From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 16:13:31 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0f4704a-8050-9274-e4ac-b2b3157cf482@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ednlbf50.ffs@tglx>
On 5/12/23 14:04, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>
> On Thu, May 04 2023 at 14:50, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> +
>> +/* CPUID: leaf 1, ECX, SMX feature bit */
>> +#define X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX (1 << 6)
>> +
>> +/* Can't include apiddef.h in asm */
>
> Why not? All it needs is a #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ guard around the C parts.
I guess I was reluctant to fiddle with another header file but I can do
this.
>
>> +#define XAPIC_ENABLE (1 << 11)
>> +#define X2APIC_ENABLE (1 << 10)
>> +
>> +/* Can't include traps.h in asm */
>
> NMI_VECTOR is defined in irq_vectors.h which just has a include
> <linux/threads.h> for no real good reason.
Ack
>
>> +#define X86_TRAP_NMI 2
>
> <SNIP>
>
>> +/*
>> + * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed informatoin on what this macro
>> + * is used for.
>> + */
>> +#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry)
>
> I'm having a hard time to find that comment in head_64.S. At least it's
> not in this patch.
The is a macro very much like this one and large comment in head_64.S. I
am just referencing that. If you would rather see that comment
duplicated here, I can.
>
>> +.Lsl_ap_cs:
>> + /* Load the relocated AP IDT */
> [ 11 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> + lidt (sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
>> +
>> + /* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */
>> + call sl_txt_load_regs
>> +
>> + /* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
>> + GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
>> +
>> + /* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
>> + leal rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax
>> + pushfl
>> + pushl $(__SL32_CS)
>> + pushl %eax
>> + iret
>
> So from here on any NMI which hits the AP before it can reach the wait
> loop will corrupt EDX...
>
>> +/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */
>> + .global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
> [ 10 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> +sl_txt_ap_wake_begin:
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Wait for NMI IPI in the relocated AP wake block which was provided
>> + * and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code. Leave all
>> + * other interrupts masked since we do not expect anything but an NMI.
>> + */
>> + xorl %edx, %edx
>> +
>> +1:
>> + hlt
>> + testl %edx, %edx
>> + jz 1b
>
> This really makes me nervous. A stray NMI and the AP starts going.
>
> Can't this NMI just bring the AP out of HLT w/o changing any state and
> the AP evaluates a memory location which indicates whether it should
> start up or not.
Given you comments on patch 09, perhaps all this NMI business becomes
obsolete.
>
>> + /*
>> + * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected
>> + * mode stub code in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be fixed in
>
> Providing an actual name for the stub might spare to rummage through
> code to figure out where this is supposed to jump to.
That can be done.
>
>> + * the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area
>> + * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code.
> [ 2 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> + */
>> + .byte 0xea
>> +sl_ap_jmp_offset:
>> + .long 0x00000000
>> + .word __SL32_CS
>
> Thanks,
>
> tglx
Thanks
Ross
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-15 20:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:19 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:32 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06 8:48 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-10 15:41 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 10:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 16:44 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 16:54 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 18:21 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 13:19 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:22 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:34 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-15 20:58 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 10:55 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 21:15 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-15 21:22 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16 0:41 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16 1:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 20:01 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 20:15 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-07 19:31 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:25 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:37 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:00 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:10 ` Ross Philipson
2023-10-31 21:37 ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:34 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-09 16:09 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-10 1:21 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-10 22:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 11:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:18 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 11:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:58 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 12:24 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-14 18:18 ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-14 19:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 13:24 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 16:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 18:17 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 19:12 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 19:42 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-15 21:23 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-11 3:33 ` Herbert Xu
2023-05-16 0:50 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:47 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:58 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:46 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-12 11:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:17 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 16:27 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16 1:11 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16 1:45 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-15 18:00 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:13 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-09-20 21:40 ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:52 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:58 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-24 2:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:44 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:06 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:54 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-11 16:21 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:02 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:19 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:40 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 18:16 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16 1:23 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:42 ` Simon Horman
2023-05-08 15:07 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:53 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:54 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:43 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:22 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16 1:37 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-05 15:45 ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06 7:56 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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