From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
To: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
Ganapatrao Kulkarni <gankulkarni@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>,
Shanker Donthineni <sdonthineni@nvidia.com>,
Alper Gun <alpergun@google.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K . V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute
Date: Tue, 15 Oct 2024 10:55:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0bb96cfd-8994-4a74-8ef2-fe5dcd5a1508@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <846c43a8-9720-4dd5-b40a-73ec00b9a9a7@arm.com>
On 11/10/2024 15:14, Steven Price wrote:
> On 08/10/2024 12:05, Jean-Philippe Brucker wrote:
>> On Fri, Oct 04, 2024 at 03:43:06PM +0100, Steven Price wrote:
>>> Add some documentation on Arm CCA and the requirements for running Linux
>>> as a Realm guest. Also update booting.rst to describe the requirement
>>> for RIPAS RAM.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
>>> ---
>>> Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> Documentation/arch/arm64/booting.rst | 3 ++
>>> Documentation/arch/arm64/index.rst | 1 +
>>> 3 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
>>> create mode 100644 Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst
>>>
>>> diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 000000000000..ab7f90e64c2f
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/arm-cca.rst
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
>>> +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>>> +
>>> +=====================================
>>> +Arm Confidential Compute Architecture
>>> +=====================================
>>> +
>>> +Arm systems that support the Realm Management Extension (RME) contain
>>> +hardware to allow a VM guest to be run in a way which protects the code
>>> +and data of the guest from the hypervisor. It extends the older "two
>>> +world" model (Normal and Secure World) into four worlds: Normal, Secure,
>>> +Root and Realm. Linux can then also be run as a guest to a monitor
>>> +running in the Realm world.
>>> +
>>> +The monitor running in the Realm world is known as the Realm Management
>>> +Monitor (RMM) and implements the Realm Management Monitor
>>> +specification[1]. The monitor acts a bit like a hypervisor (e.g. it runs
>>> +in EL2 and manages the stage 2 page tables etc of the guests running in
>>> +Realm world), however much of the control is handled by a hypervisor
>>> +running in the Normal World. The Normal World hypervisor uses the Realm
>>> +Management Interface (RMI) defined by the RMM specification to request
>>> +the RMM to perform operations (e.g. mapping memory or executing a vCPU).
>>> +
>>> +The RMM defines an environment for guests where the address space (IPA)
>>> +is split into two. The lower half is protected - any memory that is
>>> +mapped in this half cannot be seen by the Normal World and the RMM
>>> +restricts what operations the Normal World can perform on this memory
>>> +(e.g. the Normal World cannot replace pages in this region without the
>>> +guest's cooperation). The upper half is shared, the Normal World is free
>>> +to make changes to the pages in this region, and is able to emulate MMIO
>>> +devices in this region too.
>>> +
>>> +A guest running in a Realm may also communicate with the RMM to request
>>> +changes in its environment or to perform attestation about its
>>> +environment. In particular it may request that areas of the protected
>>> +address space are transitioned between 'RAM' and 'EMPTY' (in either
>>> +direction). This allows a Realm guest to give up memory to be returned
>>> +to the Normal World, or to request new memory from the Normal World.
>>> +Without an explicit request from the Realm guest the RMM will otherwise
>>> +prevent the Normal World from making these changes.
>>
>> We could mention that this interface is "RSI", so readers know what to
>> look for next
>
> Good idea.
>
>>> +
>>> +Linux as a Realm Guest
>>> +----------------------
>>> +
>>> +To run Linux as a guest within a Realm, the following must be provided
>>> +either by the VMM or by a `boot loader` run in the Realm before Linux:
>>> +
>>> + * All protected RAM described to Linux (by DT or ACPI) must be marked
>>> + RIPAS RAM before handing over the Linux.
>>
>> "handing control over to Linux", or something like that?
>
> Indeed that actually makes grammatical sense! ;)
>
>>> +
>>> + * MMIO devices must be either unprotected (e.g. emulated by the Normal
>>> + World) or marked RIPAS DEV.
>>> +
>>> + * MMIO devices emulated by the Normal World and used very early in boot
>>> + (specifically earlycon) must be specified in the upper half of IPA.
>>> + For earlycon this can be done by specifying the address on the
>>> + command line, e.g.: ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``
>>
>> This is going to be needed frequently, so maybe we should explain in a
>> little more detail how we come up with this value: "e.g. with an IPA size
>> of 33 and the base address of the emulated UART at 0x1000000,
>> ``earlycon=uart,mmio,0x101000000``"
>>
>> (Because the example IPA size is rather unintuitive and specific to the
>> kvmtool memory map)
>
With the above addressed:
Reviewed-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-15 9:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-04 14:42 [PATCH v6 00/11] arm64: Support for running as a guest in Arm CCA Steven Price
2024-10-04 14:42 ` [PATCH v6 01/11] arm64: rsi: Add RSI definitions Steven Price
2024-10-07 23:08 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 14:14 ` Steven Price
2024-10-04 14:42 ` [PATCH v6 02/11] arm64: Detect if in a realm and set RIPAS RAM Steven Price
2024-10-04 15:05 ` Steven Price
2024-10-11 13:12 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-07 23:31 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 14:14 ` Steven Price
2024-10-04 14:42 ` [PATCH v6 03/11] arm64: realm: Query IPA size from the RMM Steven Price
2024-10-07 23:33 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-15 3:55 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-15 9:08 ` Steven Price
2024-10-04 14:42 ` [PATCH v6 04/11] arm64: rsi: Add support for checking whether an MMIO is protected Steven Price
2024-10-08 0:24 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 14:14 ` Steven Price
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 05/11] arm64: rsi: Map unprotected MMIO as decrypted Steven Price
2024-10-08 0:31 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 13:19 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-12 5:22 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 13:20 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 06/11] efi: arm64: Map Device with Prot Shared Steven Price
2024-10-08 0:31 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 13:23 ` Catalin Marinas
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 07/11] arm64: Enforce bounce buffers for realm DMA Steven Price
2024-10-08 2:51 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 08/11] arm64: mm: Avoid TLBI when marking pages as valid Steven Price
2024-10-08 2:52 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-15 9:50 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 09/11] arm64: Enable memory encrypt for Realms Steven Price
2024-10-08 2:56 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 10/11] virt: arm-cca-guest: TSM_REPORT support for realms Steven Price
2024-10-05 15:42 ` kernel test robot
2024-10-08 4:12 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-11 14:14 ` Steven Price
2024-10-11 16:22 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-10-12 6:06 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-14 8:56 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-10-14 14:41 ` Steven Price
2024-10-14 14:46 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2024-10-15 0:01 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v6 11/11] arm64: Document Arm Confidential Compute Steven Price
2024-10-08 4:17 ` Gavin Shan
2024-10-08 11:05 ` Jean-Philippe Brucker
2024-10-11 14:14 ` Steven Price
2024-10-15 9:55 ` Suzuki K Poulose [this message]
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