From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
To: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/8] x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 18:46:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251101014644.7hys77jw64ynewwu@desk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DDWH24WOQG3F.1VS7MT0SKPWIL@google.com>
On Fri, Oct 31, 2025 at 11:30:54AM +0000, Brendan Jackman wrote:
> Rewording my comments from:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251029-verw-vm-v1-1-babf9b961519@linux.intel.com/
>
> On Fri Oct 31, 2025 at 12:30 AM UTC, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> >
> > TSA mitigation:
> >
> > d8010d4ba43e ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")
> >
> > introduced VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS for guests on AMD CPUs. Currently on Intel
> > CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is being used for guests which has a much broader scope
> > (kernel->user also).
> >
> > Make mitigations on Intel consistent with TSA. This would help handling the
> > guest-only mitigations better in future.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
> > [sean: make CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM mutually exclusive with the MMIO mitigation]
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>
> I think this is a clear improvement. Now that X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
> has a clear scope, can we also update the comment on its definition in
> cpufeatures.h? I.e. say that it's specifically about exit to user.
Does this suffice?
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 08ed5a2e46a5..e842f27a1108 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -321,6 +321,7 @@
#endif
.endm
+/* Primarily used in exit-to-userspace path */
#define CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS \
__CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF
> This also seems like a good moment to update the comment on
> verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected to mention the _VM flag too.
As we have 3 different flags, referring them with X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_*
should be okay?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 723666a1357e..51dec95a9af5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
/*
* Set if any of MDS/TAA/MMIO/RFDS are going to enable VERW clearing
- * through X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF on kernel and guest entry.
+ * through X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_* on kernel and guest entry.
*/
static bool verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected __ro_after_init;
> Also, where we set vmx->disable_fb_clear in vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(),
> it still refers to X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, is that wrong?
It looks correct to me. The only reason X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is used
in vmx_update_fb_clear_dis() is to check if host has enabled its
exit-to-userspace mitigation for some reason, and allow guest to also use
VERW.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-01 1:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-10-31 0:30 [PATCH v4 0/8] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:30 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-01 1:46 ` Pawan Gupta [this message]
2025-11-03 18:18 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-07 19:05 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-11 22:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 10:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:19 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 18:17 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-07 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:02 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] x86/bugs: Decouple ALTERNATIVE usage from VERW macro definition Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:37 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 17:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-01 4:13 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 17:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 17:40 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 12:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] x86/bugs: Use an X86_FEATURE_xxx flag for the MMIO Stale Data mitigation Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:44 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 10:49 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 22:28 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 22:50 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 14:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 18:24 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: VMX: Handle MMIO Stale Data in VM-Enter assembly via ALTERNATIVES_2 Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:32 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 21:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 10:51 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 23:55 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-01 3:41 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 9:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-11-03 17:37 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-03 17:46 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 17:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 18:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-12 20:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-12 23:01 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-11-13 14:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 22:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] x86/bugs: KVM: Move VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS into SVM as SVM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:34 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-13 15:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-13 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-13 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: VMX: Bundle all L1 data cache flush mitigation code together Sean Christopherson
2025-11-03 18:26 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] KVM: VMX: Disable L1TF L1 data cache flush if CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS=n Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 12:37 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 0:30 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: x86: Unify L1TF flushing under per-CPU variable Sean Christopherson
2025-10-31 11:22 ` [PATCH v4 0/8] x86/bugs: KVM: L1TF and MMIO Stale Data cleanups Brendan Jackman
2025-10-31 17:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-11-04 10:58 ` Brendan Jackman
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