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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 16:06:09 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <95704ec0-698e-2ddb-308a-2bcc81b81f46@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87jzxdblmn.ffs@tglx>

On 5/12/23 11:44, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> On Thu, May 04 2023 at 14:50, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch
> 
> Can you please make functions visible in changelogs by appending (),
> i.e. setup_arch() ?

Yes I will.

> 
> See https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/maintainer-tip.html__;!!ACWV5N9M2RV99hQ!IpJMDBpAvJRDAh0tZI_nMv0zZqwQDnxFjBEKRitYq4JU-iV-NnXg28lGtTwb1ynVA4XEy5n9aSdIekxkztyZ$
> for further hints.
> 
>> +static u32 sl_flags;
>> +static struct sl_ap_wake_info ap_wake_info;
>> +static u64 evtlog_addr;
>> +static u32 evtlog_size;
>> +static u64 vtd_pmr_lo_size;
> 
> Is any of this modifyable after boot? If not then this wants to be
> annotated with __ro_after_init.

I believe you are correct and these are never modified after boot so I 
will do this.

> 
>> +/* This should be plenty of room */
>> +static u8 txt_dmar[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(16);
>> +
>> +u32 slaunch_get_flags(void)
>> +{
>> +	return sl_flags;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(slaunch_get_flags);
> 
> What needs this export? If there is a reason then please EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()

I think that may be incorrect. I will look into it.

> 
>> +struct sl_ap_wake_info *slaunch_get_ap_wake_info(void)
>> +{
>> +	return &ap_wake_info;
>> +}
> 
> If you return a pointer, then there is not much of point for encapsulating.

I am sorry, I am not 100% sure what you mean.

> 
>> +struct acpi_table_header *slaunch_get_dmar_table(struct acpi_table_header *dmar)
> 
> Some explanation on public visible functions would be really useful.

I can add that.

> 
>> +{
>> +	/* The DMAR is only stashed and provided via TXT on Intel systems */
> 
> -ENOPARSE.

I take it you mean you don't understand the comment. I will try to make 
it clearer.

> 
>> +	if (memcmp(txt_dmar, "DMAR", 4))
>> +		return dmar;
>> +
>> +	return (struct acpi_table_header *)(&txt_dmar[0]);
> 
> s/&txt_dmar[0]/txt_dmar/ No?

Just an old habit. I can change it.

> 
>> +}
> 
>> +void __noreturn slaunch_txt_reset(void __iomem *txt,
>> +				  const char *msg, u64 error)
> 
> Please avoid these line breaks. We lifted the 80 character limit quite
> some time ago.

Ack

> 
>> +
>> +	/* Iterate over heap tables looking for table of "type" */
>> +	for (i = 0; i < type; i++) {
>> +		base += offset;
>> +		heap = early_memremap(base, sizeof(u64));
>> +		if (!heap)
>> +			slaunch_txt_reset(txt,
>> +				"Error early_memremap of heap for heap walk\n",
>> +				SL_ERROR_HEAP_MAP);
> 
> This is horrible to read.
> 
> 		if (!heap) {
> 			slaunch_txt_reset(txt, "Error early_memremap of heap for heap walk\n",
>                          		  SL_ERROR_HEAP_MAP);
>                  }
> 
> See documentation about bracket rules.

Will do.

> 
>> +
>> +/*
>> + * TXT stashes a safe copy of the DMAR ACPI table to prevent tampering.
>> + * It is stored in the TXT heap. Fetch it from there and make it available
>> + * to the IOMMU driver.
>> + */
>> +static void __init slaunch_copy_dmar_table(void __iomem *txt)
>> +{
>> +	struct txt_sinit_mle_data *sinit_mle_data;
>> +	u32 field_offset, dmar_size, dmar_offset;
>> +	void *dmar;
>> +
>> +	memset(&txt_dmar, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> 
> txt_dmar is statically allocated so it's already zero, no?

Yes. This may be left over from an older iteration of the patches. I 
will ditch it.

> 
>> +/*
>> + * Intel TXT specific late stub setup and validation.
>> + */
>> +void __init slaunch_setup_txt(void)
>> +{
>> +	u64 one = TXT_REGVALUE_ONE, val;
>> +	void __iomem *txt;
>> +
>> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMX))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * If booted through secure launch entry point, the loadflags
>> +	 * option will be set.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (!(boot_params.hdr.loadflags & SLAUNCH_FLAG))
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * See if SENTER was done by reading the status register in the
>> +	 * public space. If the public register space cannot be read, TXT may
>> +	 * be disabled.
>> +	 */
>> +	txt = early_ioremap(TXT_PUB_CONFIG_REGS_BASE,
>> +			    TXT_NR_CONFIG_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE);
>> +	if (!txt)
>> +		return;
> 
> Wait. You have established above that SMX is available and the boot has
> set the SLAUNCH flag.
> 
> So if that ioremap() fails then there is an issue with the fixmaps.
> 
> How is returning here sensible? The system will just die later on in the
> worst case with some undecodable issue.

Good point. I don't think I can do a TXT reset at this point but I could 
panic.

Thanks for the review,
Ross

> 
> Thanks,
> 
>          tglx


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  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-15 20:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:19   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:32     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06  8:48   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-10 15:41     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 10:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 16:44     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 16:54       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 18:21         ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 13:19   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:22   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:34     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-15 20:58     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 10:55   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 21:15     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-15 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16  0:41         ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16  1:43           ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 20:01             ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 20:15               ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-07 19:31                 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:25   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:37     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:00   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:10     ` Ross Philipson
2023-10-31 21:37       ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:34   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-09 16:09     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-10  1:21   ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-10 22:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 11:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:18       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 11:28         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:58           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 12:24             ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-14 18:18               ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-14 19:11                 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 13:24           ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 16:13             ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 18:17               ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 19:12                 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 19:42                   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-15 21:23     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-11  3:33   ` Herbert Xu
2023-05-16  0:50     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:47   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:58     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:46       ` Simon Horman
2023-05-12 11:26   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:17     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 16:27       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16  1:11       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16  1:45         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-15 18:00           ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:13     ` Ross Philipson
2023-09-20 21:40     ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:52   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:58     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-24  2:55       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:06     ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:54   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:55   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-11 16:21     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:02   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:19     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:40   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 18:16     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16  1:23       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:42   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-08 15:07     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:53     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:40   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:54     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:22     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16  1:37       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05  8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-05 15:45   ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06  7:56     ` Bagas Sanjaya

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