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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>,
	Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC] ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl
Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2011 19:36:44 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110704153644.GB21350@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110704150859.GB6893@redhat.com>

On Mon, Jul 04, 2011 at 17:08 +0200, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> On 06/22, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> >
> > +void exit_shm(struct task_struct *task)
> > +{
> > +	struct nsproxy *nsp = task->nsproxy;
> > +	struct ipc_namespace *ns;
> > +
> > +	if (!nsp)
> > +		return;
> > +	ns = nsp->ipc_ns;
> > +	if (!ns || !ns->shm_rmid_forced)
> 
> This looks confusing, imho. How it is possible that ->nsproxy or
> ->ipc_ns is NULL?

I spotted the same checking logic in other places.  I don't know whether
it is redundant, I guess it can happen when the namespace is dying.
Probably it cannot happed inside of task do_exit(), only for extern
observers.


> > +		return;
> > +
> > +	/* Destroy all already created segments, but not mapped yet */
> > +	down_write(&shm_ids(ns).rw_mutex);
> > +	idr_for_each(&shm_ids(ns).ipcs_idr, &shm_try_destroy_current, ns);
> >  	up_write(&shm_ids(ns).rw_mutex);
> 
> Again, I do not pretend I understand ipc/, but it seems we can check
> ns->ipc_ids[].in_use != 0 before the slow path, no?

Looks like you're right.  Given it is do_exit(), the boost is
significant.

I'll send the patch for this thing and the locking part.


Thank you!

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  reply	other threads:[~2011-07-04 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-06-22 15:25 [kernel-hardening] [RFC] ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 16:03 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2011-06-29 22:14 ` Andrew Morton
2011-06-30  9:21   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-30 13:08     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 11:25   ` Ingo Molnar
2011-07-01 11:35     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-01 12:04       ` Ingo Molnar
2011-07-01 14:18         ` Alan Cox
2011-07-03 19:38           ` Ingo Molnar
2011-07-03 21:25             ` Alan Cox
2011-07-02 16:50       ` Solar Designer
2011-07-02 17:31   ` Solar Designer
2011-07-04 15:08 ` Oleg Nesterov
2011-07-04 15:36   ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-04 15:44     ` Oleg Nesterov
2011-07-04 16:06       ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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