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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD, mm: Extend with mem_encrypt=sme option
Date: Sun,  1 Oct 2017 14:45:09 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171001194509.4187-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171001171617.uzwfzps7sxowfram@pd.tnic>

>
> So I want to be able to disable SEV and the whole code that comes with
> it in the *host*.

We can add a new variable 'sme_only'. By default this variable should be set
to false. When mem_encrypt=sme is passed then set it to true and
based on sme_only state early_detect_mem_encrypt() can clear X86_FEATURE_SEV
flag.

Here are the changes on top of your patch. I did a quick test in both host and
guest OS and it seems to be working okay. In host OS mem_encrypt=sme disabled
the SEV but in guest its still don't care. I will do more test later...

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 175310f00202..73a6fb3b14a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 
-extern bool sev_enabled;
+extern bool sme_only;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index d0669f3966a6..a09b02959874 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum);
  */
 static u32 nodes_per_socket = 1;
 
-bool sev_enabled __section(.data) = false;
+bool sme_only __section(.data) = false;
 
 static inline int rdmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long *p)
 {
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
 			goto clear_all;
 
-		if (!sev_enabled)
+		if (sme_only)
 			goto clear_sev;
 
 		rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 9b83bc1be7c0..a135e4497021 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ u64 sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__sev);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__sev);
+static bool sev_enabled __section(.data) = false;
 
 /* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
 static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
@@ -773,7 +774,6 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	unsigned long feature_mask;
 	u64 me_mask, msr;
 	char buffer[16];
-	bool sme_only;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* Check for the SME/SEV support leaf */
@@ -808,6 +808,8 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	if (!(eax & feature_mask))
 		return;
 
+	me_mask = BIT_ULL(ebx & 0x3f);
+
 	/* For SME, check the SYSCFG MSR */
 	if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
 		msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
@@ -820,9 +822,13 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 		msr = __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
 		if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED))
 			return;
-	}
 
-	me_mask = BIT_ULL(ebx & 0x3f);
+		if (feature_mask == AMD_SEV_BIT) {
+			sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+			sev_enabled = true;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
@@ -847,16 +853,11 @@ void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	} else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmd_on, sizeof(buffer))) {
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
 	} else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmd_sme, sizeof(buffer))) {
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
 		sme_only = true;
+		return;
 	}
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
 		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
-
-	if (sme_only)
-		return;
-
-	/* For SEV, check the SEV MSR */
-	if (feature_mask == AMD_SEV_BIT)
-		sev_enabled = true;
 }
-- 
2.9.5

  reply	other threads:[~2017-10-01 19:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-27 15:13 [Part1 PATCH v5 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28  9:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-28 18:48     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 19:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 12:28         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 14:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 15:54             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 15:56               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 23:06     ` [Part1 PATCH v5 18/18] x86/mm: add 'sme' argument in mem_encrypt= Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 11:56       ` [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD, mm: Extend with mem_encrypt=sme option Borislav Petkov
2017-09-30 21:17         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 21:41           ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-01 17:00             ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-01 17:16               ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-01 19:45                 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-10-01 22:02                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 11:32                     ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-02 12:41                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 15:07                         ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-03 10:50                           ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-03 11:20                             ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 13:44                 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-02 13:51                   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 16:35                     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-03 11:29                       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 11:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-28 16:20   ` [Part1 PATCH v5.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:53   ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 17:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 19:17   ` [Part1 PATCH v5.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 16:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 17:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 20:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29  5:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29  6:26 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Borislav Petkov

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