From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <tglx@linutronix.de>, <mingo@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
<nikunj@amd.com>, <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>,
<Vasant.Hegde@amd.com>, <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
<David.Kaplan@amd.com>, <x86@kernel.org>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
<peterz@infradead.org>, <seanjc@google.com>,
<pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>, <huibo.wang@amd.com>,
<naveen.rao@amd.com>, <francescolavra.fl@gmail.com>,
<tiala@microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v7 21/37] x86/apic: Initialize Secure AVIC APIC backing page
Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2025 23:24:08 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250610175424.209796-22-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250610175424.209796-1-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
With Secure AVIC, the APIC backing page is owned and managed by guest.
Allocate and initialize APIC backing page for all guest CPUs.
The NPT entry for a vCPU's APIC backing page must always be present
when the vCPU is running, in order for Secure AVIC to function. A
VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot be resumed if
the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not present. To handle this,
notify GPA of the vCPU's APIC backing page to the hypervisor by using the
SVM_VMGEXIT_SECURE_AVIC GHCB protocol event. Before executing VMRUN,
the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure the APIC backing
page is mapped in NPT.
Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
---
Changes since v6:
- No change.
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index e4d89a5f9f9f..32be4ab2f886 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1072,6 +1072,28 @@ int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd)
return 0;
}
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa)
+{
+ struct ghcb_state state;
+ struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
+ enum es_result res;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ guard(irqsave)();
+
+ ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_SELF_GPA);
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, gpa);
+ res = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, &ctxt, SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC,
+ SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_REGISTER_GPA, 0);
+
+ __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
static void snp_register_per_cpu_ghcb(void)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
index f91d23757375..184cae6e786b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h
@@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ struct apic {
/* Probe, setup and smpboot functions */
int (*probe)(void);
+ void (*setup)(void);
int (*acpi_madt_oem_check)(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id);
void (*init_apic_ldr)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 58e028d42e41..12bf2988ea19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer);
void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void);
void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void);
+enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa);
static __always_inline void vc_ghcb_invalidate(struct ghcb *ghcb)
{
@@ -592,6 +593,7 @@ static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_
static inline int snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(u8 *buffer) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare(void) { }
static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_init(void) { }
+static inline enum es_result savic_register_gpa(u64 gpa) { return ES_UNSUPPORTED; }
#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index 9c640a521a67..650e3256ea7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -118,6 +118,10 @@
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL 0x80000018
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC 0x8000001a
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_REGISTER_GPA 0
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_UNREGISTER_GPA 1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SAVIC_SELF_GPA ~0ULL
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe
#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON(reason_set, reason_code) \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index d73ba5a7b623..36f1326fea2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1503,6 +1503,9 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void)
return;
}
+ if (apic->setup)
+ apic->setup();
+
/*
* If this comes from kexec/kcrash the APIC might be enabled in
* SPIV. Soft disable it before doing further initialization.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
index bea844f28192..a2747ab9200a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
@@ -8,17 +8,44 @@
*/
#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+#include <linux/percpu-defs.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include "local.h"
+static struct apic_page __percpu *apic_page __ro_after_init;
+
static int savic_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *oem_id, char *oem_table_id)
{
return x2apic_enabled() && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC);
}
+static void savic_setup(void)
+{
+ void *backing_page;
+ enum es_result res;
+ unsigned long gpa;
+
+ backing_page = this_cpu_ptr(apic_page);
+ gpa = __pa(backing_page);
+
+ /*
+ * The NPT entry for a vCPU's APIC backing page must always be
+ * present when the vCPU is running in order for Secure AVIC to
+ * function. A VMEXIT_BUSY is returned on VMRUN and the vCPU cannot
+ * be resumed if the NPT entry for the APIC backing page is not
+ * present. Notify GPA of the vCPU's APIC backing page to the
+ * hypervisor by calling savic_register_gpa(). Before executing
+ * VMRUN, the hypervisor makes use of this information to make sure
+ * the APIC backing page is mapped in NPT.
+ */
+ res = savic_register_gpa(gpa);
+ if (res != ES_OK)
+ snp_abort();
+}
+
static int savic_probe(void)
{
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SNP_SECURE_AVIC))
@@ -30,6 +57,10 @@ static int savic_probe(void)
/* unreachable */
}
+ apic_page = alloc_percpu(struct apic_page);
+ if (!apic_page)
+ snp_abort();
+
return 1;
}
@@ -38,6 +69,7 @@ static struct apic apic_x2apic_savic __ro_after_init = {
.name = "secure avic x2apic",
.probe = savic_probe,
.acpi_madt_oem_check = savic_acpi_madt_oem_check,
+ .setup = savic_setup,
.dest_mode_logical = false,
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-10 18:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-10 17:53 [RFC PATCH v7 00/37] AMD: Add Secure AVIC Guest Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 01/37] KVM: lapic: Remove __apic_test_and_{set|clear}_vector() Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-23 11:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-25 1:18 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 12:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 02/37] KVM: lapic: Remove redundant parentheses around 'bitmap' Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-23 11:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-25 1:19 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 03/37] x86/apic: KVM: Deduplicate APIC vector => register+bit math Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-23 11:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-25 1:21 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 12:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 04/37] KVM: lapic: Rename VEC_POS/REG_POS macro usages Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 05/37] KVM: lapic: Change lapic regs base address to void pointer Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-07-01 15:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 06/37] KVM: lapic: Rename find_highest_vector() Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 07/37] KVM: lapic: Rename lapic get/set_reg() helpers Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 13:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 08/37] KVM: lapic: Rename lapic get/set_reg64() helpers Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 09/37] KVM: lapic: Rename lapic set/clear vector helpers Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 10/37] KVM: lapic: Mark apic_find_highest_vector() inline Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 13:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 11/37] x86/apic: KVM: Move apic_find_highest_vector() to a common header Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 13:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:53 ` [RFC PATCH v7 12/37] x86/apic: KVM: Move lapic get/set_reg() helpers to common code Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 14:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 13/37] KVM: x86: Move lapic get/set_reg64() " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 14/37] KVM: x86: Move lapic set/clear_vector() " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 14:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 15/37] KVM: x86: apic_test_vector() " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 16/37] x86/apic: Rename 'reg_off' to 'reg' Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 17/37] x86/apic: Unionize apic regs for 32bit/64bit access w/o type casting Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-24 10:28 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 1:15 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 18/37] x86/apic: Simplify bitwise operations on apic bitmap Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-24 10:37 ` Huang, Kai
2025-06-25 1:18 ` Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-25 14:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 19/37] x86/apic: Move apic_update_irq_cfg() calls to apic_update_vector() Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 20/37] x86/apic: Add new driver for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` Neeraj Upadhyay [this message]
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 22/37] x86/apic: Populate .read()/.write() callbacks of Secure AVIC driver Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 23/37] x86/apic: Initialize APIC ID for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 24/37] x86/apic: Add update_vector() callback for apic drivers Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 25/37] x86/apic: Add update_vector() callback for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 26/37] x86/apic: Add support to send IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 27/37] x86/apic: Support LAPIC timer " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 28/37] x86/sev: Initialize VGIF for secondary VCPUs " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 29/37] x86/apic: Add support to send NMI IPI " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 30/37] x86/apic: Allow NMI to be injected from hypervisor " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 31/37] x86/sev: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 32/37] x86/apic: Read and write LVT* APIC registers from HV for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 33/37] x86/apic: Handle EOI writes for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 34/37] x86/apic: Add kexec support for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 35/37] x86/apic: Enable Secure AVIC in Control MSR Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 36/37] x86/sev: Prevent SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR interception for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-06-10 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH v7 37/37] x86/sev: Indicate SEV-SNP guest supports Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
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