From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Pratik R. Sampat" <prsampat@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, seanjc@google.com,
pbonzini@redhat.com, kim.phillips@amd.com, nikunj@amd.com,
michael.roth@amd.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com
Subject: Re: [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected
Date: Fri, 9 Oct 2026 14:21:44 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0b99f2f4-14ef-462f-9cac-2a091ed355d0@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <06cc309d12d59aed6d4b36688d8ef37fe8b089ea.1791302373.git.prsampat@amd.com>
On 10/6/26 11:54, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> When injecting an event into the guest via the event_inj field, a
> non-zero event_inj value on #VMEXIT means that the hardware was not able
> to inject the event into the guest. This used to only occur for the
> VMEXIT_INVALID intercept code, which was a fatal error and resulted in
> the guest being torn down.
>
> Enhanced SMT Protection (ESMTP) invalidates that assumption. When ESMTP
> is enabled, VMRUN doesn't enter guest mode immediately; it stalls at a
> synchronization point until every sibling thread is either idle or has
> executed VMRUN for a legal sibling vCPU. If an ESMTP timeout / illegal
> sibling exit / interrupt arrives while VMRUN is stalled, VMRUN can now
> terminate with the corresponding #VMEXIT intercept code, without
> entering guest mode, and thus without injecting the event.
>
> For example, on a 2-way SMT core running vCPU0 on thread 0 and vCPU1 on
> thread 1:
> Thread 0 (vCPU0) Thread 1 (vCPU1)
> ---------------- ----------------
> Interrupt A injected to the guest in host
> VMRUN |
> | |
> v |
> Stall waiting for sibling |
> | |
> | host INTR arrives on thread 0 |
> | while it waits |
> | |
> v |
> #VMEXIT v
> Interrupt B injected to the guest idle
> VMRUN
>
> In this case injecting interrupt B clobbers the last event. Interrupt A
> is never delivered and lost forever.
>
> Therefore, in preparation for ESMTP support, accommodate for potentially
> lost interrupts by detecting an undelivered injected event and
> re-queuing it so as not to lose the event.
>
> svm_cancel_injection() already recovers a staged event this way and
> becomes redundant, so fold it in.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> v1..v2: No changes
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 7d59d301e1e5..5d15c706e43b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4340,6 +4340,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> u8 vector;
> int type;
> + struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
> u32 exitintinfo = svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info;
> bool nmi_l1_to_l2 = svm->nmi_l1_to_l2;
> bool soft_int_injected = svm->soft_int_injected;
> @@ -4347,6 +4348,27 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> svm->nmi_l1_to_l2 = false;
> svm->soft_int_injected = false;
>
> + /*
> + * Hardware clears EVENTINJ field when it injects an event.
> + * A non-empty EVENTINJ on #VMEXIT means the vCPU never entered guest
> + * mode, and thus that the event was never delivered. Migrate the event
> + * to EXITINTINFO so that it's requeued instead of being dropped.
> + *
> + * An undelivered event doesn't imply a fatal VMEXIT_INVALID. With
> + * Enhanced SMT Protection, VMRUN may exit with an ordinary #VMEXIT
> + * without having injected that event into the guest.
> + *
> + * Clobbering EXITINTINFO is safe precisely because the vCPU never
> + * entered guest mode.
> + */
> + if (control->event_inj) {
> + control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
> + control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
> + control->event_inj = 0;
> +
> + exitintinfo = control->exit_int_info;
> + }
> +
> /*
> * If we've made progress since setting awaiting_iret_completion, we've
> * executed an IRET and can allow NMI injection.
> @@ -4410,11 +4432,14 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> static void svm_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> - struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
>
> - control->exit_int_info = control->event_inj;
> - control->exit_int_info_err = control->event_inj_err;
> - control->event_inj = 0;
> + /*
> + * EXITINTINFO is stale as it holds the event from the previous #VMEXIT
> + * (or from the last time the current VMCB was run). Invalidate it so
> + * that svm_complete_interrupts() requeues if and only if KVM staged an
> + * event in EVENTINJ.
> + */
> + svm->vmcb->control.exit_int_info = 0;
> svm_complete_interrupts(vcpu);
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-09 19:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-06 16:54 [Patch v2 0/4] Introduce Enhanced SMT Protection for SEV-SNP Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 1/4] KVM: SVM: Re-queue events that were never injected Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 17:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-09 19:21 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-10-06 16:54 ` [Patch v2 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add host support for Enhanced SMT Protection Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 17:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-09 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 3/4] x86/sev: Add guest " Pratik R. Sampat
2026-10-06 17:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-09 19:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-10-06 16:55 ` [Patch v2 4/4] x86/hyperv: " Pratik R. Sampat
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