* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 1/6] s390x: uv-host: Add invalid command attestation check
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 2/6] s390x: lib: Add QUI getter Steffen Eiden
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
Adds an invalid command test for attestation in the uv-host.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
---
lib/s390x/asm/uv.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
s390x/uv-host.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
index 70bf65c4..7c8c399d 100644
--- a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
+++ b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* s390x Ultravisor related definitions
*
- * Copyright (c) 2020 IBM Corp
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020, 2022
*
* Authors:
* Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#define UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED 0x0342
#define UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1000
#define UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS 0x1001
+#define UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION 0x1020
/* Bits in installed uv calls */
enum uv_cmds_inst {
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ enum uv_cmds_inst {
BIT_UVC_CMD_UNSHARE_ALL = 20,
BIT_UVC_CMD_PIN_PAGE_SHARED = 21,
BIT_UVC_CMD_UNPIN_PAGE_SHARED = 22,
+ BIT_UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION = 28,
};
struct uv_cb_header {
@@ -178,6 +180,25 @@ struct uv_cb_cfs {
u64 paddr;
} __attribute__((packed)) __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+/* Retrieve Attestation Measurement */
+struct uv_cb_attest {
+ struct uv_cb_header header; /* 0x0000 */
+ uint64_t reserved08[2]; /* 0x0008 */
+ uint64_t arcb_addr; /* 0x0018 */
+ uint64_t continuation_token; /* 0x0020 */
+ uint8_t reserved28[6]; /* 0x0028 */
+ uint16_t user_data_length; /* 0x002e */
+ uint8_t user_data[256]; /* 0x0030 */
+ uint32_t reserved130[3]; /* 0x0130 */
+ uint32_t measurement_length; /* 0x013c */
+ uint64_t measurement_address; /* 0x0140 */
+ uint8_t config_uid[16]; /* 0x0148 */
+ uint32_t reserved158; /* 0x0158 */
+ uint32_t add_data_length; /* 0x015c */
+ uint64_t add_data_address; /* 0x0160 */
+ uint64_t reserved168[4]; /* 0x0168 */
+} __attribute__((packed)) __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
/* Set Secure Config Parameter */
struct uv_cb_ssc {
struct uv_cb_header header;
diff --git a/s390x/uv-host.c b/s390x/uv-host.c
index d3018e3c..726bcfa5 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-host.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-host.c
@@ -418,6 +418,7 @@ static struct cmd_list invalid_cmds[] = {
{ "bogus", 0x4242, sizeof(struct uv_cb_header), -1},
{ "share", UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS, sizeof(struct uv_cb_share), BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS },
{ "unshare", UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS, sizeof(struct uv_cb_share), BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS },
+ { "attest", UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION, sizeof(struct uv_cb_attest), BIT_UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION },
{ NULL, 0, 0 },
};
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 2/6] s390x: lib: Add QUI getter
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 1/6] s390x: uv-host: Add invalid command attestation check Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 3/6] s390x: uv-guest: remove duplicated checks Steffen Eiden
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
Some tests need the information provided by the QUI UVC and lib/s390x/uv.c
already has cached the qui result. Let's add a function to avoid
unnecessary QUI UVCs.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
lib/s390x/uv.c | 8 ++++++++
lib/s390x/uv.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/s390x/uv.c b/lib/s390x/uv.c
index 6fe11dff..3b4cafa9 100644
--- a/lib/s390x/uv.c
+++ b/lib/s390x/uv.c
@@ -47,6 +47,14 @@ bool uv_query_test_call(unsigned int nr)
return test_bit_inv(nr, uvcb_qui.inst_calls_list);
}
+const struct uv_cb_qui *uv_get_query_data(void)
+{
+ /* Query needs to be called first */
+ assert(uvcb_qui.header.rc == 1 || uvcb_qui.header.rc == 0x100);
+
+ return &uvcb_qui;
+}
+
int uv_setup(void)
{
if (!test_facility(158))
diff --git a/lib/s390x/uv.h b/lib/s390x/uv.h
index 8175d9c6..44264861 100644
--- a/lib/s390x/uv.h
+++ b/lib/s390x/uv.h
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
bool uv_os_is_guest(void);
bool uv_os_is_host(void);
bool uv_query_test_call(unsigned int nr);
+const struct uv_cb_qui *uv_get_query_data(void);
void uv_init(void);
int uv_setup(void);
void uv_create_guest(struct vm *vm);
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 3/6] s390x: uv-guest: remove duplicated checks
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 1/6] s390x: uv-host: Add invalid command attestation check Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 2/6] s390x: lib: Add QUI getter Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 4/6] s390x: uv-guest: Remove double report_prefix_pop Steffen Eiden
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
Removing some tests which are done at other points in the code
implicitly.
In lib/s390x/uc.c#setup_uv(void) the rc of the qui result is verified
using asserts.
The whole test is fenced by lib/s390x/uc.c#uv_os_is_guest(void) that
checks if SET and REMOVE SHARED is present.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
---
s390x/uv-guest.c | 22 +++++++---------------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
index 99120cae..728c60aa 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
@@ -69,23 +69,15 @@ static void test_query(void)
cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "length");
- uvcb.header.len = sizeof(uvcb);
- cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
- report((!cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_EXECUTED) ||
- (cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x100),
- "successful query");
-
/*
- * These bits have been introduced with the very first
- * Ultravisor version and are expected to always be available
- * because they are basic building blocks.
+ * BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI, BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS and
+ * BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS are always present as they
+ * have been introduced with the first Ultravisor version.
+ * However, we only need to check for QUI as
+ * SET/REMOVE SHARED are used to fence this test to be only
+ * executed by protected guests.
*/
- report(test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI, &uvcb.inst_calls_list[0]),
- "query indicated");
- report(test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS, &uvcb.inst_calls_list[0]),
- "share indicated");
- report(test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS, &uvcb.inst_calls_list[0]),
- "unshare indicated");
+ report(uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_QUI), "query indicated");
report_prefix_pop();
}
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 4/6] s390x: uv-guest: Remove double report_prefix_pop
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 3/6] s390x: uv-guest: remove duplicated checks Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-04 8:38 ` Janosch Frank
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 5/6] s390x: uv-guest: add share bit test Steffen Eiden
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 6/6] s390x: Add attestation tests Steffen Eiden
5 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
---
s390x/uv-guest.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
index 728c60aa..fd2cfef1 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
@@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ static void test_sharing(void)
cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
report(cc == 0 && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_EXECUTED, "unshare");
report_prefix_pop();
-
- report_prefix_pop();
}
static struct {
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 4/6] s390x: uv-guest: Remove double report_prefix_pop
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 4/6] s390x: uv-guest: Remove double report_prefix_pop Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-04 8:38 ` Janosch Frank
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Janosch Frank @ 2022-05-04 8:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Eiden, Thomas Huth, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
On 5/2/22 11:39, Steffen Eiden wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> s390x/uv-guest.c | 2 --
> 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> index 728c60aa..fd2cfef1 100644
> --- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
> +++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> @@ -111,8 +111,6 @@ static void test_sharing(void)
> cc = uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb);
> report(cc == 0 && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_EXECUTED, "unshare");
> report_prefix_pop();
> -
> - report_prefix_pop();
> }
>
> static struct {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 5/6] s390x: uv-guest: add share bit test
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 4/6] s390x: uv-guest: Remove double report_prefix_pop Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-04 8:39 ` Janosch Frank
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 6/6] s390x: Add attestation tests Steffen Eiden
5 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
The UV facility bits shared/unshared must both be set or none.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
---
s390x/uv-guest.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
index fd2cfef1..152ad807 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
@@ -157,6 +157,16 @@ static void test_invalid(void)
report_prefix_pop();
}
+static void test_share_bits(void)
+{
+ bool unshare = uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS);
+ bool share = uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS);
+
+ report_prefix_push("query");
+ report(!(share ^ unshare), "share bits are identical");
+ report_prefix_pop();
+}
+
int main(void)
{
bool has_uvc = test_facility(158);
@@ -167,6 +177,12 @@ int main(void)
goto done;
}
+ /*
+ * Needs to be done before the guest-fence,
+ * as the fence tests if both shared bits are present
+ */
+ test_share_bits();
+
if (!uv_os_is_guest()) {
report_skip("Not a protected guest");
goto done;
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 5/6] s390x: uv-guest: add share bit test
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 5/6] s390x: uv-guest: add share bit test Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-04 8:39 ` Janosch Frank
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Janosch Frank @ 2022-05-04 8:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Eiden, Thomas Huth, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
On 5/2/22 11:39, Steffen Eiden wrote:
> The UV facility bits shared/unshared must both be set or none.
>
> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
> s390x/uv-guest.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> index fd2cfef1..152ad807 100644
> --- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
> +++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> @@ -157,6 +157,16 @@ static void test_invalid(void)
> report_prefix_pop();
> }
>
> +static void test_share_bits(void)
> +{
> + bool unshare = uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS);
> + bool share = uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS);
> +
> + report_prefix_push("query");
> + report(!(share ^ unshare), "share bits are identical");
> + report_prefix_pop();
> +}
> +
> int main(void)
> {
> bool has_uvc = test_facility(158);
> @@ -167,6 +177,12 @@ int main(void)
> goto done;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Needs to be done before the guest-fence,
> + * as the fence tests if both shared bits are present
> + */
> + test_share_bits();
> +
> if (!uv_os_is_guest()) {
> report_skip("Not a protected guest");
> goto done;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 6/6] s390x: Add attestation tests
2022-05-02 9:39 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 0/6] s390x: Attestation tests Steffen Eiden
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 5/6] s390x: uv-guest: add share bit test Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-02 9:39 ` Steffen Eiden
2022-05-04 8:36 ` Janosch Frank
5 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Eiden @ 2022-05-02 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Huth, Janosch Frank, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
Adds several tests to verify correct error paths of attestation.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
---
lib/s390x/asm/uv.h | 5 +-
s390x/Makefile | 1 +
s390x/pv-attest.c | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
s390x/uv-guest.c | 11 ++-
4 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 s390x/pv-attest.c
diff --git a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
index 7c8c399d..38920461 100644
--- a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
+++ b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
@@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ struct uv_cb_qui {
u8 reserved88[158 - 136]; /* 0x0088 */
uint16_t max_guest_cpus; /* 0x009e */
u64 uv_feature_indications; /* 0x00a0 */
- u8 reserveda8[200 - 168]; /* 0x00a8 */
+ uint8_t reserveda8[224 - 168]; /* 0x00a8 */
+ uint64_t supp_att_hdr_ver; /* 0x00e0 */
+ uint64_t supp_paf; /* 0x00e8 */
+ uint8_t reservedf0[256 - 240]; /* 0x00f0 */
} __attribute__((packed)) __attribute__((aligned(8)));
struct uv_cb_cgc {
diff --git a/s390x/Makefile b/s390x/Makefile
index 8ff84db5..5a49d1e7 100644
--- a/s390x/Makefile
+++ b/s390x/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tests += $(TEST_DIR)/mvpg-sie.elf
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/spec_ex-sie.elf
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/firq.elf
tests += $(TEST_DIR)/epsw.elf
+tests += $(TEST_DIR)/pv-attest.elf
pv-tests += $(TEST_DIR)/pv-diags.elf
diff --git a/s390x/pv-attest.c b/s390x/pv-attest.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..65048349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/s390x/pv-attest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Retrieve Attestation Measurement Utravisor Call tests
+ *
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2022
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
+ */
+
+#include <libcflat.h>
+#include <alloc_page.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/facility.h>
+#include <asm/uv.h>
+#include <sclp.h>
+#include <uv.h>
+
+#define ARCB_VERSION_NONE 0
+#define ARCB_VERSION_1 0x100
+#define ARCB_MEAS_NONE 0
+#define ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512 1
+#define MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512 64
+#define PAF_PHKH_ATT (1ULL << 61)
+#define ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT 32
+/* arcb with one key slot and no nonce */
+struct uv_arcb_v1 {
+ uint64_t reserved0; /* 0x0000 */
+ uint32_t req_ver; /* 0x0008 */
+ uint32_t req_len; /* 0x000c */
+ uint8_t iv[12]; /* 0x0010 */
+ uint32_t reserved1c; /* 0x001c */
+ uint8_t reserved20[7]; /* 0x0020 */
+ uint8_t nks; /* 0x0027 */
+ int32_t reserved28; /* 0x0028 */
+ uint32_t sea; /* 0x002c */
+ uint64_t plaint_att_flags; /* 0x0030 */
+ uint32_t meas_alg_id; /* 0x0038 */
+ uint32_t reserved3c; /* 0x003c */
+ uint8_t cpk[160]; /* 0x0040 */
+ uint8_t key_slot[80]; /* 0x00e0 */
+ uint8_t meas_key[64]; /* 0x0130 */
+ uint8_t tag[16]; /* 0x0170 */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct attest_request_v1 {
+ struct uv_arcb_v1 arcb;
+ uint8_t measurement[MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512];
+ uint8_t additional[ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT];
+};
+
+static void test_attest_v1(uint64_t page)
+{
+ struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
+ .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
+ .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+ };
+ const struct uv_cb_qui *uvcb_qui = uv_get_query_data();
+ struct attest_request_v1 *attest_req = (void *)page;
+ struct uv_arcb_v1 *arcb = &attest_req->arcb;
+ int cc;
+
+ report_prefix_push("v1");
+ if (!test_bit_inv(0, &uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver)) {
+ report_skip("Attestation version 1 not supported");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Create a minimal arcb/uvcb such that FW has everything to start
+ * unsealing the request. However, this unsealing will fail as the
+ * kvm-unit-test framework provides no cryptography functions that
+ * would be needed to seal such requests.
+ */
+ arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
+ arcb->req_len = sizeof(*arcb);
+ arcb->nks = 1;
+ arcb->sea = sizeof(arcb->meas_key);
+ arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
+ arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
+ uvcb.arcb_addr = (uint64_t)&attest_req->arcb;
+ uvcb.measurement_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->measurement;
+ uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
+ uvcb.add_data_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->additional;
+ uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
+
+ uvcb.continuation_token = 0xff;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x101, "invalid continuation token");
+ uvcb.continuation_token = 0;
+
+ uvcb.user_data_length = sizeof(uvcb.user_data) + 1;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x102, "invalid user data size");
+ uvcb.user_data_length = 0;
+
+ uvcb.arcb_addr = get_ram_size() + PAGE_SIZE;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x103, "invalid arcb address");
+ uvcb.arcb_addr = page;
+
+ /* 0x104 - 0x105 need an unseal-able request */
+
+ arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_NONE;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x106, "unsupported version");
+ arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
+
+ arcb->req_len += 1;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x107, "arcb too big");
+ arcb->req_len -= 1;
+
+ /*
+ * The arcb needs to grow as well if number of key slots (nks)
+ * is increased. However, this is not the case and there is no explicit
+ * 'too many/less nks for that arcb size' error code -> expect 0x107
+ */
+ arcb->nks = 2;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x107, "too many nks for arcb");
+ arcb->nks = 1;
+
+ arcb->nks = 0;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x108, "invalid num key slots");
+ arcb->nks = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Possible valid size (when using nonce).
+ * However, req_len too small to host a nonce
+ */
+ arcb->sea = 80;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x109, "encrypted size too big");
+ arcb->sea = 17;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x109, "encrypted size too small");
+ arcb->sea = 64;
+
+ arcb->plaint_att_flags = uvcb_qui->supp_paf ^ GENMASK_ULL(63, 0);
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10a, "invalid flag");
+ arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
+
+ arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_NONE;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10b, "invalid measurement algorithm");
+ arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
+
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10c, "unable unseal");
+
+ uvcb.measurement_length = 0;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10d, "invalid measurement size");
+ uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
+
+ uvcb.add_data_length = 0;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10e, "invalid additional size");
+ uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
+
+done:
+ report_prefix_pop();
+}
+
+static void test_attest(uint64_t page)
+{
+ struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
+ .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
+ .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
+ };
+ const struct uv_cb_qui *uvcb_qui = uv_get_query_data();
+ int cc;
+
+ /* Verify that the UV supports at least one header version */
+ report(uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver, "has hdr support");
+
+ memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ uvcb.header.len -= 1;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "uvcb too small");
+ uvcb.header.len += 1;
+
+ uvcb.header.len += 1;
+ cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "uvcb too large");
+ uvcb.header.len -= 1;
+}
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ bool has_uvc = test_facility(158);
+ uint64_t page;
+
+
+ report_prefix_push("attestation");
+ if (!has_uvc) {
+ report_skip("Ultravisor call facility is not available");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!uv_os_is_guest()) {
+ report_skip("Not a protected guest");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION)) {
+ report_skip("Attestation not supported.");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ page = (uint64_t)alloc_page();
+ /* The privilege check is done in uv-guest.c */
+ test_attest(page);
+ test_attest_v1(page);
+ free_page((void *)page);
+done:
+ report_prefix_pop();
+ return report_summary();
+}
diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
index 152ad807..c16f19d4 100644
--- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
+++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
/*
* Guest Ultravisor Call tests
*
- * Copyright (c) 2020 IBM Corp
+ * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020, 2022
*
* Authors:
* Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
@@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ static void test_priv(void)
check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
report_prefix_pop();
+ report_prefix_push("attest");
+ uvcb.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION;
+ uvcb.len = sizeof(struct uv_cb_attest);
+ expect_pgm_int();
+ enter_pstate();
+ uv_call_once(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
+ check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
+ report_prefix_pop();
+
report_prefix_pop();
}
--
2.30.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 6/6] s390x: Add attestation tests
2022-05-02 9:39 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v5 6/6] s390x: Add attestation tests Steffen Eiden
@ 2022-05-04 8:36 ` Janosch Frank
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Janosch Frank @ 2022-05-04 8:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Eiden, Thomas Huth, Claudio Imbrenda, David Hildenbrand
Cc: kvm, linux-s390
On 5/2/22 11:39, Steffen Eiden wrote:
> Adds several tests to verify correct error paths of attestation.
>
> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> lib/s390x/asm/uv.h | 5 +-
> s390x/Makefile | 1 +
> s390x/pv-attest.c | 225 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> s390x/uv-guest.c | 11 ++-
> 4 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 s390x/pv-attest.c
>
> diff --git a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
> index 7c8c399d..38920461 100644
> --- a/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
> +++ b/lib/s390x/asm/uv.h
> @@ -108,7 +108,10 @@ struct uv_cb_qui {
> u8 reserved88[158 - 136]; /* 0x0088 */
> uint16_t max_guest_cpus; /* 0x009e */
> u64 uv_feature_indications; /* 0x00a0 */
> - u8 reserveda8[200 - 168]; /* 0x00a8 */
> + uint8_t reserveda8[224 - 168]; /* 0x00a8 */
> + uint64_t supp_att_hdr_ver; /* 0x00e0 */
> + uint64_t supp_paf; /* 0x00e8 */
> + uint8_t reservedf0[256 - 240]; /* 0x00f0 */
> } __attribute__((packed)) __attribute__((aligned(8)));
>
> struct uv_cb_cgc {
> diff --git a/s390x/Makefile b/s390x/Makefile
> index 8ff84db5..5a49d1e7 100644
> --- a/s390x/Makefile
> +++ b/s390x/Makefile
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tests += $(TEST_DIR)/mvpg-sie.elf
> tests += $(TEST_DIR)/spec_ex-sie.elf
> tests += $(TEST_DIR)/firq.elf
> tests += $(TEST_DIR)/epsw.elf
> +tests += $(TEST_DIR)/pv-attest.elf
>
> pv-tests += $(TEST_DIR)/pv-diags.elf
>
> diff --git a/s390x/pv-attest.c b/s390x/pv-attest.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 00000000..65048349
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/s390x/pv-attest.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Retrieve Attestation Measurement Utravisor Call tests
> + *
> + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2022
> + *
> + * Authors:
> + * Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
> + */
> +
> +#include <libcflat.h>
> +#include <alloc_page.h>
> +#include <asm/page.h>
> +#include <asm/facility.h>
> +#include <asm/uv.h>
> +#include <sclp.h>
> +#include <uv.h>
> +
> +#define ARCB_VERSION_NONE 0
> +#define ARCB_VERSION_1 0x100
> +#define ARCB_MEAS_NONE 0
> +#define ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512 1
> +#define MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512 64
> +#define PAF_PHKH_ATT (1ULL << 61)
> +#define ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT 32
> +/* arcb with one key slot and no nonce */
> +struct uv_arcb_v1 {
> + uint64_t reserved0; /* 0x0000 */
> + uint32_t req_ver; /* 0x0008 */
> + uint32_t req_len; /* 0x000c */
> + uint8_t iv[12]; /* 0x0010 */
> + uint32_t reserved1c; /* 0x001c */
> + uint8_t reserved20[7]; /* 0x0020 */
> + uint8_t nks; /* 0x0027 */
> + int32_t reserved28; /* 0x0028 */
> + uint32_t sea; /* 0x002c */
> + uint64_t plaint_att_flags; /* 0x0030 */
> + uint32_t meas_alg_id; /* 0x0038 */
> + uint32_t reserved3c; /* 0x003c */
> + uint8_t cpk[160]; /* 0x0040 */
> + uint8_t key_slot[80]; /* 0x00e0 */
> + uint8_t meas_key[64]; /* 0x0130 */
> + uint8_t tag[16]; /* 0x0170 */
> +} __attribute__((packed));
> +
> +struct attest_request_v1 {
> + struct uv_arcb_v1 arcb;
> + uint8_t measurement[MEASUREMENT_SIZE_HMAC_SHA512];
> + uint8_t additional[ADDITIONAL_SIZE_PAF_PHKH_ATT];
> +};
> +
> +static void test_attest_v1(uint64_t page)
> +{
> + struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
> + .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
> + .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
> + };
> + const struct uv_cb_qui *uvcb_qui = uv_get_query_data();
> + struct attest_request_v1 *attest_req = (void *)page;
> + struct uv_arcb_v1 *arcb = &attest_req->arcb;
> + int cc;
> +
> + report_prefix_push("v1");
> + if (!test_bit_inv(0, &uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver)) {
> + report_skip("Attestation version 1 not supported");
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + /*
> + * Create a minimal arcb/uvcb such that FW has everything to start
> + * unsealing the request. However, this unsealing will fail as the
> + * kvm-unit-test framework provides no cryptography functions that
> + * would be needed to seal such requests.
> + */
> + arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
> + arcb->req_len = sizeof(*arcb);
> + arcb->nks = 1;
> + arcb->sea = sizeof(arcb->meas_key);
> + arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
> + arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
> + uvcb.arcb_addr = (uint64_t)&attest_req->arcb;
> + uvcb.measurement_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->measurement;
> + uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
> + uvcb.add_data_address = (uint64_t)attest_req->additional;
> + uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
> +
> + uvcb.continuation_token = 0xff;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x101, "invalid continuation token");
> + uvcb.continuation_token = 0;
> +
> + uvcb.user_data_length = sizeof(uvcb.user_data) + 1;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x102, "invalid user data size");
> + uvcb.user_data_length = 0;
> +
> + uvcb.arcb_addr = get_ram_size() + PAGE_SIZE;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x103, "invalid arcb address");
> + uvcb.arcb_addr = page;
> +
> + /* 0x104 - 0x105 need an unseal-able request */
> +
> + arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_NONE;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x106, "unsupported version");
> + arcb->req_ver = ARCB_VERSION_1;
> +
> + arcb->req_len += 1;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x107, "arcb too big");
> + arcb->req_len -= 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * The arcb needs to grow as well if number of key slots (nks)
> + * is increased. However, this is not the case and there is no explicit
> + * 'too many/less nks for that arcb size' error code -> expect 0x107
> + */
> + arcb->nks = 2;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x107, "too many nks for arcb");
> + arcb->nks = 1;
> +
> + arcb->nks = 0;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x108, "invalid num key slots");
> + arcb->nks = 1;
> +
> + /*
> + * Possible valid size (when using nonce).
> + * However, req_len too small to host a nonce
> + */
> + arcb->sea = 80;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x109, "encrypted size too big");
> + arcb->sea = 17;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x109, "encrypted size too small");
> + arcb->sea = 64;
> +
> + arcb->plaint_att_flags = uvcb_qui->supp_paf ^ GENMASK_ULL(63, 0);
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10a, "invalid flag");
> + arcb->plaint_att_flags = PAF_PHKH_ATT;
> +
> + arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_NONE;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10b, "invalid measurement algorithm");
> + arcb->meas_alg_id = ARCB_MEAS_HMAC_SHA512;
> +
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10c, "unable unseal");
> +
> + uvcb.measurement_length = 0;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10d, "invalid measurement size");
> + uvcb.measurement_length = sizeof(attest_req->measurement);
> +
> + uvcb.add_data_length = 0;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc == 1 && uvcb.header.rc == 0x10e, "invalid additional size");
> + uvcb.add_data_length = sizeof(attest_req->additional);
> +
> +done:
> + report_prefix_pop();
> +}
> +
> +static void test_attest(uint64_t page)
> +{
> + struct uv_cb_attest uvcb = {
> + .header.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION,
> + .header.len = sizeof(uvcb),
> + };
> + const struct uv_cb_qui *uvcb_qui = uv_get_query_data();
> + int cc;
> +
> + /* Verify that the UV supports at least one header version */
> + report(uvcb_qui->supp_att_hdr_ver, "has hdr support");
> +
> + memset((void *)page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + uvcb.header.len -= 1;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "uvcb too small");
> + uvcb.header.len += 1;
> +
> + uvcb.header.len += 1;
> + cc = uv_call(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + report(cc && uvcb.header.rc == UVC_RC_INV_LEN, "uvcb too large");
> + uvcb.header.len -= 1;
> +}
> +
> +int main(void)
> +{
> + bool has_uvc = test_facility(158);
> + uint64_t page;
> +
> +
> + report_prefix_push("attestation");
> + if (!has_uvc) {
> + report_skip("Ultravisor call facility is not available");
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + if (!uv_os_is_guest()) {
> + report_skip("Not a protected guest");
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + if (!uv_query_test_call(BIT_UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION)) {
> + report_skip("Attestation not supported.");
> + goto done;
> + }
> +
> + page = (uint64_t)alloc_page();
> + /* The privilege check is done in uv-guest.c */
> + test_attest(page);
> + test_attest_v1(page);
> + free_page((void *)page);
> +done:
> + report_prefix_pop();
> + return report_summary();
> +}
> diff --git a/s390x/uv-guest.c b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> index 152ad807..c16f19d4 100644
> --- a/s390x/uv-guest.c
> +++ b/s390x/uv-guest.c
> @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
> /*
> * Guest Ultravisor Call tests
> *
> - * Copyright (c) 2020 IBM Corp
> + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2020, 2022
> *
> * Authors:
> * Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
> @@ -53,6 +53,15 @@ static void test_priv(void)
> check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
> report_prefix_pop();
>
> + report_prefix_push("attest");
> + uvcb.cmd = UVC_CMD_ATTESTATION;
> + uvcb.len = sizeof(struct uv_cb_attest);
> + expect_pgm_int();
> + enter_pstate();
> + uv_call_once(0, (uint64_t)&uvcb);
> + check_pgm_int_code(PGM_INT_CODE_PRIVILEGED_OPERATION);
> + report_prefix_pop();
> +
> report_prefix_pop();
> }
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread