* [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-24 19:01 ` Liam Merwick
2025-02-24 21:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 02/10] KVM: selftests: SEV-SNP test for KVM_SEV_INIT2 Pratik R. Sampat
` (8 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 2 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
successfully initialized.
Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* Replace FW version check with sev->snp_initialized (Sean)
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 3 +++
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 0dbb25442ec1..87b5d63a5817 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3050,7 +3050,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
sev_es_supported = true;
- sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+ sev_snp_supported = (sev_snp_enabled &&
+ cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
+ snp_initialized());
out:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 2e87ca0e292a..8d2cf8552bc2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1352,6 +1352,14 @@ int sev_platform_init(struct sev_platform_init_args *args)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
+bool snp_initialized(void)
+{
+ struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+
+ return sev->snp_initialized;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_initialized);
+
static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
{
struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index f3cad182d4ef..d34068c87a28 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 uaddr, u32 len);
void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask);
void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr);
+bool snp_initialized(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
@@ -988,6 +989,8 @@ static inline void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask)
static inline void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr) { }
+static inline bool snp_initialized(void) { return false; }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
#endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-24 19:01 ` Liam Merwick
2025-02-25 16:50 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-24 21:28 ` Tom Lendacky
1 sibling, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Liam Merwick @ 2025-02-24 19:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pratik R. Sampat, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, liam.merwick
On 21/02/2025 21:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
> successfully initialized.
>
> Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
> ---
> v6..v7:
>
> * Replace FW version check with sev->snp_initialized (Sean)
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 ++++++++
> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 3 +++
> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 0dbb25442ec1..87b5d63a5817 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3050,7 +3050,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
> WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
> sev_es_supported = true;
> - sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
> + sev_snp_supported = (sev_snp_enabled &&
> + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
> + snp_initialized());
>
> out:
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> index 2e87ca0e292a..8d2cf8552bc2 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> @@ -1352,6 +1352,14 @@ int sev_platform_init(struct sev_platform_init_args *args)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
>
> +bool snp_initialized(void)
> +{
> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
Should check psp_master isn't NULL before accessing just in case
(particularly for future potential callers).
(e.g. see ccb88e9549e7 ("crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in
__sev_platform_shutdown_locked")
> +
> + return sev->snp_initialized;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_initialized);
> +
> static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
> {
> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> index f3cad182d4ef..d34068c87a28 100644
> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> @@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
> void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 uaddr, u32 len);
> void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask);
> void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr);
> +bool snp_initialized(void);
>
> #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> @@ -988,6 +989,8 @@ static inline void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask)
>
> static inline void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr) { }
>
> +static inline bool snp_initialized(void) { return false; }
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> #endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-24 19:01 ` Liam Merwick
@ 2025-02-25 16:50 ` Pratik R. Sampat
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-25 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Liam Merwick, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal
Hi Liam,
Thanks for review!
On 2/24/2025 1:01 PM, Liam Merwick wrote:
>
>
> On 21/02/2025 21:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
>> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
>> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
>> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
>> successfully initialized.
>>
>> Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
>> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
>> ---
>> v6..v7:
>>
>> * Replace FW version check with sev->snp_initialized (Sean)
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
>> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 ++++++++
>> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 3 +++
>> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> index 0dbb25442ec1..87b5d63a5817 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
>> @@ -3050,7 +3050,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
>> sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES,
>> sev_es_asid_count));
>> sev_es_supported = true;
>> - sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled &&
>> cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
>> + sev_snp_supported = (sev_snp_enabled &&
>> + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
>> + snp_initialized());
>> out:
>> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
>> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> index 2e87ca0e292a..8d2cf8552bc2 100644
>> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
>> @@ -1352,6 +1352,14 @@ int sev_platform_init(struct
>> sev_platform_init_args *args)
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
>> +bool snp_initialized(void)
>> +{
>> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
>
>
> Should check psp_master isn't NULL before accessing just in case
> (particularly for future potential callers).
>
> (e.g. see ccb88e9549e7 ("crypto: ccp - Fix null pointer dereference in
> __sev_platform_shutdown_locked")
>
Thanks for pointing this out, if I end up using this interface, I'll put
the NULL check in.
Thanks!
Pratik
>
>
>
>> +
>> + return sev->snp_initialized;
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_initialized);
>> +
>> static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
>> {
>> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
>> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>> index f3cad182d4ef..d34068c87a28 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
>> @@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
>> void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 uaddr, u32 len);
>> void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask);
>> void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr);
>> +bool snp_initialized(void);
>> #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>> @@ -988,6 +989,8 @@ static inline void
>> *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask)
>> static inline void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr) { }
>> +static inline bool snp_initialized(void) { return false; }
>> +
>> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>> #endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-24 19:01 ` Liam Merwick
@ 2025-02-24 21:28 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25 16:41 ` Pratik R. Sampat
1 sibling, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2025-02-24 21:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pratik R. Sampat, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, shuah, pgonda,
ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth, sraithal
On 2/21/25 15:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
> successfully initialized.
Hmmm... rather than creating a new API, can you just issue an
SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command and see if the SNP is not in the UNINIT state?
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Fixes: 1dfe571c12cf ("KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support")
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
> ---
> v6..v7:
>
> * Replace FW version check with sev->snp_initialized (Sean)
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 +++-
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 8 ++++++++
> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 3 +++
> 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 0dbb25442ec1..87b5d63a5817 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3050,7 +3050,9 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
> sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
> WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
> sev_es_supported = true;
> - sev_snp_supported = sev_snp_enabled && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
> + sev_snp_supported = (sev_snp_enabled &&
> + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) &&
> + snp_initialized());
>
> out:
> if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> index 2e87ca0e292a..8d2cf8552bc2 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
> @@ -1352,6 +1352,14 @@ int sev_platform_init(struct sev_platform_init_args *args)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
>
> +bool snp_initialized(void)
> +{
> + struct sev_device *sev = psp_master->sev_data;
> +
> + return sev->snp_initialized;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_initialized);
> +
> static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
> {
> struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> index f3cad182d4ef..d34068c87a28 100644
> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> @@ -954,6 +954,7 @@ int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret);
> void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 uaddr, u32 len);
> void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask);
> void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr);
> +bool snp_initialized(void);
>
> #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> @@ -988,6 +989,8 @@ static inline void *snp_alloc_firmware_page(gfp_t mask)
>
> static inline void snp_free_firmware_page(void *addr) { }
>
> +static inline bool snp_initialized(void) { return false; }
> +
> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> #endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-24 21:28 ` Tom Lendacky
@ 2025-02-25 16:41 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-25 17:45 ` Pratik R. Sampat
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-25 16:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, shuah, pgonda,
ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth, sraithal
Hi Tom,
On 2/24/2025 3:28 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 2/21/25 15:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
>> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
>> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
>> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
>> successfully initialized.
>
> Hmmm... rather than creating a new API, can you just issue an
> SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command and see if the SNP is not in the UNINIT state?
>
Although reading sev->snp_initialized is probably cheaper to do, it is
cleaner to query the platform status.
Querying SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS requires the pages to transition to
firmware-owned and back, and the helpers for it are implemented within
sev-dev.c. So, similar to sev_platform_status(), I'm thinking it is
probably better to create the snp_platform_status() API as well and use
that within KVM to check the state.
Thanks!
Pratik
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-25 16:41 ` Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-25 17:45 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-25 19:09 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-25 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, shuah, pgonda,
ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth, sraithal
On 2/25/2025 10:41 AM, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> Hi Tom,
>
> On 2/24/2025 3:28 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 2/21/25 15:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>>> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
>>> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
>>> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
>>> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
>>> successfully initialized.
>>
>> Hmmm... rather than creating a new API, can you just issue an
>> SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command and see if the SNP is not in the UNINIT state?
>>
>
> Although reading sev->snp_initialized is probably cheaper to do, it is
> cleaner to query the platform status.
>
> Querying SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS requires the pages to transition to
> firmware-owned and back, and the helpers for it are implemented within
> sev-dev.c. So, similar to sev_platform_status(), I'm thinking it is
> probably better to create the snp_platform_status() API as well and use
> that within KVM to check the state.
>
Although I am guessing the initial intent was to not have an API exposed
at all from CCP and only make the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS call instead?
Since that may not be cleanly possible (we have helpers for page state
conversions such as rmp_mark_pages_firmware() in ccp) without
duplicating functionality in KVM as well, I guess the question really
boils down to whether we export the cheaper snp_initialized() or the
snp_platform_status() API instead?
Thanks again!
Pratik
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-25 17:45 ` Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-25 19:09 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-25 19:45 ` Pratik R. Sampat
0 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2025-02-25 19:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Pratik R. Sampat, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, shuah, pgonda,
ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth, sraithal
On 2/25/25 11:45, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
> On 2/25/2025 10:41 AM, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>> Hi Tom,
>>
>> On 2/24/2025 3:28 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 2/21/25 15:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>>>> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
>>>> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
>>>> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
>>>> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
>>>> successfully initialized.
>>>
>>> Hmmm... rather than creating a new API, can you just issue an
>>> SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command and see if the SNP is not in the UNINIT state?
>>>
>>
>> Although reading sev->snp_initialized is probably cheaper to do, it is
>> cleaner to query the platform status.
>>
>> Querying SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS requires the pages to transition to
>> firmware-owned and back, and the helpers for it are implemented within
>> sev-dev.c. So, similar to sev_platform_status(), I'm thinking it is
>> probably better to create the snp_platform_status() API as well and use
>> that within KVM to check the state.
>>
>
> Although I am guessing the initial intent was to not have an API exposed
> at all from CCP and only make the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS call instead?
>
> Since that may not be cleanly possible (we have helpers for page state
> conversions such as rmp_mark_pages_firmware() in ccp) without
> duplicating functionality in KVM as well, I guess the question really
> boils down to whether we export the cheaper snp_initialized() or the
> snp_platform_status() API instead?
Taking a closer look, we do already have APIs that KVM uses to allocate
firmware pages (output pages for SNP APIs) that can be used:
snp_alloc_firmware_page() and snp_free_firmware_page().
I think that should be enough to use sev_do_cmd() to perform the
SEV_CMD_SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command without exposing a new API.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Thanks again!
> Pratik
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure
2025-02-25 19:09 ` Tom Lendacky
@ 2025-02-25 19:45 ` Pratik R. Sampat
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-25 19:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto,
linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, shuah, pgonda,
ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth, sraithal
On 2/25/2025 1:09 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 2/25/25 11:45, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>> On 2/25/2025 10:41 AM, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>>> Hi Tom,
>>>
>>> On 2/24/2025 3:28 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>> On 2/21/25 15:01, Pratik R. Sampat wrote:
>>>>> During platform init, SNP initialization may fail for several reasons,
>>>>> such as firmware command failures and incompatible versions. However,
>>>>> the KVM capability may continue to advertise support for it. Export this
>>>>> information to KVM and withdraw SEV-SNP support if has not been
>>>>> successfully initialized.
>>>>
>>>> Hmmm... rather than creating a new API, can you just issue an
>>>> SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command and see if the SNP is not in the UNINIT state?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Although reading sev->snp_initialized is probably cheaper to do, it is
>>> cleaner to query the platform status.
>>>
>>> Querying SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS requires the pages to transition to
>>> firmware-owned and back, and the helpers for it are implemented within
>>> sev-dev.c. So, similar to sev_platform_status(), I'm thinking it is
>>> probably better to create the snp_platform_status() API as well and use
>>> that within KVM to check the state.
>>>
>>
>> Although I am guessing the initial intent was to not have an API exposed
>> at all from CCP and only make the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS call instead?
>>
>> Since that may not be cleanly possible (we have helpers for page state
>> conversions such as rmp_mark_pages_firmware() in ccp) without
>> duplicating functionality in KVM as well, I guess the question really
>> boils down to whether we export the cheaper snp_initialized() or the
>> snp_platform_status() API instead?
>
> Taking a closer look, we do already have APIs that KVM uses to allocate
> firmware pages (output pages for SNP APIs) that can be used:
> snp_alloc_firmware_page() and snp_free_firmware_page().
>
> I think that should be enough to use sev_do_cmd() to perform the
> SEV_CMD_SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command without exposing a new API.
>
Ah, I had missed that! Calling the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS this way works.
Pratik
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
>>
>> Thanks again!
>> Pratik
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v7 02/10] KVM: selftests: SEV-SNP test for KVM_SEV_INIT2
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 03/10] KVM: selftests: Add vmgexit helper Pratik R. Sampat
` (7 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Add the X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP CPU feature to the architectural definition
for the SEV-SNP VM type to exercise the KVM_SEV_INIT2 call. Ensure that
the SNP test is skipped in scenarios where CPUID supports it but KVM
does not, preventing reporting of failure in such cases.
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* No change
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c | 13 +++++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
index d60da8966772..6f63fd10bbc6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/processor.h
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_cpu_feature {
#define X86_FEATURE_VGIF KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x8000000A, 0, EDX, 16)
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x8000001F, 0, EAX, 1)
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x8000001F, 0, EAX, 3)
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP KVM_X86_CPU_FEATURE(0x8000001F, 0, EAX, 4)
/*
* KVM defined paravirt features.
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
index 3fb967f40c6a..ab3dd11ac163 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
int kvm_fd;
u64 supported_vmsa_features;
bool have_sev_es;
+bool have_snp;
static int __sev_ioctl(int vm_fd, int cmd_id, void *data)
{
@@ -83,6 +84,9 @@ void test_vm_types(void)
if (have_sev_es)
test_init2(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, &(struct kvm_sev_init){});
+ if (have_snp)
+ test_init2(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, &(struct kvm_sev_init){});
+
test_init2_invalid(0, &(struct kvm_sev_init){},
"VM type is KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM");
if (kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM))
@@ -138,15 +142,24 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
"sev-es: KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES (%x) does not match cpuid (checking %x)",
kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES), 1 << KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+ have_snp = kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ TEST_ASSERT(!have_snp || kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP),
+ "sev-snp: KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES (%x) indicates SNP support (bit %d), but CPUID does not",
+ kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES), KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+
test_vm_types();
test_flags(KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
if (have_sev_es)
test_flags(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+ if (have_snp)
+ test_flags(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0);
if (have_sev_es)
test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, supported_vmsa_features);
+ if (have_snp)
+ test_features(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, supported_vmsa_features);
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 03/10] KVM: selftests: Add vmgexit helper
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 01/10] KVM: SEV: Disable SEV-SNP support on initialization failure Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 02/10] KVM: selftests: SEV-SNP test for KVM_SEV_INIT2 Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 04/10] KVM: selftests: Add SMT control state helper Pratik R. Sampat
` (6 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Abstract rep vmmcall coded into the vmgexit helper for the sev
library.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* Change vmgexit macro define to an inline function (Sean)
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h | 5 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
index 82c11c81a956..3003dc837fb7 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@ kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+static inline void vmgexit(void)
+{
+ __asm__ __volatile__("rep; vmmcall");
+}
+
static inline void sev_register_encrypted_memory(struct kvm_vm *vm,
struct userspace_mem_region *region)
{
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
index a1a688e75266..6812b94bf5b6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void guest_sev_es_code(void)
* force "termination" to signal "done" via the GHCB MSR protocol.
*/
wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ);
- __asm__ __volatile__("rep; vmmcall");
+ vmgexit();
}
static void guest_sev_code(void)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 04/10] KVM: selftests: Add SMT control state helper
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 03/10] KVM: selftests: Add vmgexit helper Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 05/10] KVM: selftests: Replace assert() with TEST_ASSERT_EQ() Pratik R. Sampat
` (5 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Move the SMT control check out of the hyperv_cpuid selftest so that
it is generally accessible all selftests. Split the functionality into
a helper that populates a buffer with SMT control value which other
helpers can use to ascertain if SMT state is available and active.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* New - Implement SMT control interface within kvm_util so that it is
accessible to KVM KSTs and subsequently the SEV library (Sean)
---
.../testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/kvm/x86/hyperv_cpuid.c | 19 ----------
2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h
index 4c4e5a847f67..446f04b2710f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/kvm_util.h
@@ -542,6 +542,41 @@ static inline uint64_t vm_get_stat(struct kvm_vm *vm, const char *stat_name)
return data;
}
+static inline bool read_smt_control(char *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ FILE *f = fopen("/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control", "r");
+ bool ret;
+
+ if (!f)
+ return false;
+
+ ret = fread(buf, sizeof(*buf), buf_size, f) > 0;
+ fclose(f);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline bool smt_possible(void)
+{
+ char buf[16];
+
+ if (read_smt_control(buf, sizeof(buf)) &&
+ (!strncmp(buf, "forceoff", 8) || !strncmp(buf, "notsupported", 12)))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline bool smt_on(void)
+{
+ char buf[16];
+
+ if (read_smt_control(buf, sizeof(buf)) && !strncmp(buf, "on", 2))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
void vm_create_irqchip(struct kvm_vm *vm);
static inline int __vm_create_guest_memfd(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t size,
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/hyperv_cpuid.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/hyperv_cpuid.c
index 4e920705681a..1eb55d0b7297 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/hyperv_cpuid.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/hyperv_cpuid.c
@@ -22,25 +22,6 @@ static void guest_code(void)
{
}
-static bool smt_possible(void)
-{
- char buf[16];
- FILE *f;
- bool res = true;
-
- f = fopen("/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control", "r");
- if (f) {
- if (fread(buf, sizeof(*buf), sizeof(buf), f) > 0) {
- if (!strncmp(buf, "forceoff", 8) ||
- !strncmp(buf, "notsupported", 12))
- res = false;
- }
- fclose(f);
- }
-
- return res;
-}
-
static void test_hv_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool evmcs_expected)
{
const bool has_irqchip = !vcpu || vcpu->vm->has_irqchip;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 05/10] KVM: selftests: Replace assert() with TEST_ASSERT_EQ()
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 04/10] KVM: selftests: Add SMT control state helper Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 06/10] KVM: selftests: Introduce SEV VM type check Pratik R. Sampat
` (4 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
For SEV tests, assert() failures on VM type or fd do not provide
sufficient error reporting. Replace assert() with TEST_ASSERT_EQ() to
obtain more detailed information on the assertion condition failure,
including the call stack.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* New - Replace older instances of assert with TEST_ASSERT for richer
error reporing
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
index e9535ee20b7f..60d7a03dc1c2 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@ static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
{
if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
- assert(vm->arch.sev_fd == -1);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->arch.sev_fd, -1);
vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL);
} else {
struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
- assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->type, KVM_X86_SEV_VM);
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
}
}
@@ -50,12 +50,12 @@ void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
{
if (vm->type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
- assert(vm->arch.sev_fd == -1);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->arch.sev_fd, -1);
vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_ES_INIT, NULL);
} else {
struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
- assert(vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->type, KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM);
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
}
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 06/10] KVM: selftests: Introduce SEV VM type check
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 05/10] KVM: selftests: Replace assert() with TEST_ASSERT_EQ() Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 07/10] KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP Pratik R. Sampat
` (3 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
In preparation for SNP, declutter the vm type check by introducing a
SEV-SNP VM type check as well as a transitive set of helper functions.
The SNP VM type is the subset of SEV-ES. Similarly, the SEV-ES and SNP
types are subset of the SEV VM type check.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* No change
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h | 4 ++++
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c | 4 ++--
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
index 3003dc837fb7..b112f7664534 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ enum sev_guest_state {
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ 0x100
+bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+bool is_sev_es_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c
index bd5a802fa7a5..a92dc1dad085 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/processor.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ void kvm_arch_vm_post_create(struct kvm_vm *vm)
sync_global_to_guest(vm, host_cpu_is_amd);
sync_global_to_guest(vm, is_forced_emulation_enabled);
- if (vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) {
+ if (is_sev_vm(vm)) {
struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
@@ -1156,7 +1156,7 @@ void kvm_get_cpu_address_width(unsigned int *pa_bits, unsigned int *va_bits)
void kvm_init_vm_address_properties(struct kvm_vm *vm)
{
- if (vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM) {
+ if (is_sev_vm(vm)) {
vm->arch.sev_fd = open_sev_dev_path_or_exit();
vm->arch.c_bit = BIT_ULL(this_cpu_property(X86_PROPERTY_SEV_C_BIT));
vm->gpa_tag_mask = vm->arch.c_bit;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
index 60d7a03dc1c2..4587f2b6bc39 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
@@ -4,6 +4,23 @@
#include "sev.h"
+bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ return vm->type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM;
+}
+
+/* A SNP VM is also a SEV-ES VM */
+bool is_sev_es_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ return is_sev_snp_vm(vm) || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM;
+}
+
+/* A SEV-ES and SNP VM is also a SEV VM */
+bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ return is_sev_es_vm(vm) || vm->type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
+}
+
/*
* sparsebit_next_clear() can return 0 if [x, 2**64-1] are all set, and the
* -1 would then cause an underflow back to 2**64 - 1. This is expected and
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
index 6812b94bf5b6..a2de1e63c3cb 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
for (;;) {
vcpu_run(vcpu);
- if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) {
+ if (is_sev_es_vm(vm)) {
TEST_ASSERT(vcpu->run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT,
"Wanted SYSTEM_EVENT, got %s",
exit_reason_str(vcpu->run->exit_reason));
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 07/10] KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 06/10] KVM: selftests: Introduce SEV VM type check Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 08/10] KVM: selftests: Force GUEST_MEMFD flag for SNP VM type Pratik R. Sampat
` (2 subsequent siblings)
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Extend the SEV library to include support for SNP ioctl() wrappers,
which aid in launching and interacting with a SEV-SNP guest.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* Remove FW version macros (Sean)
* Define a new type KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID so that encrypt_region
called using the SEV path does not have to pass a literal (Sean)
* Replace assert() within snp_vm_init() to TEST_ASSERT_EQ() (Sean)
* As SNP currently uses privatization and encryption of a region in
tandem, remove privatize_region() and include it's functionality
within encrypt_region() by adding a parameter (Sean)
* Minor cleanup of code braces (Sean)
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h | 33 ++++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 9e75da97bce0..565e4d054627 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
};
/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */
+#define KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID 0x0
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
index 88585c1de416..17e44fbdc2a7 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
@@ -841,6 +841,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start {
};
/* Kept in sync with firmware values for simplicity. */
+#define KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID 0x0
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3
#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
index b112f7664534..c696d10f9332 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/include/x86/sev.h
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ enum sev_guest_state {
#define SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG (1UL << 0)
#define SEV_POLICY_ES (1UL << 2)
+#define SNP_POLICY_SMT (1ULL << 16)
+#define SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO (1ULL << 17)
+#define SNP_POLICY_DBG (1ULL << 19)
+
#define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ 0x100
bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
@@ -34,13 +38,26 @@ bool is_sev_snp_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy);
void sev_vm_launch_measure(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint8_t *measurement);
void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy);
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm);
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu);
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement);
kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
+/*
+ * A SEV-SNP VM requires the policy reserved bit to always be set.
+ * The SMT policy bit is also required to be set based on SMT being
+ * available and active on the system.
+ */
+static inline u64 snp_default_policy(void)
+{
+ return SNP_POLICY_RSVD_MBO | (smt_on() ? SNP_POLICY_SMT : 0);
+}
+
/*
* The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP uAPI is utter garbage and takes an "unsigned long"
* instead of a proper struct. The size of the parameter is embedded in the
@@ -74,6 +91,7 @@ kvm_static_assert(SEV_RET_SUCCESS == 0);
void sev_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm);
static inline void vmgexit(void)
{
@@ -102,4 +120,17 @@ static inline void sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &update_data);
}
+static inline void snp_launch_update_data(struct kvm_vm *vm, vm_paddr_t gpa,
+ uint64_t hva, uint64_t size, uint8_t type)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update_data = {
+ .uaddr = hva,
+ .gfn_start = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT,
+ .len = size,
+ .type = type,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, &update_data);
+}
+
#endif /* SELFTEST_KVM_SEV_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
index 4587f2b6bc39..a56f5164b0a6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86/sev.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ bool is_sev_vm(struct kvm_vm *vm)
* and find the first range, but that's correct because the condition
* expression would cause us to quit the loop.
*/
-static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region)
+static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *region,
+ uint8_t page_type, bool private)
{
const struct sparsebit *protected_phy_pages = region->protected_phy_pages;
const vm_paddr_t gpa_base = region->region.guest_phys_addr;
@@ -41,13 +42,23 @@ static void encrypt_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, struct userspace_mem_region *regio
if (!sparsebit_any_set(protected_phy_pages))
return;
- sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
+ if (!is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+ sev_register_encrypted_memory(vm, region);
sparsebit_for_each_set_range(protected_phy_pages, i, j) {
const uint64_t size = (j - i + 1) * vm->page_size;
const uint64_t offset = (i - lowest_page_in_region) * vm->page_size;
- sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+ if (private)
+ vm_mem_set_private(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm))
+ snp_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset,
+ (uint64_t)addr_gpa2hva(vm, gpa_base + offset),
+ size, page_type);
+ else
+ sev_launch_update_data(vm, gpa_base + offset, size);
+
}
}
@@ -77,6 +88,14 @@ void sev_es_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
}
}
+void snp_vm_init(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_init init = { 0 };
+
+ TEST_ASSERT_EQ(vm->type, KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &init);
+}
+
void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
{
struct kvm_sev_launch_start launch_start = {
@@ -93,7 +112,7 @@ void sev_vm_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
- encrypt_region(vm, region);
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_PAGE_TYPE_INVALID, false);
if (policy & SEV_POLICY_ES)
vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL);
@@ -129,6 +148,33 @@ void sev_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
TEST_ASSERT_EQ(status.state, SEV_GUEST_STATE_RUNNING);
}
+void snp_vm_launch_start(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start launch_start = {
+ .policy = policy,
+ };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &launch_start);
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_update(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct userspace_mem_region *region;
+ int ctr;
+
+ hash_for_each(vm->regions.slot_hash, ctr, region, slot_node)
+ encrypt_region(vm, region, KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL, true);
+
+ vm->arch.is_pt_protected = true;
+}
+
+void snp_vm_launch_finish(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish launch_finish = { 0 };
+
+ vm_sev_ioctl(vm, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH, &launch_finish);
+}
+
struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
struct kvm_vcpu **cpu)
{
@@ -145,8 +191,20 @@ struct kvm_vm *vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(uint32_t type, void *guest_code,
return vm;
}
-void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint32_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
+void vm_sev_launch(struct kvm_vm *vm, uint64_t policy, uint8_t *measurement)
{
+ if (is_sev_snp_vm(vm)) {
+ vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_EXIT_HYPERCALL, (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE));
+
+ snp_vm_launch_start(vm, policy);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_update(vm);
+
+ snp_vm_launch_finish(vm);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
sev_vm_launch(vm, policy);
if (!measurement)
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 08/10] KVM: selftests: Force GUEST_MEMFD flag for SNP VM type
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 07/10] KVM: selftests: Add library support for interacting with SNP Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 09/10] KVM: selftests: Abstractions for SEV to decouple policy from type Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:02 ` [PATCH v7 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV-SNP smoke test Pratik R. Sampat
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Force the SEV-SNP VM type to set the KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD flag for the
creation of private memslots.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* No change
---
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
index 33fefeb3ca44..089488e2eaf6 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/kvm_util.c
@@ -413,14 +413,17 @@ struct kvm_vm *__vm_create(struct vm_shape shape, uint32_t nr_runnable_vcpus,
nr_extra_pages);
struct userspace_mem_region *slot0;
struct kvm_vm *vm;
- int i;
+ int i, flags = 0;
pr_debug("%s: mode='%s' type='%d', pages='%ld'\n", __func__,
vm_guest_mode_string(shape.mode), shape.type, nr_pages);
vm = ____vm_create(shape);
- vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, nr_pages, 0);
+ if (shape.type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+ flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD;
+
+ vm_userspace_mem_region_add(vm, VM_MEM_SRC_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0, nr_pages, flags);
for (i = 0; i < NR_MEM_REGIONS; i++)
vm->memslots[i] = 0;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 09/10] KVM: selftests: Abstractions for SEV to decouple policy from type
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 08/10] KVM: selftests: Force GUEST_MEMFD flag for SNP VM type Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:01 ` Pratik R. Sampat
2025-02-21 21:02 ` [PATCH v7 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV-SNP smoke test Pratik R. Sampat
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
In preparation for SNP, cleanup the smoke test to decouple deriving type
from policy. This enables us to reuse existing interfaces as well as
deduplicate the test calls that are called for SEV and SEV-ES.
No functional change intended.
[seanjc@google.com: deduplication of common SEV+ test calls]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/Z6wIDsbjt2ZaiX0I@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* Remove individual wrappers around sev and sev-es helpers
* Combine common tests and deduplicate the SEV, SEV-ES calls from the
main function (Sean)
---
.../selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c | 50 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
index a2de1e63c3cb..620aa7c41f7a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void compare_xsave(u8 *from_host, u8 *from_guest)
abort();
}
-static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t policy)
+static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_vm *vm;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t policy)
double x87val = M_PI;
struct kvm_xsave __attribute__((aligned(64))) xsave = { 0 };
- vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, guest_code_xsave, &vcpu);
+ vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(type, guest_code_xsave, &vcpu);
gva = vm_vaddr_alloc_shared(vm, PAGE_SIZE, KVM_UTIL_MIN_VADDR,
MEM_REGION_TEST_DATA);
hva = addr_gva2hva(vm, gva);
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t policy)
: "ymm4", "st", "st(1)", "st(2)", "st(3)", "st(4)", "st(5)", "st(6)", "st(7)");
vcpu_xsave_set(vcpu, &xsave);
- vm_sev_launch(vm, SEV_POLICY_ES | policy, NULL);
+ vm_sev_launch(vm, policy, NULL);
/* This page is shared, so make it decrypted. */
memset(hva, 0, 4096);
@@ -107,14 +107,12 @@ static void test_sync_vmsa(uint32_t policy)
kvm_vm_free(vm);
}
-static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint64_t policy)
+static void test_sev(void *guest_code, uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_vm *vm;
struct ucall uc;
- uint32_t type = policy & SEV_POLICY_ES ? KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
-
vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(type, guest_code, &vcpu);
/* TODO: Validate the measurement is as expected. */
@@ -160,16 +158,14 @@ static void guest_shutdown_code(void)
__asm__ __volatile__("ud2");
}
-static void test_sev_es_shutdown(void)
+static void test_sev_shutdown(uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct kvm_vm *vm;
- uint32_t type = KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM;
-
vm = vm_sev_create_with_one_vcpu(type, guest_shutdown_code, &vcpu);
- vm_sev_launch(vm, SEV_POLICY_ES, NULL);
+ vm_sev_launch(vm, policy, NULL);
vcpu_run(vcpu);
TEST_ASSERT(vcpu->run->exit_reason == KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN,
@@ -179,27 +175,33 @@ static void test_sev_es_shutdown(void)
kvm_vm_free(vm);
}
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+static void test_sev_smoke(void *guest, uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
{
const u64 xf_mask = XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX;
- TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));
-
- test_sev(guest_sev_code, SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
- test_sev(guest_sev_code, 0);
+ test_sev(guest, type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ test_sev(guest, type, policy);
- if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES)) {
- test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
- test_sev(guest_sev_es_code, SEV_POLICY_ES);
+ if (type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM)
+ return;
- test_sev_es_shutdown();
+ test_sev_shutdown(type, policy);
- if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_XCRS) &&
- (xgetbv(0) & kvm_cpu_supported_xcr0() & xf_mask) == xf_mask) {
- test_sync_vmsa(0);
- test_sync_vmsa(SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
- }
+ if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_XCRS) &&
+ (xgetbv(0) & kvm_cpu_supported_xcr0() & xf_mask) == xf_mask) {
+ test_sync_vmsa(type, policy);
+ test_sync_vmsa(type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV));
+
+ test_sev_smoke(guest_sev_code, KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0);
+
+ if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
+ test_sev_smoke(guest_sev_es_code, KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, SEV_POLICY_ES);
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v7 10/10] KVM: selftests: Add a basic SEV-SNP smoke test
2025-02-21 21:01 [PATCH v7 00/10] Basic SEV-SNP Selftests Pratik R. Sampat
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2025-02-21 21:01 ` [PATCH v7 09/10] KVM: selftests: Abstractions for SEV to decouple policy from type Pratik R. Sampat
@ 2025-02-21 21:02 ` Pratik R. Sampat
9 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Pratik R. Sampat @ 2025-02-21 21:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, x86, kvm, linux-crypto, linux-kselftest
Cc: seanjc, pbonzini, thomas.lendacky, tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen,
shuah, pgonda, ashish.kalra, nikunj, pankaj.gupta, michael.roth,
sraithal, prsampat
Extend sev_smoke_test to also run a minimal SEV-SNP smoke test that
initializes and sets up private memory regions required to run a simple
SEV-SNP guest.
Similar to its SEV-ES smoke test counterpart, this also does not
support GHCB and ucall yet and uses the GHCB MSR protocol to trigger an
exit of the type KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT.
Signed-off-by: Pratik R. Sampat <prsampat@amd.com>
---
v6..v7:
* Remove FW version checks for SNP (Sean)
* Include testing for policy flag SNP_POLICY_DBG
* Rework test in accordance with the last deduplication cleanup of
main()
---
.../selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
index 620aa7c41f7a..0505cde77358 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_smoke_test.c
@@ -16,6 +16,18 @@
#define XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX (XFEATURE_MASK_FP | XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM)
+static void guest_snp_code(void)
+{
+ uint64_t sev_msr = rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
+
+ GUEST_ASSERT(sev_msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED);
+ GUEST_ASSERT(sev_msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
+ GUEST_ASSERT(sev_msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED);
+
+ wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB, GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ);
+ vmgexit();
+}
+
static void guest_sev_es_code(void)
{
/* TODO: Check CPUID after GHCB-based hypercall support is added. */
@@ -179,7 +191,10 @@ static void test_sev_smoke(void *guest, uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
{
const u64 xf_mask = XFEATURE_MASK_X87_AVX;
- test_sev(guest, type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ if (type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+ test_sev(guest, type, policy | SNP_POLICY_DBG);
+ else
+ test_sev(guest, type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
test_sev(guest, type, policy);
if (type == KVM_X86_SEV_VM)
@@ -190,7 +205,10 @@ static void test_sev_smoke(void *guest, uint32_t type, uint64_t policy)
if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_XCRS) &&
(xgetbv(0) & kvm_cpu_supported_xcr0() & xf_mask) == xf_mask) {
test_sync_vmsa(type, policy);
- test_sync_vmsa(type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
+ if (type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM)
+ test_sync_vmsa(type, policy | SNP_POLICY_DBG);
+ else
+ test_sync_vmsa(type, policy | SEV_POLICY_NO_DBG);
}
}
@@ -203,5 +221,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
test_sev_smoke(guest_sev_es_code, KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, SEV_POLICY_ES);
+ if (kvm_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_SNP))
+ test_sev_smoke(guest_snp_code, KVM_X86_SNP_VM, snp_default_policy());
+
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
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