fbdev_fill_mode_cmd(display, sizes, &mode_cmd);
> @@ -262,32 +262,68 @@ __intel_fbdev_fb_alloc(struct intel_display *display,
>
> }
>
> -static bool bios_fb_ok(const struct intel_framebuffer *fb,
> - const struct drm_fb_helper_surface_size *sizes)
> +static struct intel_framebuffer *
> +__intel_fbdev_fb_realloc(struct intel_display *display,
> + const struct drm_framebuffer *orig_fb,
> + struct drm_gem_object *obj)
> +{
> + struct drm_framebuffer *new_fb;
> + struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd = {
> + .flags = DRM_MODE_FB_MODIFIERS,
> + .width = orig_fb->width,
> + .height = orig_fb->height,
> + .pitches[0] = orig_fb->pitches[0],
> + .offsets[0] = orig_fb->offsets[0],
> + .pixel_format = orig_fb->format->format,
> + .modifier[0] = orig_fb->modifier,
> + };
> +
> + new_fb = intel_framebuffer_create(obj, orig_fb->format, &mode_cmd);
> +
> + if (IS_ERR(new_fb)) {
> + intel_bo_fbdev_destroy(obj);
> + return ERR_CAST(new_fb);
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Can this error path unpin obj twice on Xe when intel_framebuffer_create()
fails after intel_bo_framebuffer_init()?
In xe_display_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover(), copy_bo is allocated with
xe_bo_create_pin_map_novm(), which sets XE_BO_FLAG_PINNED and pins the BO
once. Inside intel_framebuffer_init(), xe_display_bo_framebuffer_init()
only takes a GEM reference, but if a later step in intel_framebuffer_init()
fails, its error unwind calls xe_display_bo_framebuffer_fini(), which sees
XE_BO_FLAG_PINNED and calls xe_bo_unpin(). Calling intel_bo_fbdev_destroy()
-> xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm() here then unpins copy_bo a second time when
pin_count is already zero, triggering an xe_assert() failure and a
WARN_ON_ONCE(!bo->pin_count) in ttm_bo_unpin().
> +
> + drm_gem_object_put(obj);
> + return to_intel_framebuffer(new_fb);
> +}
> +
> +static struct intel_framebuffer *bios_fb_pick(struct intel_framebuffer *fb,
> + const struct drm_fb_helper_surface_size *sizes)
> {
> struct intel_display *display = to_intel_display(fb->base.dev);
> int width = fb->base.width;
> int height = fb->base.height;
> int depth = fb->base.format->depth;
> int bpp = fb->base.format->cpp[0] * 8;
> + struct drm_gem_object *new;
>
> if (sizes->fb_width > width || sizes->fb_height > height) {
> drm_dbg_kms(display->drm,
> "BIOS fb too small (%dx%d), we require (%dx%d), releasing it\n",
> width, height, sizes->fb_width, sizes->fb_height);
> - return false;
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> if (sizes->surface_depth != depth || sizes->surface_bpp != bpp) {
> drm_dbg_kms(display->drm,
> "BIOS fb using wrong depth/bpp (%d/%d), we require (%d/%d), releasing it\n",
> depth, bpp, sizes->surface_depth, sizes->surface_bpp);
> - return false;
> + return NULL;
> }
>
> - return true;
> + new = intel_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover(fb->base.obj[0]);
> + if (IS_ERR(new))
> + return ERR_CAST(new);
> + if (fb->base.obj[0] == new)
> + return fb;
> +
> + /* Different object, re-create an intel_framebuffer around it */
> + return __intel_fbdev_fb_realloc(display, &fb->base, new);
> }
>
> +
> int intel_fbdev_driver_fbdev_probe(struct drm_fb_helper *helper,
> struct drm_fb_helper_surface_size *sizes)
> {
> @@ -305,13 +341,23 @@ int intel_fbdev_driver_fbdev_probe(struct drm_fb_helper *helper,
>
> ifbdev->fb = NULL;
>
> - if (fb && !bios_fb_ok(fb, sizes)) {
> - drm_framebuffer_put(&fb->base);
> - fb = NULL;
> - }
> -
> wakeref = intel_display_rpm_get(display);
>
> + if (fb) {
> + struct intel_framebuffer *bios_fb =
> + bios_fb_pick(fb, sizes);
> +
> + if (IS_ERR(bios_fb)) {
> + drm_dbg_kms(display->drm, "Re-using BIOS fb failed (%pe).", bios_fb);
> + bios_fb = NULL;
> + }
> +
> + if (fb != bios_fb) {
> + drm_framebuffer_put(&fb->base);
> + fb = bios_fb;
> + }
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Does deferring the stolen memory check from initial_plane_vma() and
initial_plane_bo() to bios_fb_pick() regress FBC CFB allocation and
drm_panic?
Because the initial BIOS framebuffer in stolen memory is now kept across
intel_initial_commit() (and only unpinned after the later fbcon modeset
commit completes), intel_fbc_alloc_cfb() runs while the BIOS FB still
occupies more than half of stolen memory. When a 1:1 CFB no longer fits in
the remaining stolen space, find_compression_limit() either degrades FBC to
a reduced compression ratio that intel_fbc_is_cfb_ok() never upgrades after
the BIOS FB is freed, or fails with -ENOSPC.
In addition, drm_framebuffer_put(&fb->base) here only drops ifbdev's
reference while the original stolen FB remains active on
plane_state->hw.fb until fbcon performs a modeset. When console takeover is
deferred (CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_DEFERRED_TAKEOVER=y during a quiet
boot) or CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=n, the primary plane continues scanning
out the stolen BIOS FB while ifbdev->fb points to the new system memory FB.
If a panic occurs before takeover, intel_get_scanout_buffer() sees
plane_state->hw.fb != intel_fbdev_framebuffer(display->fbdev.fbdev) and
calls intel_parent_panic_setup() on the stolen BO, which fails on both i915
and Xe.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/display/xe_display_bo.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/display/xe_display_bo.c
> index d78d893210c4f..43d05a58bcb47 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/display/xe_display_bo.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/xe/display/xe_display_bo.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -152,6 +153,64 @@ bool xe_display_bo_fbdev_prefer_stolen(struct xe_device *xe, unsigned int size)
> return stolen->size >= (size * 2) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> }
>
> +static struct drm_gem_object *xe_display_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover(struct drm_gem_object *obj)
> +{
> + struct xe_bo *orig_bo = gem_to_xe_bo(obj), *copy_bo;
> + struct xe_device *xe = xe_bo_device(orig_bo);
> + struct xe_validation_ctx ctx;
> + struct drm_exec exec;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (IS_DGFX(xe) ||
> + xe_display_bo_fbdev_prefer_stolen(xe, xe_bo_size(orig_bo)))
> + return obj;
[Severity: Medium]
Does xe_display_bo_fbdev_prefer_stolen() still contain an unconditional
"return false;" right before the stolen->size check from commit "HACK:
Always fallback"?
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/display/xe_display_bo.c:xe_display_bo_fbdev_prefer_stolen() {
...
/* machine hang when doing lots of LMEMBAR accesses */
if (XE_DEVICE_WA(xe, 22019338487_display))
return false;
return false;
/*
* If the FB is too big, just don't use it since fbdev is not very
* important and we should probably use that space with FBC or other
* features.
*/
return stolen->size >= (size * 2) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
}
That makes the size check unreachable and forces
xe_display_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover() to always copy the BIOS framebuffer
out of stolen memory on every integrated Xe platform.
> +
> + copy_bo = xe_bo_create_pin_map_novm(xe, xe_device_get_root_tile(xe), xe_bo_size(orig_bo),
> + ttm_bo_type_kernel,
> + XE_BO_FLAG_FORCE_WC | XE_BO_FLAG_SYSTEM | XE_BO_FLAG_GGTT,
> + false);
> + if (IS_ERR(copy_bo))
> + return ERR_CAST(copy_bo);
> +
> + xe_validation_guard(&ctx, &xe->val, &exec, (struct xe_val_flags) {}, err) {
> + struct dma_fence *fence;
> +
> + err = drm_exec_lock_obj(&exec, &orig_bo->ttm.base);
> + drm_exec_retry_on_contention(&exec);
> + if (err)
> + break;
> +
> + err = drm_exec_lock_obj(&exec, ©_bo->ttm.base);
> + drm_exec_retry_on_contention(&exec);
> + if (err)
> + break;
> +
> + err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(orig_bo->ttm.base.resv, 1);
> + if (err)
> + break;
> +
> + err = dma_resv_reserve_fences(copy_bo->ttm.base.resv, 1);
> + if (err)
> + break;
> +
> + fence = xe_migrate_copy(xe_device_get_root_tile(xe)->migrate, orig_bo, copy_bo,
> + orig_bo->ttm.resource, copy_bo->ttm.resource, false);
[Severity: High]
Does xe_migrate_copy() dereference a NULL pointer when copying a stolen
orig_bo on integrated platforms with GRAPHICS_VERx100(xe) < 1270 (such as
Tiger Lake, Rocket Lake, Alder Lake, and Raptor Lake)?
On integrated platforms, initial_plane_bo() allocates orig_bo in
XE_PL_STOLEN, where the manager has use_tt = false and orig_bo->ttm.ttm is
NULL. Inside __xe_migrate_copy(), src_is_vram is determined by
is_devmem(), which calls xe_bo_is_stolen_devmem() and returns false when
GRAPHICS_VERx100(xe) < 1270:
drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_migrate.c:__xe_migrate_copy() {
...
bool src_is_vram = is_devmem(src_bo, src);
...
if (!src_is_vram)
xe_res_first_sg(xe_bo_sg(src_bo), 0, size, &src_it);
else
xe_res_first(src, 0, size, &src_it);
...
}
Taking the !src_is_vram branch calls xe_bo_sg(orig_bo), which dereferences
orig_bo->ttm.ttm. In addition, emit_pte() gates adding
vram_region_gpu_offset(res) on is_vram alongside setting devmem = true,
whereas pre-12.70 stolen memory needs the stolen GPU offset added without
setting the devmem PTE bit.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261113124453.144408-7-dev@lankhorst.se?part=5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-13 13:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-13 12:44 [PATCH v5 0/5] drm/xe/display: Transparant fallback from stolen to sysmem Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 12:44 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] drm/xe/display: Avoid using stolen memory for framebuffer when media gt exists Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 12:44 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] drm/xe/migrate: Support copying between sysmem and stolen Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 13:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 12:44 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] drm/xe: Raise gt frequency slightly earlier Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 13:30 ` Ville Syrjälä
2026-11-13 12:44 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] HACK: Always fallback Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 12:50 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 12:44 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] drm/i915: Introduce intel_bo_fbdev_bios_fb_takeover() Maarten Lankhorst
2026-11-13 13:21 ` Ville Syrjälä
2026-11-13 13:22 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-13 13:22 ` ✗ CI.checkpatch: warning for drm/xe/display: Transparant fallback from stolen to sysmem. (rev5) Patchwork
2026-11-13 13:24 ` ✓ CI.KUnit: success " Patchwork
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