* [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:08 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
` (12 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel, stable,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
The EFI platform firmware fallback would clobber any pre-allocated
buffers. Instead, correctly refuse to reallocate when too small (as
already done in the sysfs fallback), or perform allocation normally
when needed.
Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firm ware_request_platform()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index cdd2c9a9f38a..685edb7dd05a 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (rc)
return rc; /* rc == -ENOENT when the fw was not found */
- fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
+ if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!fw_priv->data)
+ fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
if (!fw_priv->data)
return -ENOMEM;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:08 ` Scott Branden
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel, stable,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On 2020-07-17 10:42 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> The EFI platform firmware fallback would clobber any pre-allocated
> buffers. Instead, correctly refuse to reallocate when too small (as
> already done in the sysfs fallback), or perform allocation normally
> when needed.
>
> Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firm ware_request_platform()")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
> ---
> To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
> kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 5 ++++-
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> index cdd2c9a9f38a..685edb7dd05a 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> @@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
> if (rc)
> return rc; /* rc == -ENOENT when the fw was not found */
>
> - fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
> + if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + if (!fw_priv->data)
> + fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
> if (!fw_priv->data)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:09 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
` (11 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel, stable,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++---
fs/exec.c | 7 ++++---
include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++----
7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index ca871b13524e..c2f57cedcd6f 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
int i, len;
int rc = -ENOENT;
char *path;
- enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE;
size_t msize = INT_MAX;
void *buffer = NULL;
/* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */
if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) {
buffer = fw_priv->data;
- id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER;
msize = fw_priv->allocated_size;
}
@@ -496,7 +494,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
- &size, msize, id);
+ &size, msize,
+ READING_FIRMWARE);
if (rc) {
if (rc != -ENOENT)
dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index e6e8a9a70327..2bf549757ce7 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ void *allocated = NULL;
int ret;
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
@@ -950,8 +951,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
goto out;
}
- if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER)
- *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
+ if (!*buf)
+ *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
if (!*buf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
@@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
- if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) {
+ if (allocated) {
vfree(*buf);
*buf = NULL;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3f881a892ea7..95fc775ed937 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
#endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
+/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
- id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \
id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \
id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 0c6573b98c36..26105148f4d2 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3988,7 +3988,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
{
struct load_info info = { };
loff_t size;
- void *hdr;
+ void *hdr = NULL;
int err;
err = may_init_module();
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index e9cbadade74b..ac02b7632353 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
- void *data;
+ void *data = NULL;
loff_t size;
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e3fcad871861..15a44c5022f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
{
- void *data;
+ void *data = NULL;
char *datap;
loff_t size;
int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index c1583d98c5e5..f80ee4ce4669 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
{
/*
- * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
- *
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
* firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
* of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
- * buffers?
+ * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
+ * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
*/
return 0;
}
const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
[READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
- [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
[READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
[READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:09 ` Scott Branden
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Mimi Zohar, David Howells,
Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google), linux-security-module,
Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Matthew Garrett, James Morris,
Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh, Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu,
Hans de Goede, Alexander Viro, linux-integrity,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec,
linux-kernel, stable, Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman,
Dave Olsthoorn, Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel,
Andrew Morton
On 2020-07-17 10:42 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
> that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
> should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
>
> Fixes: a098ecd2fa7d ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
> Fixes: fd90bc559bfb ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
> Fixes: 4f0496d8ffa3 ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
> ---
> To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
> kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 5 ++---
> fs/exec.c | 7 ++++---
> include/linux/fs.h | 2 +-
> kernel/module.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++----
> 7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> index ca871b13524e..c2f57cedcd6f 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> @@ -465,14 +465,12 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> int i, len;
> int rc = -ENOENT;
> char *path;
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id = READING_FIRMWARE;
> size_t msize = INT_MAX;
> void *buffer = NULL;
>
> /* Already populated data member means we're loading into a buffer */
> if (!decompress && fw_priv->data) {
> buffer = fw_priv->data;
> - id = READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER;
> msize = fw_priv->allocated_size;
> }
>
> @@ -496,7 +494,8 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
>
> /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
> rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
> - &size, msize, id);
> + &size, msize,
> + READING_FIRMWARE);
> if (rc) {
> if (rc != -ENOENT)
> dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index e6e8a9a70327..2bf549757ce7 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -927,6 +927,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> {
> loff_t i_size, pos;
> ssize_t bytes = 0;
> + void *allocated = NULL;
> int ret;
>
> if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
> @@ -950,8 +951,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> goto out;
> }
>
> - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER)
> - *buf = vmalloc(i_size);
> + if (!*buf)
> + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
> if (!*buf) {
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto out;
> @@ -980,7 +981,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
>
> out_free:
> if (ret < 0) {
> - if (id != READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER) {
> + if (allocated) {
> vfree(*buf);
> *buf = NULL;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 3f881a892ea7..95fc775ed937 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -2993,10 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
> #endif
> extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
>
> +/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
> #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
> id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
> id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
> - id(FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER, firmware) \
> id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \
> id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
> id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
> index 0c6573b98c36..26105148f4d2 100644
> --- a/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/kernel/module.c
> @@ -3988,7 +3988,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
> {
> struct load_info info = { };
> loff_t size;
> - void *hdr;
> + void *hdr = NULL;
> int err;
>
> err = may_init_module();
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index e9cbadade74b..ac02b7632353 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
>
> int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
> {
> - void *data;
> + void *data = NULL;
> loff_t size;
> int rc;
> key_perm_t perm;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index e3fcad871861..15a44c5022f7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
>
> static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
> {
> - void *data;
> + void *data = NULL;
> char *datap;
> loff_t size;
> int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index c1583d98c5e5..f80ee4ce4669 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -611,19 +611,17 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
> int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
> {
> /*
> - * READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER
> - *
> * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
> * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
> * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
> - * buffers?
> + * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
> + * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
> */
> return 0;
> }
>
> const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
> [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> - [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
> [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
> [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
> [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 01/13] firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 02/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:10 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 04/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
` (10 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel, stable,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
The "FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED" enum is a "where", not a "what". It
should not be distinguished separately from just "FIRMWARE", as this
confuses the LSMs about what is being loaded. Additionally, there was
no actual validation of the firmware contents happening.
Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firmware_request_platform()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 2 +-
include/linux/fs.h | 3 +--
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index 685edb7dd05a..6958ab1a8059 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
- rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED);
+ rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 95fc775ed937..f50a35d54a61 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2993,11 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
#endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
-/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
+/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how* nor *where*. */
#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
- id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \
id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:10 ` Scott Branden
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Mimi Zohar, David Howells,
Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google), linux-security-module,
Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Matthew Garrett, James Morris,
Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh, Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu,
Hans de Goede, Alexander Viro, linux-integrity,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec,
linux-kernel, stable, Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman,
Dave Olsthoorn, Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel,
Andrew Morton
On 2020-07-17 10:42 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> The "FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED" enum is a "where", not a "what". It
> should not be distinguished separately from just "FIRMWARE", as this
> confuses the LSMs about what is being loaded. Additionally, there was
> no actual validation of the firmware contents happening.
>
> Fixes: e4c2c0ff00ec ("firmware: Add new platform fallback mechanism and firmware_request_platform()")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
> ---
> To aid in backporting, this change is made before moving
> kernel_read_file() to separate header/source files.
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 2 +-
> include/linux/fs.h | 3 +--
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> index 685edb7dd05a..6958ab1a8059 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
> @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
> if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
> return -ENOENT;
>
> - rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED);
> + rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
> if (rc)
> return rc;
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 95fc775ed937..f50a35d54a61 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -2993,11 +2993,10 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
> #endif
> extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
>
> -/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how*. */
> +/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how* nor *where*. */
> #define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
> id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
> id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
> - id(FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED, firmware) \
> id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
> id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
> id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 04/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 03/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
` (9 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
Christoph Hellwig, linux-security-module, Paul Moore,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Matthew Garrett, James Morris,
Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh, Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux,
Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede, Alexander Viro, linux-integrity,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec,
linux-kernel, Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
From: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 1 +
fs/exec.c | 1 +
include/linux/fs.h | 38 ---------------------
include/linux/ima.h | 1 +
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 1 +
kernel/kexec_file.c | 1 +
kernel/module.c | 1 +
security/integrity/digsig.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 1 +
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 1 +
security/security.c | 1 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 1 +
15 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index c2f57cedcd6f..d4a413ea48ce 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 2bf549757ce7..07a7fe9ac5be 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
* formats.
*/
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index f50a35d54a61..11dd6cc7de58 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2993,44 +2993,6 @@ static inline void i_readcount_inc(struct inode *inode)
#endif
extern int do_pipe_flags(int *, int);
-/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how* nor *where*. */
-#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
- id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
- id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
- id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
- id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
- id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
- id(POLICY, security-policy) \
- id(X509_CERTIFICATE, x509-certificate) \
- id(MAX_ID, )
-
-#define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
-#define __fid_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
-
-enum kernel_read_file_id {
- __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_enumify)
-};
-
-static const char * const kernel_read_file_str[] = {
- __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_stringify)
-};
-
-static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- if ((unsigned)id >= READING_MAX_ID)
- return kernel_read_file_str[READING_UNKNOWN];
-
- return kernel_read_file_str[id];
-}
-
-extern int kernel_read_file(struct file *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
- enum kernel_read_file_id);
-extern int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
- enum kernel_read_file_id);
-extern int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
- enum kernel_read_file_id);
-extern int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int, void **, loff_t *, loff_t,
- enum kernel_read_file_id);
extern ssize_t kernel_read(struct file *, void *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t kernel_write(struct file *, const void *, size_t, loff_t *);
extern ssize_t __kernel_write(struct file *, const void *, size_t, loff_t *);
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 9164e1534ec9..148636bfcc8f 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H
#define _LINUX_IMA_H
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..78cf3d7dc835
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H
+#define _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H
+
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* This is a list of *what* is being read, not *how* nor *where*. */
+#define __kernel_read_file_id(id) \
+ id(UNKNOWN, unknown) \
+ id(FIRMWARE, firmware) \
+ id(MODULE, kernel-module) \
+ id(KEXEC_IMAGE, kexec-image) \
+ id(KEXEC_INITRAMFS, kexec-initramfs) \
+ id(POLICY, security-policy) \
+ id(X509_CERTIFICATE, x509-certificate) \
+ id(MAX_ID, )
+
+#define __fid_enumify(ENUM, dummy) READING_ ## ENUM,
+#define __fid_stringify(dummy, str) #str,
+
+enum kernel_read_file_id {
+ __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_enumify)
+};
+
+static const char * const kernel_read_file_str[] = {
+ __kernel_read_file_id(__fid_stringify)
+};
+
+static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ if ((unsigned int)id >= READING_MAX_ID)
+ return kernel_read_file_str[READING_UNKNOWN];
+
+ return kernel_read_file_str[id];
+}
+
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+ void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
+ void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
+ void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
+ void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0a0a03b36a3b..42df0d9b4c37 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef __LINUX_SECURITY_H
#define __LINUX_SECURITY_H
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 09cc78df53c6..1358069ce9e9 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <linux/elfcore.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include "kexec_internal.h"
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 26105148f4d2..e9765803601b 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index ac02b7632353..f8869be45d8f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/digsig.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 15a44c5022f7..e13ffece3726 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index f80ee4ce4669..dab4a13221cf 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e493063a3c34..f8390f6081f0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/magic.h>
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index ee5cb944f4ad..81bc95127f92 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 0ce3e73edd42..f5920115a325 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index efa6108b1ce9..5de45010fb1a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:42 ` [PATCH 04/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:11 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
` (8 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
These routines are used in places outside of exec(2), so in preparation
for refactoring them, move them into a separate source file,
fs/kernel_read_file.c.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/Makefile | 3 +-
fs/exec.c | 132 ----------------------------------------
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 fs/kernel_read_file.c
diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
index 2ce5112b02c8..a05fc247b2a7 100644
--- a/fs/Makefile
+++ b/fs/Makefile
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
- fs_types.o fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o
+ fs_types.o fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o \
+ kernel_read_file.o
ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 07a7fe9ac5be..d619b79aab30 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -923,138 +923,6 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);
-int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
- loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- loff_t i_size, pos;
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
- void *allocated = NULL;
- int ret;
-
- if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- ret = deny_write_access(file);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
- i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
- if (i_size <= 0) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
- ret = -EFBIG;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!*buf)
- *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
- if (!*buf) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- pos = 0;
- while (pos < i_size) {
- bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
- if (bytes < 0) {
- ret = bytes;
- goto out_free;
- }
-
- if (bytes == 0)
- break;
- }
-
- if (pos != i_size) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out_free;
- }
-
- ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
- if (!ret)
- *size = pos;
-
-out_free:
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (allocated) {
- vfree(*buf);
- *buf = NULL;
- }
- }
-
-out:
- allow_write_access(file);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
-
-int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
- loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- struct file *file;
- int ret;
-
- if (!path || !*path)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(file))
- return PTR_ERR(file);
-
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
- fput(file);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
-
-int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- struct file *file;
- struct path root;
- int ret;
-
- if (!path || !*path)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- task_lock(&init_task);
- get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root);
- task_unlock(&init_task);
-
- file = file_open_root(root.dentry, root.mnt, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
- path_put(&root);
- if (IS_ERR(file))
- return PTR_ERR(file);
-
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
- fput(file);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
-
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
-{
- struct fd f = fdget(fd);
- int ret = -EBADF;
-
- if (!f.file)
- goto out;
-
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
-out:
- fdput(f);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
-
#if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_AOUT) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT) || \
defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC)
ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..54d972d4befc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
+#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+ loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ loff_t i_size, pos;
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ void *allocated = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+ if (i_size <= 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
+ ret = -EFBIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!*buf)
+ *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
+ if (!*buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ pos = 0;
+ while (pos < i_size) {
+ bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
+ if (bytes < 0) {
+ ret = bytes;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pos != i_size) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+ if (!ret)
+ *size = pos;
+
+out_free:
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (allocated) {
+ vfree(*buf);
+ *buf = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ allow_write_access(file);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+ loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!path || !*path)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ fput(file);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
+ loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+ struct path root;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!path || !*path)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ task_lock(&init_task);
+ get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root);
+ task_unlock(&init_task);
+
+ file = file_open_root(root.dentry, root.mnt, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
+ path_put(&root);
+ if (IS_ERR(file))
+ return PTR_ERR(file);
+
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ fput(file);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
+
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+{
+ struct fd f = fdget(fd);
+ int ret = -EBADF;
+
+ if (!f.file)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+out:
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:11 ` Scott Branden
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> These routines are used in places outside of exec(2), so in preparation
> for refactoring them, move them into a separate source file,
> fs/kernel_read_file.c.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
> ---
> fs/Makefile | 3 +-
> fs/exec.c | 132 ----------------------------------------
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 133 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 fs/kernel_read_file.c
>
> diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile
> index 2ce5112b02c8..a05fc247b2a7 100644
> --- a/fs/Makefile
> +++ b/fs/Makefile
> @@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ obj-y := open.o read_write.o file_table.o super.o \
> seq_file.o xattr.o libfs.o fs-writeback.o \
> pnode.o splice.o sync.o utimes.o d_path.o \
> stack.o fs_struct.o statfs.o fs_pin.o nsfs.o \
> - fs_types.o fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o
> + fs_types.o fs_context.o fs_parser.o fsopen.o \
> + kernel_read_file.o
>
> ifeq ($(CONFIG_BLOCK),y)
> obj-y += buffer.o block_dev.o direct-io.o mpage.o
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 07a7fe9ac5be..d619b79aab30 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -923,138 +923,6 @@ struct file *open_exec(const char *name)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(open_exec);
>
> -int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> - loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> - loff_t i_size, pos;
> - ssize_t bytes = 0;
> - void *allocated = NULL;
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - ret = deny_write_access(file);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> -
> - ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
> - if (ret)
> - goto out;
> -
> - i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
> - if (i_size <= 0) {
> - ret = -EINVAL;
> - goto out;
> - }
> - if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> - ret = -EFBIG;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> - if (!*buf)
> - *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
> - if (!*buf) {
> - ret = -ENOMEM;
> - goto out;
> - }
> -
> - pos = 0;
> - while (pos < i_size) {
> - bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
> - if (bytes < 0) {
> - ret = bytes;
> - goto out_free;
> - }
> -
> - if (bytes == 0)
> - break;
> - }
> -
> - if (pos != i_size) {
> - ret = -EIO;
> - goto out_free;
> - }
> -
> - ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
> - if (!ret)
> - *size = pos;
> -
> -out_free:
> - if (ret < 0) {
> - if (allocated) {
> - vfree(*buf);
> - *buf = NULL;
> - }
> - }
> -
> -out:
> - allow_write_access(file);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
> -
> -int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> - loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> - struct file *file;
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (!path || !*path)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> - if (IS_ERR(file))
> - return PTR_ERR(file);
> -
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> - fput(file);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
> -
> -int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> - loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> - struct file *file;
> - struct path root;
> - int ret;
> -
> - if (!path || !*path)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - task_lock(&init_task);
> - get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root);
> - task_unlock(&init_task);
> -
> - file = file_open_root(root.dentry, root.mnt, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> - path_put(&root);
> - if (IS_ERR(file))
> - return PTR_ERR(file);
> -
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> - fput(file);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
> -
> -int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> - enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> -{
> - struct fd f = fdget(fd);
> - int ret = -EBADF;
> -
> - if (!f.file)
> - goto out;
> -
> - ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> -out:
> - fdput(f);
> - return ret;
> -}
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
> -
> #if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_AOUT) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT) || \
> defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC)
> ssize_t read_code(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, loff_t pos, size_t len)
> diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..54d972d4befc
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
> +#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> +
> +int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> + loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + loff_t i_size, pos;
> + ssize_t bytes = 0;
> + void *allocated = NULL;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + ret = deny_write_access(file);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out;
> +
> + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
> + if (i_size <= 0) {
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> + ret = -EFBIG;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (!*buf)
> + *buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
> + if (!*buf) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + pos = 0;
> + while (pos < i_size) {
> + bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
> + if (bytes < 0) {
> + ret = bytes;
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> +
> + if (bytes == 0)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (pos != i_size) {
> + ret = -EIO;
> + goto out_free;
> + }
> +
> + ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
> + if (!ret)
> + *size = pos;
> +
> +out_free:
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + if (allocated) {
> + vfree(*buf);
> + *buf = NULL;
> + }
> + }
> +
> +out:
> + allow_write_access(file);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
> +
> +int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> + loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + struct file *file;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!path || !*path)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(file))
> + return PTR_ERR(file);
> +
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> + fput(file);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
> +
> +int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> + loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + struct file *file;
> + struct path root;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (!path || !*path)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + task_lock(&init_task);
> + get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root);
> + task_unlock(&init_task);
> +
> + file = file_open_root(root.dentry, root.mnt, path, O_RDONLY, 0);
> + path_put(&root);
> + if (IS_ERR(file))
> + return PTR_ERR(file);
> +
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> + fput(file);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
> +
> +int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> +{
> + struct fd f = fdget(fd);
> + int ret = -EBADF;
> +
> + if (!f.file)
> + goto out;
> +
> + ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> +out:
> + fdput(f);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_fd);
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 05/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:04 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-21 21:43 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
` (7 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 2 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
size_t in_size,
const void *in_buffer))
{
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int i, len;
int rc = -ENOENT;
char *path;
@@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
fw_priv->size = 0;
/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
- &size, msize,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
READING_FIRMWARE);
- if (rc) {
+ if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -ENOENT)
dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
path, rc);
@@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
path);
continue;
}
+ size = rc;
dev_dbg(device, "Loading firmware from %s\n", path);
if (decompress) {
dev_dbg(device, "f/w decompressing %s\n",
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index 54d972d4befc..dc28a8def597 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
+ if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
@@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
}
ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
- if (!ret)
- *size = pos;
out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -72,11 +70,11 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
out:
allow_write_access(file);
- return ret;
+ return ret == 0 ? pos : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -89,14 +87,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -115,13 +113,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
@@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
if (!f.file)
goto out;
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
index 78cf3d7dc835..0ca0bdbed1bd 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
- void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, loff_t max_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 1358069ce9e9..a201bbb19158 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -220,13 +220,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
{
int ret;
void *ldata;
- loff_t size;
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
- &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
- if (ret)
+ INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+ if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- image->kernel_buf_len = size;
+ image->kernel_buf_len = ret;
/* Call arch image probe handlers */
ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
@@ -243,11 +242,11 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
- &size, INT_MAX,
+ INT_MAX,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
- if (ret)
+ if (ret < 0)
goto out;
- image->initrd_buf_len = size;
+ image->initrd_buf_len = ret;
}
if (cmdline_len) {
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index e9765803601b..b6fd4f51cc30 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -3988,7 +3988,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
{
struct load_info info = { };
- loff_t size;
void *hdr = NULL;
int err;
@@ -4002,12 +4001,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
return -EINVAL;
- err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
+ err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX,
READING_MODULE);
- if (err)
+ if (err < 0)
return err;
info.hdr = hdr;
- info.len = size;
+ info.len = err;
return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index f8869be45d8f..97661ffabc4e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -171,16 +171,17 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e13ffece3726..9ba145d3d6d9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
char *datap;
- loff_t size;
+ size_t size;
int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
char *p;
@@ -284,11 +284,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
}
+ size = rc;
datap = data;
while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:04 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 19:55 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 22:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-21 21:43 ` Scott Branden
1 sibling, 2 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Hi Kees,
On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
> "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
I don't think the size argument is redundant though.
The existing kernel_read_file functions always read the whole file.
Now, what happens if the file is bigger than the buffer.
How does kernel_read_file know it read the whole file by looking at the
return value?
> code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
> INT_MAX.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
> kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
> 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> size_t in_size,
> const void *in_buffer))
> {
> - loff_t size;
> + size_t size;
> int i, len;
> int rc = -ENOENT;
> char *path;
> @@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> fw_priv->size = 0;
>
> /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
> - &size, msize,
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
> READING_FIRMWARE);
> - if (rc) {
> + if (rc < 0) {
> if (rc != -ENOENT)
> dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
> path, rc);
> @@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> path);
> continue;
> }
> + size = rc;
> dev_dbg(device, "Loading firmware from %s\n", path);
> if (decompress) {
> dev_dbg(device, "f/w decompressing %s\n",
> diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> index 54d972d4befc..dc28a8def597 100644
> --- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>
> -int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> +int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
> loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> loff_t i_size, pos;
> @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> ret = -EINVAL;
> goto out;
> }
> - if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> + if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
Should this be SSIZE_MAX?
> ret = -EFBIG;
> goto out;
> }
> @@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> }
>
> ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
> - if (!ret)
> - *size = pos;
>
> out_free:
> if (ret < 0) {
> @@ -72,11 +70,11 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
>
> out:
> allow_write_access(file);
> - return ret;
> + return ret == 0 ? pos : ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
>
> -int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> +int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
> loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct file *file;
> @@ -89,14 +87,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf, loff_t *size,
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
> fput(file);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
>
> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> - loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct file *file;
> @@ -115,13 +113,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
> if (IS_ERR(file))
> return PTR_ERR(file);
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
> fput(file);
> return ret;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
>
> -int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> +int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> {
> struct fd f = fdget(fd);
> @@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> if (!f.file)
> goto out;
>
> - ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
> + ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
> out:
> fdput(f);
> return ret;
> diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> index 78cf3d7dc835..0ca0bdbed1bd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
> @@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> }
>
> int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
> int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 1358069ce9e9..a201bbb19158 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -220,13 +220,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> {
> int ret;
> void *ldata;
> - loff_t size;
>
> ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
> - &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> - if (ret)
> + INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
> + if (ret < 0)
> return ret;
> - image->kernel_buf_len = size;
> + image->kernel_buf_len = ret;
>
> /* Call arch image probe handlers */
> ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
> @@ -243,11 +242,11 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
> /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
> if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
> ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
> - &size, INT_MAX,
> + INT_MAX,
> READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
> - if (ret)
> + if (ret < 0)
> goto out;
> - image->initrd_buf_len = size;
> + image->initrd_buf_len = ret;
> }
>
> if (cmdline_len) {
> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
> index e9765803601b..b6fd4f51cc30 100644
> --- a/kernel/module.c
> +++ b/kernel/module.c
> @@ -3988,7 +3988,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
> {
> struct load_info info = { };
> - loff_t size;
> void *hdr = NULL;
> int err;
>
> @@ -4002,12 +4001,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
> |MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
> + err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX,
> READING_MODULE);
> - if (err)
> + if (err < 0)
> return err;
> info.hdr = hdr;
> - info.len = size;
> + info.len = err;
>
> return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
> }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> index f8869be45d8f..97661ffabc4e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
> @@ -171,16 +171,17 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,
> int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
> {
> void *data = NULL;
> - loff_t size;
> + size_t size;
> int rc;
> key_perm_t perm;
>
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
> READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
> if (rc < 0) {
> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
> return rc;
> }
> + size = rc;
>
> perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ;
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index e13ffece3726..9ba145d3d6d9 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
> {
> void *data = NULL;
> char *datap;
> - loff_t size;
> + size_t size;
> int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
>
> char *p;
> @@ -284,11 +284,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
> datap = path;
> strsep(&datap, "\n");
>
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, READING_POLICY);
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
> if (rc < 0) {
> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
> return rc;
> }
> + size = rc;
>
> datap = data;
> while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 19:04 ` Scott Branden
@ 2020-07-17 19:55 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 22:06 ` Kees Cook
1 sibling, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On 2020-07-17 12:04 p.m., Scott Branden wrote:
> Hi Kees,
>
> On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
>> In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
>> "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
> I don't think the size argument is redundant though.
> The existing kernel_read_file functions always read the whole file.
> Now, what happens if the file is bigger than the buffer.
> How does kernel_read_file know it read the whole file by looking at
> the return value?
Actually, this change looks ok dealing with the size. I'll look at the
rest.
>
>> code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
>> INT_MAX.)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
>> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
>> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
>> kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
>> kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
>> security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
>> 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
>> b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
>> index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
>> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
>> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
>> @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
>> struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
>> size_t in_size,
>> const void *in_buffer))
>> {
>> - loff_t size;
>> + size_t size;
>> int i, len;
>> int rc = -ENOENT;
>> char *path;
>> @@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device
>> *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
>> fw_priv->size = 0;
>> /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
>> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
>> - &size, msize,
>> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
>> READING_FIRMWARE);
>> - if (rc) {
>> + if (rc < 0) {
>> if (rc != -ENOENT)
>> dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
>> path, rc);
>> @@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device,
>> struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
>> path);
>> continue;
>> }
>> + size = rc;
>> dev_dbg(device, "Loading firmware from %s\n", path);
>> if (decompress) {
>> dev_dbg(device, "f/w decompressing %s\n",
>> diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
>> index 54d972d4befc..dc28a8def597 100644
>> --- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
>> +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
>> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
>> #include <linux/security.h>
>> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>> -int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
>> +int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
>> loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> {
>> loff_t i_size, pos;
>> @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
>> loff_t *size,
>> ret = -EINVAL;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> - if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
>> + if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> Should this be SSIZE_MAX?
>> ret = -EFBIG;
>> goto out;
>> }
>> @@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
>> loff_t *size,
>> }
>> ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
>> - if (!ret)
>> - *size = pos;
>> out_free:
>> if (ret < 0) {
>> @@ -72,11 +70,11 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void
>> **buf, loff_t *size,
>> out:
>> allow_write_access(file);
>> - return ret;
>> + return ret == 0 ? pos : ret;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
>> -int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
>> loff_t *size,
>> +int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
>> loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> {
>> struct file *file;
>> @@ -89,14 +87,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
>> void **buf, loff_t *size,
>> if (IS_ERR(file))
>> return PTR_ERR(file);
>> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
>> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
>> fput(file);
>> return ret;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
>> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
>> - loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> + loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> {
>> struct file *file;
>> @@ -115,13 +113,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const
>> char *path, void **buf,
>> if (IS_ERR(file))
>> return PTR_ERR(file);
>> - ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, size, max_size, id);
>> + ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
>> fput(file);
>> return ret;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
>> -int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t *size,
>> loff_t max_size,
>> +int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> {
>> struct fd f = fdget(fd);
>> @@ -130,7 +128,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf,
>> loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> if (!f.file)
>> goto out;
>> - ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, size, max_size, id);
>> + ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
>> out:
>> fdput(f);
>> return ret;
>> diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
>> b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
>> index 78cf3d7dc835..0ca0bdbed1bd 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
>> @@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char
>> *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
>> }
>> int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
>> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>> int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
>> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>> int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
>> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>> int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
>> - void **buf, loff_t *size, loff_t max_size,
>> + void **buf, loff_t max_size,
>> enum kernel_read_file_id id);
>> #endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
>> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
>> index 1358069ce9e9..a201bbb19158 100644
>> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
>> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
>> @@ -220,13 +220,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage
>> *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
>> {
>> int ret;
>> void *ldata;
>> - loff_t size;
>> ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
>> - &size, INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
>> - if (ret)
>> + INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> return ret;
>> - image->kernel_buf_len = size;
>> + image->kernel_buf_len = ret;
>> /* Call arch image probe handlers */
>> ret = arch_kexec_kernel_image_probe(image, image->kernel_buf,
>> @@ -243,11 +242,11 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage
>> *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
>> /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
>> if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
>> ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
>> - &size, INT_MAX,
>> + INT_MAX,
>> READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
>> - if (ret)
>> + if (ret < 0)
>> goto out;
>> - image->initrd_buf_len = size;
>> + image->initrd_buf_len = ret;
>> }
>> if (cmdline_len) {
>> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
>> index e9765803601b..b6fd4f51cc30 100644
>> --- a/kernel/module.c
>> +++ b/kernel/module.c
>> @@ -3988,7 +3988,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(init_module, void __user *, umod,
>> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs,
>> int, flags)
>> {
>> struct load_info info = { };
>> - loff_t size;
>> void *hdr = NULL;
>> int err;
>> @@ -4002,12 +4001,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd,
>> const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
>> |MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
>> return -EINVAL;
>> - err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, &size, INT_MAX,
>> + err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX,
>> READING_MODULE);
>> - if (err)
>> + if (err < 0)
>> return err;
>> info.hdr = hdr;
>> - info.len = size;
>> + info.len = err;
>> return load_module(&info, uargs, flags);
>> }
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> index f8869be45d8f..97661ffabc4e 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
>> @@ -171,16 +171,17 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int
>> id, const void *data,
>> int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char
>> *path)
>> {
>> void *data = NULL;
>> - loff_t size;
>> + size_t size;
>> int rc;
>> key_perm_t perm;
>> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
>> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
>> READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
>> if (rc < 0) {
>> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
>> return rc;
>> }
>> + size = rc;
>> perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW |
>> KEY_USR_READ;
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> index e13ffece3726..9ba145d3d6d9 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
>> @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
>> {
>> void *data = NULL;
>> char *datap;
>> - loff_t size;
>> + size_t size;
>> int rc, pathlen = strlen(path);
>> char *p;
>> @@ -284,11 +284,12 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
>> datap = path;
>> strsep(&datap, "\n");
>> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0,
>> READING_POLICY);
>> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
>> if (rc < 0) {
>> pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
>> return rc;
>> }
>> + size = rc;
>> datap = data;
>> while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) {
>
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 19:04 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 19:55 ` Scott Branden
@ 2020-07-17 22:06 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-18 5:44 ` Scott Branden
1 sibling, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 22:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 12:04:18PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
> On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> > In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
> > "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
>
> I don't think the size argument is redundant though.
> The existing kernel_read_file functions always read the whole file.
> Now, what happens if the file is bigger than the buffer.
> How does kernel_read_file know it read the whole file by looking at the
> return value?
Yes; an entirely reasonable concern. This is why I add the file_size
output argument later in the series.
> > code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
> > INT_MAX.)
> > [...]
> > - if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
> > + if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
>
> Should this be SSIZE_MAX?
No, for two reasons: then we need to change the return value and likely
the callers need more careful checks, and more importantly, because the
VFS already limits single read actions to INT_MAX, so limits above this
make no sense. Win win! :)
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 22:06 ` Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-18 5:44 ` Scott Branden
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-18 5:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Hi Kees,
On 2020-07-17 3:06 p.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 12:04:18PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
>> On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
>>> In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
>>> "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
>> I don't think the size argument is redundant though.
>> The existing kernel_read_file functions always read the whole file.
>> Now, what happens if the file is bigger than the buffer.
>> How does kernel_read_file know it read the whole file by looking at the
>> return value?
> Yes; an entirely reasonable concern. This is why I add the file_size
> output argument later in the series.
There is something wrong with this patch. I apply patches 1-5 and these
pass the kernel self test.
Patch 6 does not pass the kernel-selftest/firmware/fw_run_tests.sh
>>> code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
>>> INT_MAX.)
>>> [...]
>>> - if (i_size > SIZE_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
>>> + if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
>> Should this be SSIZE_MAX?
> No, for two reasons: then we need to change the return value and likely
> the callers need more careful checks, and more importantly, because the
> VFS already limits single read actions to INT_MAX, so limits above this
> make no sense. Win win! :)
>
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:04 ` Scott Branden
@ 2020-07-21 21:43 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-21 21:50 ` Kees Cook
1 sibling, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-21 21:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Hi Kees,
On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
> "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
> code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
> INT_MAX.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
> kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
> 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
> --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> size_t in_size,
> const void *in_buffer))
> {
> - loff_t size;
> + size_t size;
> int i, len;
> int rc = -ENOENT;
> char *path;
> @@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> fw_priv->size = 0;
>
> /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
> - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
> - &size, msize,
> + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
> READING_FIRMWARE);
> - if (rc) {
> + if (rc < 0) {
> if (rc != -ENOENT)
> dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
> path, rc);
> @@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> path);
> continue;
> }
> + size = rc;
Change fails to return 0. Need rc = 0; here.
> dev_dbg(device, "Loading firmware from %s\n", path);
> if (decompress) {
> dev_dbg(device, "f/w decompressing %s\n",
>
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
2020-07-21 21:43 ` Scott Branden
@ 2020-07-21 21:50 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-21 21:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On Tue, Jul 21, 2020 at 02:43:07PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
> On 2020-07-17 10:43 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> > In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
> > "size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
> > code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
> > INT_MAX.)
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 8 ++++----
> > fs/kernel_read_file.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
> > include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
> > kernel/kexec_file.c | 13 ++++++-------
> > kernel/module.c | 7 +++----
> > security/integrity/digsig.c | 5 +++--
> > security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 5 +++--
> > 7 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> > index d4a413ea48ce..ea419c7d3d34 100644
> > --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> > +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
> > @@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> > size_t in_size,
> > const void *in_buffer))
> > {
> > - loff_t size;
> > + size_t size;
> > int i, len;
> > int rc = -ENOENT;
> > char *path;
> > @@ -494,10 +494,9 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> > fw_priv->size = 0;
> > /* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
> > - rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer,
> > - &size, msize,
> > + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
> > READING_FIRMWARE);
> > - if (rc) {
> > + if (rc < 0) {
> > if (rc != -ENOENT)
> > dev_warn(device, "loading %s failed with error %d\n",
> > path, rc);
> > @@ -506,6 +505,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
> > path);
> > continue;
> > }
> > + size = rc;
> Change fails to return 0. Need rc = 0; here.
Oh nice; good catch! I'll fix this.
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 06/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-20 8:34 ` David Laight
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 08/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
` (6 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index dc28a8def597..e21a76001fff 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -5,15 +5,31 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+/**
+ * kernel_read_file() - read file contents into a kernel buffer
+ *
+ * @file file to read from
+ * @buf pointer to a "void *" buffer for reading into (if
+ * *@buf is NULL, a buffer will be allocated, and
+ * @buf_size will be ignored)
+ * @buf_size size of buf, if already allocated. If @buf not
+ * allocated, this is the largest size to allocate.
+ * @id the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of
+ * file contents being read (for LSMs to examine)
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read (no single read will be bigger
+ * than INT_MAX), or negative on error.
+ *
+ */
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
- loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
void *allocated = NULL;
int ret;
- if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
+ if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
ret = deny_write_access(file);
@@ -29,7 +45,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (i_size > INT_MAX || (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size)) {
+ if (i_size > INT_MAX || i_size > buf_size) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
@@ -75,7 +91,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
- loff_t max_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
int ret;
@@ -87,14 +103,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- loff_t max_size,
+ size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -113,13 +129,13 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
@@ -128,7 +144,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, loff_t max_size,
if (!f.file)
goto out;
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, max_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, buf_size, id);
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
index 0ca0bdbed1bd..910039e7593e 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -36,16 +36,16 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
}
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
- void **buf, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
- void **buf, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
- void **buf, loff_t max_size,
+ void **buf, size_t buf_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 97661ffabc4e..04f779c4f5ed 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 9ba145d3d6d9..8695170d0e5c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, 0, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* RE: [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-20 8:34 ` David Laight
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: David Laight @ 2020-07-20 8:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: 'Kees Cook', Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Matthew Garrett, James Morris,
Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh, Serge E. Hallyn,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton
From: Kees Cook
> Sent: 17 July 2020 18:43
> In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
> the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
> its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
> arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
> longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
> callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 ++++----
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
> 4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> index dc28a8def597..e21a76001fff 100644
> --- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> +++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
> @@ -5,15 +5,31 @@
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>
> +/**
> + * kernel_read_file() - read file contents into a kernel buffer
> + *
> + * @file file to read from
> + * @buf pointer to a "void *" buffer for reading into (if
> + * *@buf is NULL, a buffer will be allocated, and
> + * @buf_size will be ignored)
> + * @buf_size size of buf, if already allocated. If @buf not
> + * allocated, this is the largest size to allocate.
> + * @id the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of
> + * file contents being read (for LSMs to examine)
> + *
> + * Returns number of bytes read (no single read will be bigger
> + * than INT_MAX), or negative on error.
> + *
> + */
That seems to be self-inconsistent.
If '*buf' is NULL is both says that buf_size is ignored and
is treated as a limit.
To make life easier, zero should probably be treated as no-limit.
David
-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK
Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 07/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 09/13] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Kees Cook
` (5 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 1 +
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 4 ++++
kernel/kexec_file.c | 4 ++--
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 2 +-
7 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index ea419c7d3d34..3439a533927c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -495,6 +495,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
+ NULL,
READING_FIRMWARE);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc != -ENOENT)
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index e21a76001fff..2e29c38eb4df 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
* @buf_size will be ignored)
* @buf_size size of buf, if already allocated. If @buf not
* allocated, this is the largest size to allocate.
+ * @file_size if non-NULL, the full size of @file will be
+ * written here.
* @id the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of
* file contents being read (for LSMs to examine)
*
@@ -22,7 +24,8 @@
*
*/
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
- size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
ssize_t bytes = 0;
@@ -49,6 +52,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
+ if (file_size)
+ *file_size = i_size;
if (!*buf)
*buf = allocated = vmalloc(i_size);
@@ -91,7 +96,8 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
- size_t buf_size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
int ret;
@@ -103,14 +109,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- size_t buf_size,
+ size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -129,13 +135,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
@@ -144,7 +151,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
if (!f.file)
goto out;
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, buf_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
index 910039e7593e..023293eaf948 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -37,15 +37,19 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
#endif /* _LINUX_KERNEL_READ_FILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index a201bbb19158..7b0ecdc621aa 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
void *ldata;
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
- INT_MAX, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+ INT_MAX, NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
image->kernel_buf_len = ret;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
- INT_MAX,
+ INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index b6fd4f51cc30..860d713dd910 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -4001,7 +4001,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
return -EINVAL;
- err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX,
+ err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_MODULE);
if (err < 0)
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 04f779c4f5ed..8a523dfd7fd7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 8695170d0e5c..cff04083e598 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 09/13] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 08/13] fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 10/13] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Kees Cook
` (4 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 2 +-
.../base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ima.h | 12 +++++++++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 +++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 9 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 12 +++++++++--
kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 2 +-
security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
12 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
index 5327bfc6ba71..a196aacce22c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(u32 opt_flags)
return false;
/* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
- ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+ ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
if (ret < 0)
return false;
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index 6958ab1a8059..a12c79d47efc 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
- rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+ rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 148636bfcc8f..502e36ad7804 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -20,7 +20,9 @@ extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode);
extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
-extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
+extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
+extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id);
extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -78,7 +80,13 @@ static inline int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static inline int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 6791813cd439..aaa2916bbae7 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -184,7 +184,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, cred_getsecid, const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_act_as, struct cred *new, u32 secid)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_create_files_as, struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_module_request, char *kmod_name)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_read_file, struct file *file,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_read_file, struct file *file, char *buf,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 95b7c1d32062..812d626195fc 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -635,7 +635,16 @@
* @kernel_load_data:
* Load data provided by userspace.
* @id kernel load data identifier
+ * @contents if a subsequent @kernel_post_load_data will be called.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_post_load_data:
+ * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer).
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing the data contents.
+ * @size length of the data contents.
+ * @id kernel load data identifier
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * This must be paired with a prior @kernel_load_data call that had
+ * @contents set to true.
* @kernel_read_file:
* Read a file specified by userspace.
* @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 42df0d9b4c37..e748974c707b 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -387,7 +387,9 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id);
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1014,7 +1016,13 @@ static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static inline int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index f977786fe498..c82c6c06f051 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
return -EPERM;
/* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */
- result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
+ result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE, false);
if (result < 0)
return result;
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 860d713dd910..d56cb34d9a2f 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2967,7 +2967,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
return -ENOEXEC;
- err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE);
+ err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE, false);
if (err)
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index dab4a13221cf..85000dc8595c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -676,6 +676,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
/**
* ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
* @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
+ * call to ima_post_load_data().
*
* Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
* data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file
@@ -683,7 +685,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
@@ -723,6 +725,23 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
+ * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
+ * @size: size of in memory file contents
+ * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
+ *
+ * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy. Policy rules
+ * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
+ *
+ * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
+ * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
+ */
+int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id load_id)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log.
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index 81bc95127f92..db320a43f42e 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
return 0;
}
-static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f5920115a325..090674f1197a 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1680,17 +1680,29 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file);
-int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
int ret;
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_load_data, 0, id, contents);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return ima_load_data(id);
+ return ima_load_data(id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data);
+int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
+ enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_post_load_data, 0, buf, size, id);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ return ima_post_load_data(buf, size, id);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data);
+
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5de45010fb1a..1a5c68196faf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4019,7 +4019,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)
+static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
int rc = 0;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 10/13] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 09/13] LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 11/13] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
` (3 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 8 ++++----
.../base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 7 ++++++-
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 20 +++++++++----------
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
index a196aacce22c..7cfdfdcb819c 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c
@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ static ssize_t firmware_loading_store(struct device *dev,
dev_err(dev, "%s: map pages failed\n",
__func__);
else
- rc = security_kernel_post_read_file(NULL,
- fw_priv->data, fw_priv->size,
- READING_FIRMWARE);
+ rc = security_kernel_post_load_data(fw_priv->data,
+ fw_priv->size,
+ LOADING_FIRMWARE);
/*
* Same logic as fw_load_abort, only the DONE bit
@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@ static bool fw_run_sysfs_fallback(u32 opt_flags)
return false;
/* Also permit LSMs and IMA to fail firmware sysfs fallback */
- ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
+ ret = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (ret < 0)
return false;
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
index a12c79d47efc..4d1157af0e86 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (!(opt_flags & FW_OPT_FALLBACK_PLATFORM))
return -ENOENT;
- rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, false);
+ rc = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_FIRMWARE, true);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ int firmware_fallback_platform(struct fw_priv *fw_priv, u32 opt_flags)
if (fw_priv->data && size > fw_priv->allocated_size)
return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = security_kernel_post_load_data((u8 *)data, size, LOADING_FIRMWARE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
if (!fw_priv->data)
fw_priv->data = vmalloc(size);
if (!fw_priv->data)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 85000dc8595c..1a7bc4c7437d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -648,15 +648,6 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum ima_hooks func;
u32 secid;
- if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) {
- if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
- (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
- pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
- return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
/* permit signed certs */
if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
return 0;
@@ -706,7 +697,7 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
}
break;
case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
- if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE)) {
+ if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
}
@@ -739,6 +730,15 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
*/
int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id load_id)
{
+ if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
+ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
+ (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
+ pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
+ return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 11/13] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 10/13] firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data() Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 12/13] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
` (2 subsequent siblings)
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Now that there is an API for checking loaded contents for modules
loaded without a file, call into the LSM hooks.
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
kernel/module.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index d56cb34d9a2f..90a4788dff9d 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2967,7 +2967,7 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
if (info->len < sizeof(*(info->hdr)))
return -ENOEXEC;
- err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE, false);
+ err = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_MODULE, true);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2977,11 +2977,17 @@ static int copy_module_from_user(const void __user *umod, unsigned long len,
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_chunked_from_user(info->hdr, umod, info->len) != 0) {
- vfree(info->hdr);
- return -EFAULT;
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
}
- return 0;
+ err = security_kernel_post_load_data((char *)info->hdr, info->len,
+ LOADING_MODULE);
+out:
+ if (err)
+ vfree(info->hdr);
+
+ return err;
}
static void free_copy(struct load_info *info)
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 12/13] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 11/13] module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data() Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 13/13] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:17 ` [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Scott Branden
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 2 +-
include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +++
include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++--
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
security/security.c | 7 ++++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 5 +++--
9 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index 2e29c38eb4df..d73bc3fa710a 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id, true);
if (ret)
goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 502e36ad7804..259023039dc9 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot);
extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
extern int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id);
-extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents);
extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -91,7 +92,8 @@ static inline int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
return 0;
}
-static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+static inline int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index aaa2916bbae7..c2ded57c5d9b 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_load_data, enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_load_data, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_read_file, struct file *file,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, kernel_post_read_file, struct file *file, char *buf,
loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setuid, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 812d626195fc..b66433b5aa15 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -650,6 +650,7 @@
* @file contains the file structure pointing to the file being read
* by the kernel.
* @id kernel read file identifier
+ * @contents if a subsequent @kernel_post_read_file will be called.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @kernel_post_read_file:
* Read a file specified by userspace.
@@ -658,6 +659,8 @@
* @buf pointer to buffer containing the file contents.
* @size length of the file contents.
* @id kernel read file identifier
+ * This must be paired with a prior @kernel_read_file call that had
+ * @contents set to true.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_fix_setuid:
* Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index e748974c707b..a5d66b89cd6c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents);
int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_load_data_id id);
-int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1028,7 +1029,8 @@ static inline int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
}
static inline int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 1a7bc4c7437d..dc4f90660aa6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
* ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
* @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
* @read_id: caller identifier
+ * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file()
*
* Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
* in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
@@ -609,8 +610,15 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry)
*
* For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
*/
-int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
+int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
+ bool contents)
{
+ /* Reject all partial reads during appraisal. */
+ if (!contents) {
+ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
/*
* Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
* firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index db320a43f42e..a1778ebef137 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -117,11 +117,21 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb)
}
}
-static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
struct super_block *load_root;
const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id);
+ /*
+ * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents
+ * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged
+ * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were
+ * no associated file struct.
+ */
+ if (!contents)
+ file = NULL;
+
/* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */
if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) &&
ignore_read_file_id[id]) {
@@ -178,7 +188,7 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
{
- return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id);
+ return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents);
}
static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 090674f1197a..800af5403176 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1657,14 +1657,15 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
}
-int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
int ret;
- ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_read_file, 0, file, id, contents);
if (ret)
return ret;
- return ima_read_file(file, id);
+ return ima_read_file(file, id, contents);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1a5c68196faf..6d183bbc12a6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4004,13 +4004,14 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
}
static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
- enum kernel_read_file_id id)
+ enum kernel_read_file_id id,
+ bool contents)
{
int rc = 0;
switch (id) {
case READING_MODULE:
- rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
+ rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
break;
default:
break;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* [PATCH 13/13] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 12/13] LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2020-07-17 19:17 ` [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Scott Branden
13 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, Kees Cook, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 2 +-
fs/kernel_read_file.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 8 +--
kernel/kexec_file.c | 4 +-
kernel/module.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/digsig.c | 2 +-
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 3 +-
7 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
index 3439a533927c..fa540ca51961 100644
--- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
+++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ fw_get_filesystem_firmware(struct device *device, struct fw_priv *fw_priv,
fw_priv->size = 0;
/* load firmware files from the mount namespace of init */
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, &buffer, msize,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(path, 0, &buffer, msize,
NULL,
READING_FIRMWARE);
if (rc < 0) {
diff --git a/fs/kernel_read_file.c b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
index d73bc3fa710a..90d255fbdd9b 100644
--- a/fs/kernel_read_file.c
+++ b/fs/kernel_read_file.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
* kernel_read_file() - read file contents into a kernel buffer
*
* @file file to read from
+ * @offset where to start reading from (see below).
* @buf pointer to a "void *" buffer for reading into (if
* *@buf is NULL, a buffer will be allocated, and
* @buf_size will be ignored)
@@ -19,19 +20,31 @@
* @id the kernel_read_file_id identifying the type of
* file contents being read (for LSMs to examine)
*
+ * @offset must be 0 unless both @buf and @file_size are non-NULL
+ * (i.e. the caller must be expecting to read partial file contents
+ * via an already-allocated @buf, in at most @buf_size chunks, and
+ * will be able to determine when the entire file was read by
+ * checking @file_size). This isn't a recommended way to read a
+ * file, though, since it is possible that the contents might
+ * change between calls to kernel_read_file().
+ *
* Returns number of bytes read (no single read will be bigger
* than INT_MAX), or negative on error.
*
*/
-int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void **buf,
size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
loff_t i_size, pos;
- ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ size_t copied;
void *allocated = NULL;
+ bool whole_file;
int ret;
+ if (offset != 0 && (!*buf || !file_size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
@@ -39,19 +52,27 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id, true);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
-
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (i_size <= 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- if (i_size > INT_MAX || i_size > buf_size) {
+ /* The file is too big for sane activities. */
+ if (i_size > INT_MAX) {
+ ret = -EFBIG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* The entire file cannot be read in one buffer. */
+ if (!file_size && offset == 0 && i_size > buf_size) {
ret = -EFBIG;
goto out;
}
+
+ whole_file = (offset == 0 && i_size <= buf_size);
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id, whole_file);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
if (file_size)
*file_size = i_size;
@@ -62,9 +83,14 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
goto out;
}
- pos = 0;
- while (pos < i_size) {
- bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + pos, i_size - pos, &pos);
+ pos = offset;
+ copied = 0;
+ while (copied < buf_size) {
+ ssize_t bytes;
+ size_t wanted = min_t(size_t, buf_size - copied,
+ i_size - pos);
+
+ bytes = kernel_read(file, *buf + copied, wanted, &pos);
if (bytes < 0) {
ret = bytes;
goto out_free;
@@ -72,14 +98,17 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
if (bytes == 0)
break;
+ copied += bytes;
}
- if (pos != i_size) {
- ret = -EIO;
- goto out_free;
- }
+ if (whole_file) {
+ if (pos != i_size) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
- ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+ ret = security_kernel_post_read_file(file, *buf, i_size, id);
+ }
out_free:
if (ret < 0) {
@@ -91,11 +120,11 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf,
out:
allow_write_access(file);
- return ret == 0 ? pos : ret;
+ return ret == 0 ? copied : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, loff_t offset, void **buf,
size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
@@ -109,14 +138,15 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
- size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, loff_t offset,
+ void **buf, size_t buf_size,
+ size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct file *file;
@@ -135,14 +165,14 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, void **buf,
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
- ret = kernel_read_file(file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(file, offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
fput(file);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_read_file_from_path_initns);
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
- size_t *file_size,
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, loff_t offset, void **buf,
+ size_t buf_size, size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id)
{
struct fd f = fdget(fd);
@@ -151,7 +181,7 @@ int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, void **buf, size_t buf_size,
if (!f.file)
goto out;
- ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
+ ret = kernel_read_file(f.file, offset, buf, buf_size, file_size, id);
out:
fdput(f);
return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
index 023293eaf948..575ffa1031d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
@@ -35,19 +35,19 @@ static inline const char *kernel_read_file_id_str(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
return kernel_read_file_str[id];
}
-int kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
+int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path(const char *path, loff_t offset,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path,
+int kernel_read_file_from_path_initns(const char *path, loff_t offset,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
-int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd,
+int kernel_read_file_from_fd(int fd, loff_t offset,
void **buf, size_t buf_size,
size_t *file_size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index 7b0ecdc621aa..c340a14c4cb9 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
int ret;
void *ldata;
- ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, &image->kernel_buf,
+ ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(kernel_fd, 0, &image->kernel_buf,
INT_MAX, NULL, READING_KEXEC_IMAGE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
#endif
/* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */
if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) {
- ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf,
+ ret = kernel_read_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, 0, &image->initrd_buf,
INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index 90a4788dff9d..d353d1f67681 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -4007,7 +4007,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(finit_module, int, fd, const char __user *, uargs, int, flags)
|MODULE_INIT_IGNORE_VERMAGIC))
return -EINVAL;
- err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, &hdr, INT_MAX, NULL,
+ err = kernel_read_file_from_fd(fd, 0, &hdr, INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_MODULE);
if (err < 0)
return err;
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 8a523dfd7fd7..0f518dcfde05 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
int rc;
key_perm_t perm;
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
READING_X509_CERTIFICATE);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index cff04083e598..4212423714ee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
datap = path;
strsep(&datap, "\n");
- rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, READING_POLICY);
+ rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL,
+ READING_POLICY);
if (rc < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc);
return rc;
--
2.25.1
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support
2020-07-17 17:42 [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Kees Cook
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-07-17 17:43 ` [PATCH 13/13] fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads Kees Cook
@ 2020-07-17 19:17 ` Scott Branden
2020-07-17 22:10 ` Kees Cook
13 siblings, 1 reply; 27+ messages in thread
From: Scott Branden @ 2020-07-17 19:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Kees Cook
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
Hi Kees,
Thanks for sending out. This looks different than your other patch series.
We should get the first 5 patches accepted now though as they are
simple cleanups and fixes. That will reduce the number of outstanding
patches in the series.
At first glance the issue with the changes after that is the existing
API assumes it has read the whole file and failed if it did not.
Now, if the file is larger than the amount requested there is no indication?
On 2020-07-17 10:42 a.m., Kees Cook wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Here's my attempt at clearing the path to partial read support in
> kernel_read_file(), which fixes a number of issues along the way. I'm
> still fighting with the firmware test suite (it doesn't seem to pass
> for me even in stock v5.7... ?) But I don't want to block Scott's work[1]
> any this week, so here's the series as it is currently.
>
> The primary difference to Scott's approach is to avoid adding a new set of
> functions and just adapt the existing APIs to deal with "offset". Also,
> the fixes for the enum are first in the series so they can be backported
> without the header file relocation.
>
> I'll keep poking at the firmware tests...
>
> -Kees
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202007161415.10D015477@keescook/
>
> Kees Cook (12):
> firmware_loader: EFI firmware loader must handle pre-allocated buffer
> fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER enum
> fs/kernel_read_file: Remove FIRMWARE_EFI_EMBEDDED enum
> fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate source file
> fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
> fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
> fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
> LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
> firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
> module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
> LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
> fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
>
> Scott Branden (1):
> fs/kernel_read_file: Split into separate include file
>
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 8 +-
> .../base/firmware_loader/fallback_platform.c | 12 +-
> drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c | 13 +-
> fs/Makefile | 3 +-
> fs/exec.c | 132 +-----------
> fs/kernel_read_file.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/fs.h | 39 ----
> include/linux/ima.h | 19 +-
> include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 55 +++++
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 6 +-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++
> include/linux/security.h | 19 +-
> kernel/kexec.c | 2 +-
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 18 +-
> kernel/module.c | 24 ++-
> security/integrity/digsig.c | 8 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 9 +-
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 58 ++++--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 1 +
> security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 17 +-
> security/security.c | 26 ++-
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +-
> 22 files changed, 432 insertions(+), 246 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 fs/kernel_read_file.c
> create mode 100644 include/linux/kernel_read_file.h
>
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support
2020-07-17 19:17 ` [PATCH 00/13] Introduce partial kernel_read_file() support Scott Branden
@ 2020-07-17 22:10 ` Kees Cook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 27+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2020-07-17 22:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Scott Branden
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki, Peter Zijlstra, Stephen Boyd, Mimi Zohar,
David Howells, Peter Jones, Joel Fernandes (Google),
linux-security-module, Paul Moore, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Matthew Garrett, James Morris, Matthew Wilcox, KP Singh,
Serge E. Hallyn, selinux, Jessica Yu, Hans de Goede,
Alexander Viro, linux-integrity, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Stephen Smalley, Randy Dunlap, kexec, linux-kernel,
Luis Chamberlain, Eric W. Biederman, Dave Olsthoorn,
Dmitry Kasatkin, Casey Schaufler, linux-fsdevel, Andrew Morton
On Fri, Jul 17, 2020 at 12:17:02PM -0700, Scott Branden wrote:
> Thanks for sending out. This looks different than your other patch series.
Yes, it mutated in my head as I considered how all of this should hang
together, which is why I wanted to get it sent before the weekend. I'm
still trying to figure out why the fireware testsuite fails for me, etc.
> We should get the first 5 patches accepted now though as they are
> simple cleanups and fixes. That will reduce the number of outstanding
> patches in the series.
Agreed. I'd like to get some more eyes on it, but I can get it ready for
-next.
> At first glance the issue with the changes after that is the existing
> API assumes it has read the whole file and failed if it did not.
> Now, if the file is larger than the amount requested there is no indication?
The intention is to have old API users unchanged and new users can use
a pre-allocated buf (with buf_size) along with file_size to examine
their partial read progress. If I broke the old API, that's a bug and I
need to fix it, but that's why I wanted to start with the firmware test
suite (basic things like module loading work fine after this series, but
I wanted to really exercise the corners that the firmware suite pokes
at).
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 27+ messages in thread