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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	 Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 02/18] x86: cet: Remove unnecessary memory zeroing for shadow stack
Date: Fri, 14 Nov 2025 12:50:44 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251114205100.1873640-3-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251114205100.1873640-1-seanjc@google.com>

From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>

Skip mapping the shadow stack as a writable page and the redundant memory
zeroing.

Currently, the shadow stack is allocated using alloc_page(), then mapped as
a writable page, zeroed, and finally mapped as a shadow stack page. The
memory zeroing is redundant as alloc_page() already does that.

This also eliminates the need for invlpg, as the shadow stack is no
longer mapped writable.

Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
[mks: drop invlpg() as it's no longer needed, adapted changelog accordingly]
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
[sean: add a comment to explain the magic shadow stack protections]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 x86/cet.c | 19 +++++++------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/x86/cet.c b/x86/cet.c
index 51a54a50..e2681886 100644
--- a/x86/cet.c
+++ b/x86/cet.c
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ int main(int ac, char **av)
 {
 	char *shstk_virt;
 	unsigned long shstk_phys;
-	unsigned long *ptep;
 	pteval_t pte = 0;
 	bool rvc;
 
@@ -89,18 +88,14 @@ int main(int ac, char **av)
 	shstk_virt = alloc_vpage();
 	shstk_phys = (unsigned long)virt_to_phys(alloc_page());
 
-	/* Install the new page. */
-	pte = shstk_phys | PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK;
+	/*
+	 * Install a mapping for the shadow stack page.  Shadow stack pages are
+	 * denoted by an "impossible" combination of a !WRITABLE, DIRTY PTE
+	 * (writes from CPU for shadow stack operations are allowed, but writes
+	 * from software are not).
+	 */
+	pte = shstk_phys | PT_PRESENT_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_DIRTY_MASK;
 	install_pte(current_page_table(), 1, shstk_virt, pte, 0);
-	memset(shstk_virt, 0x0, PAGE_SIZE);
-
-	/* Mark it as shadow-stack page. */
-	ptep = get_pte_level(current_page_table(), shstk_virt, 1);
-	*ptep &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK;
-	*ptep |= PT_DIRTY_MASK;
-
-	/* Flush the paging cache. */
-	invlpg((void *)shstk_virt);
 
 	/* Enable shadow-stack protection */
 	wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, ENABLE_SHSTK_BIT);
-- 
2.52.0.rc1.455.g30608eb744-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-11-14 20:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-14 20:50 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 00/18] x86: Improve CET tests Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 01/18] x86: cet: Pass virtual addresses to invlpg Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 03/18] x86: cet: Directly check for #CP exception in run_in_user() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 04/18] x86: cet: Validate #CP error code Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 05/18] x86: cet: Use report_skip() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 06/18] x86: cet: Drop unnecessary casting Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 07/18] x86: cet: Validate writing unaligned values to SSP MSR causes #GP Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 08/18] x86: cet: Validate CET states during VMX transitions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 09/18] x86: cet: Make shadow stack less fragile Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 10/18] x86: cet: Simplify IBT test Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 11/18] x86: cet: Use symbolic values for the #CP error codes Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 12/18] x86: cet: Test far returns too Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 13/18] x86: Avoid top-most page for vmalloc on x86-64 Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 14/18] x86: cet: Run SHSTK and IBT tests as appropriate if either feature is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 15/18] x86: cet: Drop the "intel_" prefix from the CET testcase Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 16/18] x86: cet: Enable NOTRACK handling for IBT tests Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  5:30   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 17/18] x86: cet: Reset IBT tracker state on #CP violations Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  5:40   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 20:51 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 18/18] x86: cet: Add testcases to verify KVM rejects emulation of CET instructions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  6:15   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-17  7:32   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-18 22:26 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 00/18] x86: Improve CET tests Sean Christopherson

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