From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Part1 PATCH v5 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2017 13:48:48 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <abed199b-217e-65ba-8dfc-f2e7b71eeef5@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170928090242.ber7gynwaldinafa@pd.tnic>
Hi Boris,
On 09/28/2017 04:02 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
...
>> +bool sev_active(void)
>> +{
>> + return sme_me_mask && sev_enabled;
>
> What I'm still missing is the chicken bit. I.e., to be able to boot with
> "mem_encrypt=smeonly" or so, which disables the SEV side but can still
> allow SME. For when SEV has issues and people want to disable it.
>
Let me understand the ask, are you saying that we need a method to disable the SEV
feature from the host OS so that Hypervisor will not be able to create a SEV guest?
Because once a guest is booted with SEV feature, there is no way to disable the SEV
feature from the guest.
i.e if "mem_encrypt=smeonly" is set then we clear X86_FEATURE_SEV capability flag
defined in [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150585470323923&w=2
> You can do the patch ontop of those and send it as a reply to this
> thread - no need to wait to resend the whole thing again.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-28 18:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-09-27 15:13 [Part1 PATCH v5 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 01/17] Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 02/17] x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 9:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-28 18:48 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2017-09-28 19:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 12:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 15:54 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 15:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-29 23:06 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 18/18] x86/mm: add 'sme' argument in mem_encrypt= Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 11:56 ` [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD, mm: Extend with mem_encrypt=sme option Borislav Petkov
2017-09-30 21:17 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-30 21:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-01 17:00 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-01 17:16 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-01 19:45 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-01 22:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 11:32 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-02 12:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 15:07 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-10-03 10:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2017-10-03 11:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 13:44 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-02 13:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-10-02 16:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-10-03 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 03/17] x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 04/17] x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 05/17] x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 11:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-28 16:20 ` [Part1 PATCH v5.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 06/17] x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:53 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 17:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 19:17 ` [Part1 PATCH v5.1 " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 07/17] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 08/17] resource: Consolidate resource walking code Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 09/17] resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 10/17] x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 16:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 11/17] x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 12/17] x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 17:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 13/17] x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 17:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 14/17] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot Brijesh Singh
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 15/17] percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED Brijesh Singh
2017-09-28 20:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 16/17] X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 5:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2017-09-27 15:13 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 17/17] X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute " Brijesh Singh
2017-09-29 6:26 ` [Part1 PATCH v5 00/17] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Borislav Petkov
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