From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
kexec@lists.infradead.org,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 04:14:30 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1906280411370.18880@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJusJeCYPKVFHiu6yn+mfqQe5k0RqZhbCUZEkxtXx_shMmw@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> By that metric, on a secure boot system how do we determine that code
> running in the firmware environment wasn't compromised before it
> launched the initial signed kernel?
Remote attestation tied to a hardware root of trust, before allowing
access to any further resources.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
_______________________________________________
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-27 18:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190622000358.19895-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 06/29] kexec_load: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 07/29] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 08/29] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Matthew Garrett
2019-06-24 2:01 ` Dave Young
2019-06-25 2:35 ` Dave Young
2019-06-22 0:03 ` [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down Matthew Garrett
2019-06-22 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2019-06-27 4:59 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 15:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 18:14 ` James Morris [this message]
2019-06-27 23:17 ` Matthew Garrett
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