messages from 2012-04-11 03:20:53 to 2013-04-04 21:00:03 UTC [more...]
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] kernel ASLR
2013-04-04 21:00 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] x86: routines to choose random kernel base offset
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] x86: build reloc tool for both 64 and 32 bit
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Security vulnerability tools
2013-03-28 7:32 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [oss-security] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 2/2] fs: Limit sys_mount to only request filesystem modules
2013-03-04 18:36 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Secure Open Source Project Guide
2013-02-06 7:02 UTC (14+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] debugfs: convert gid= argument from decimal, not octal
2013-01-02 19:06 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH/RFC] user_ns: fix missing limiting of user_ns counts
2012-12-30 11:00 UTC (8+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Linux Security Workgroup
2012-10-09 14:07 UTC (14+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [Resend][PATCH] Revert "futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecated"
2012-09-29 15:43 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Linux security workgroup usage of kernel-hardening mailing list
2012-09-25 21:08 UTC (5+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [RESEND][PATCH v2012.5 0/2] fs: add link restrictions
2012-08-12 19:32 UTC (11+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] fs: add link restriction audit reporting
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Revert "futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecated"
2012-08-06 14:57 UTC (7+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] futex: mark get_robust_list as deprecated
2012-08-03 18:06 UTC (16+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Revert "futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecated"
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Revert "futex: Mark get_robust_list as deprecated"
2012-08-03 14:40 UTC
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 0/2] proc: /proc/<pid>/environ offset fixes
2012-07-25 12:16 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 1/2] proc: environ_read() make sure offset points to environment address range
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 2/2] proc: do not allow negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] proc: /proc/<pid>/environ offset fixes
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] proc: do not allow negative offsets on /proc/<pid>/environ
2012-07-23 16:44 UTC (5+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.5 0/2] fs: add link restrictions
2012-07-02 20:17 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] fs: add link restriction audit reporting
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.4 0/2] fs: add link restrictions
2012-07-02 1:26 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] "
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] fs: add link restriction audit reporting
[kernel-hardening] RLIMIT_NPROC DoS fix
2012-06-21 0:55 UTC (3+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [owl-dev] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.3] fs: add link restrictions
2012-06-19 22:20 UTC
[kernel-hardening] Docs for PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
2012-06-07 1:29 UTC (4+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order?
2012-05-25 1:55 UTC (39+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 1/3] seccomp: Don't allow tracers to abuse RET_TRACE
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 2/3] arch/x86: move secure_computing after ptrace
` [kernel-hardening] [RFC PATCH 3/3] arch/*: move secure_computing after trace
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] Yama: add additional ptrace scopes
2012-04-19 3:40 UTC (2+ messages)
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
2012-04-18 2:53 UTC (28+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 02/15] Fix execve behavior apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 03/15] sk_run_filter: add BPF_S_ANC_SECCOMP_LD_W
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 04/15] net/compat.c,linux/filter.h: share compat_sock_fprog
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 05/15] seccomp: kill the seccomp_t typedef
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 06/15] asm/syscall.h: add syscall_get_arch
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 07/15] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 08/15] seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 09/15] seccomp: remove duplicated failure logging
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 10/15] seccomp: add SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 11/15] signal, x86: add SIGSYS info and make it synchronous
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 12/15] seccomp: Add SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 13/15] ptrace,seccomp: Add PTRACE_SECCOMP support
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 14/15] x86: Enable HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v18 15/15] Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter
` [kernel-hardening] "
` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v18 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 00/15] seccomp_filter: BPF-based syscall filtering
2012-04-16 19:11 UTC (9+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs
` [kernel-hardening] "
[kernel-hardening] [PATCH v15 00/13] seccomp_filter: syscall filtering using BPF
2012-04-11 15:41 UTC (6+ messages)
` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v15 04/13] arch/x86: add syscall_get_arch to syscall.h
` [kernel-hardening] "
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