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From: Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
To: sbauer@eng.utah.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, x86@kernel.org,
	wmealing@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	Abhiram Balasubramanian <abhiram@cs.utah.edu>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 3/3] SROP mitigation: Add sysctl to disable SROP protection.
Date: Tue,  8 Mar 2016 13:47:55 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1457470075-4586-3-git-send-email-sbauer@eng.utah.edu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1457470075-4586-1-git-send-email-sbauer@eng.utah.edu>

This patch adds a sysctl argument to disable SROP protection.

Cc: Abhiram Balasubramanian <abhiram@cs.utah.edu>
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu>
---
 include/linux/signal.h |  2 ++
 kernel/signal.c        | 12 ++++++++++--
 kernel/sysctl.c        |  8 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/signal.h b/include/linux/signal.h
index fae0618..7e580d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/signal.h
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ struct task_struct;
 
 /* for sysctl */
 extern int print_fatal_signals;
+extern int srop_disabled;
+
 /*
  * Real Time signals may be queued.
  */
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 00e4a16..dec4e20 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
 static struct kmem_cache *sigqueue_cachep;
 
 int print_fatal_signals __read_mostly;
+int srop_disabled __read_mostly;
 
 static void __user *sig_handler(struct task_struct *t, int sig)
 {
@@ -2452,6 +2453,9 @@ int verify_clear_sigcookie(unsigned long __user *sig_cookie_ptr)
 	unsigned long user_cookie;
 	unsigned long calculated_cookie;
 
+	if (srop_disabled)
+		goto out;
+
 	if (get_user(user_cookie, sig_cookie_ptr))
 		return 1;
 
@@ -2459,13 +2463,17 @@ int verify_clear_sigcookie(unsigned long __user *sig_cookie_ptr)
 
 	if (user_cookie != calculated_cookie) {
 		pr_warn("Signal protector does not match what kernel set it to"\
-			". Possible exploit attempt or buggy program!\n");
+			". Possible exploit attempt or buggy program!\n If you"\
+			" believe this is an error you can disable SROP "\
+			" Protection by #echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/"\
+			"disable-srop-protection\n");
 		return 1;
 
 	}
 
+out:
 	user_cookie = 0;
-	return put_user(user_cookie, sig_cookie_ptr)
+	return put_user(user_cookie, sig_cookie_ptr);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(verify_clear_sigcookie);
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 97715fd..6c95172 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -524,6 +524,14 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
 		.mode		= 0644,
 		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
 	},
+	{
+		.procname	= "disable-srop-protection",
+		.data		= &srop_disabled,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec,
+
+	},
 #ifdef CONFIG_SPARC
 	{
 		.procname	= "reboot-cmd",
-- 
1.9.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-08 20:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-08 20:47 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 1/3] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies Scott Bauer
2016-03-08 20:47 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3 2/3] x86: SROP mitigation: implement " Scott Bauer
2016-03-08 21:03   ` [kernel-hardening] " One Thousand Gnomes
2016-03-08 21:38     ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-08 20:47 ` Scott Bauer [this message]
2016-03-08 21:00   ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] SROP mitigation: Add sysctl to disable SROP protection One Thousand Gnomes
2016-03-10  6:36     ` Kees Cook
2016-03-10  6:46       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-08 20:58 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] SROP Mitigation: Architecture independent code for signal cookies Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-08 21:49   ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-08 21:57     ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-03-08 22:06       ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-09 22:02       ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-08 21:04 ` kbuild test robot
2016-03-09  8:32 ` Ingo Molnar
2016-03-09 22:07   ` Scotty Bauer
2016-03-09 22:22     ` Jonathan Corbet
2016-03-10  9:43       ` Ingo Molnar

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