From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
jmorris@namei.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Date: Sat, 22 Jun 2019 16:54:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <201906221654.3E113D1@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190622000358.19895-10-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 05:03:38PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
>
> When KEXEC_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
> kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down.
>
> [Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
> and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
> other lockdowns. Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA
> integration, which will be replaced by integrating with the IMA
> architecture policy patches.]
>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
-Kees
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
> ---
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 5 ++++-
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index eec7e5bb2a08..27adb4312b03 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -237,7 +237,10 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - ret = 0;
> + ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> break;
>
> /* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
> --
> 2.22.0.410.gd8fdbe21b5-goog
>
--
Kees Cook
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-22 23:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
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