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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com,
	Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub
Date: Mon, 15 May 2023 16:13:31 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0f4704a-8050-9274-e4ac-b2b3157cf482@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ednlbf50.ffs@tglx>

On 5/12/23 14:04, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> 
> On Thu, May 04 2023 at 14:50, Ross Philipson wrote:
>> +
>> +/* CPUID: leaf 1, ECX, SMX feature bit */
>> +#define X86_FEATURE_BIT_SMX	(1 << 6)
>> +
>> +/* Can't include apiddef.h in asm */
> 
> Why not? All it needs is a #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ guard around the C parts.

I guess I was reluctant to fiddle with another header file but I can do 
this.

> 
>> +#define XAPIC_ENABLE	(1 << 11)
>> +#define X2APIC_ENABLE	(1 << 10)
>> +
>> +/* Can't include traps.h in asm */
> 
> NMI_VECTOR is defined in irq_vectors.h which just has a include
> <linux/threads.h> for no real good reason.

Ack

> 
>> +#define X86_TRAP_NMI	2
> 
> <SNIP>
> 
>> +/*
>> + * See the comment in head_64.S for detailed informatoin on what this macro
>> + * is used for.
>> + */
>> +#define rva(X) ((X) - sl_stub_entry)
> 
> I'm having a hard time to find that comment in head_64.S. At least it's
> not in this patch.

The is a macro very much like this one and large comment in head_64.S. I 
am just referencing that. If you would rather see that comment 
duplicated here, I can.

> 
>> +.Lsl_ap_cs:
>> +	/* Load the relocated AP IDT */
> [ 11 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> +	lidt	(sl_ap_idt_desc - sl_txt_ap_wake_begin)(%ecx)
>> +
>> +	/* Fixup MTRRs and misc enable MSR on APs too */
>> +	call	sl_txt_load_regs
>> +
>> +	/* Enable SMI with GETSEC[SMCTRL] */
>> +	GETSEC $(SMX_X86_GETSEC_SMCTRL)
>> +
>> +	/* IRET-to-self can be used to enable NMIs which SENTER disabled */
>> +	leal	rva(.Lnmi_enabled_ap)(%ebx), %eax
>> +	pushfl
>> +	pushl	$(__SL32_CS)
>> +	pushl	%eax
>> +	iret
> 
> So from here on any NMI which hits the AP before it can reach the wait
> loop will corrupt EDX...
> 
>> +/* This is the beginning of the relocated AP wake code block */
>> +	.global sl_txt_ap_wake_begin
> [ 10 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> +sl_txt_ap_wake_begin:
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * Wait for NMI IPI in the relocated AP wake block which was provided
>> +	 * and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code. Leave all
>> +	 * other interrupts masked since we do not expect anything but an NMI.
>> +	 */
>> +	xorl	%edx, %edx
>> +
>> +1:
>> +	hlt
>> +	testl	%edx, %edx
>> +	jz	1b
> 
> This really makes me nervous. A stray NMI and the AP starts going.
> 
> Can't this NMI just bring the AP out of HLT w/o changing any state and
> the AP evaluates a memory location which indicates whether it should
> start up or not.

Given you comments on patch 09, perhaps all this NMI business becomes 
obsolete.

> 
>> +	/*
>> +	 * This is the long absolute jump to the 32b Secure Launch protected
>> +	 * mode stub code in the rmpiggy. The jump address will be fixed in
> 
> Providing an actual name for the stub might spare to rummage through
> code to figure out where this is supposed to jump to.

That can be done.

> 
>> +	 * the SMP boot code when the first AP is brought up. This whole area
>> +	 * is provided and protected in the memory map by the prelaunch code.
> [ 2 more citation lines. Click/Enter to show. ]
>> +	 */
>> +	.byte	0xea
>> +sl_ap_jmp_offset:
>> +	.long	0x00000000
>> +	.word	__SL32_CS
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	tglx

Thanks
Ross

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  reply	other threads:[~2023-05-15 20:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 100+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-05-04 14:50 [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 01/14] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 02/14] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:19   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:32     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06  8:48   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-10 15:41     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 10:47   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 16:44     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 16:54       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 18:21         ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 13:19   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 03/14] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 04/14] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:22   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:34     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-15 20:58     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-12 10:55   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 21:15     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-15 21:22       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16  0:41         ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16  1:43           ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-16 20:01             ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-06-16 20:15               ` Matthew Garrett
2023-07-07 19:31                 ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 05/14] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:25   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 17:37     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:00   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:10     ` Ross Philipson
2023-10-31 21:37       ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 06/14] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 16:34   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-09 16:09     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-10  1:21   ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-10 22:28     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 11:04     ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:18       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 11:28         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 11:58           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2023-05-12 12:24             ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-14 18:18               ` Eric Biggers
2023-05-14 19:11                 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 13:24           ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 16:13             ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 18:17               ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-12 19:12                 ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 19:42                   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-05-15 21:23     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-11  3:33   ` Herbert Xu
2023-05-16  0:50     ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 07/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:47   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:58     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:46       ` Simon Horman
2023-05-12 11:26   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:17     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 16:27       ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-16  1:11       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-16  1:45         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-06-15 18:00           ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:13     ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2023-09-20 21:40     ` ross.philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 08/14] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:52   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 23:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:58     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-24  2:55       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:06     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 09/14] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 17:54   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-05 18:59     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:55   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-11 16:21     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 18:02   ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-05-15 20:19     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 10/14] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 11/14] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:40   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-15 18:16     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16  1:23       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 12/14] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2023-05-05 19:42   ` Simon Horman
2023-05-08 15:07     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:53     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-10 22:40   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-05-12 15:54     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 13/14] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2023-05-12 11:43   ` Matthew Garrett
2023-05-12 16:22     ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-16  1:37       ` Daniel P. Smith
2023-05-04 14:50 ` [PATCH v6 14/14] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support " Ross Philipson
2023-05-05  8:39 ` [PATCH v6 00/14] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Bagas Sanjaya
2023-05-05 15:45   ` Ross Philipson
2023-05-06  7:56     ` Bagas Sanjaya

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