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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 17/18] x86: cet: Reset IBT tracker state on #CP violations
Date: Sat, 15 Nov 2025 06:40:05 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6bfc1419-c037-4c14-86af-7f404b5e906a@grsecurity.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251114205100.1873640-18-seanjc@google.com>

On 14.11.25 21:50, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Reset the IBT tracker state back to IDLE on #CP violations to not
> influence follow-up tests with a poisoned starting state.

Again, maybe missing a "From: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>"?

> 
> Opportunistically rename "rvc" to "got_cp" to make it more obvious what
> the flag tracks ("rvc" is presumably "raised vector CP"?).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
> [sean: add helper, align indentation, use handler+callback instead of "extra"]
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>  lib/x86/usermode.c | 12 +++++++++---
>  lib/x86/usermode.h | 13 ++++++++++---
>  x86/cet.c          | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/lib/x86/usermode.c b/lib/x86/usermode.c
> index f896e3bd..b65c5378 100644
> --- a/lib/x86/usermode.c
> +++ b/lib/x86/usermode.c
> @@ -21,12 +21,17 @@ static void restore_exec_to_jmpbuf(void)
>  	longjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
>  }
>  
> +static handler ex_callback;
> +
>  static void restore_exec_to_jmpbuf_exception_handler(struct ex_regs *regs)
>  {
>  	this_cpu_write_exception_vector(regs->vector);
>  	this_cpu_write_exception_rflags_rf((regs->rflags >> 16) & 1);
>  	this_cpu_write_exception_error_code(regs->error_code);
>  
> +	if (ex_callback)
> +		ex_callback(regs);
> +
>  	/* longjmp must happen after iret, so do not do it now.  */
>  	regs->rip = (unsigned long)&restore_exec_to_jmpbuf;
>  	regs->cs = KERNEL_CS;
> @@ -35,9 +40,9 @@ static void restore_exec_to_jmpbuf_exception_handler(struct ex_regs *regs)
>  #endif
>  }
>  
> -uint64_t run_in_user(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
> -		uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2, uint64_t arg3,
> -		uint64_t arg4, bool *raised_vector)
> +uint64_t run_in_user_ex(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
> +			uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2, uint64_t arg3,
> +			uint64_t arg4, bool *raised_vector, handler ex_handler)
>  {
>  	extern char ret_to_kernel;
>  	volatile uint64_t rax = 0;
> @@ -45,6 +50,7 @@ uint64_t run_in_user(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
>  	handler old_ex;
>  
>  	*raised_vector = 0;
> +	ex_callback = ex_handler;
>  	set_idt_entry(RET_TO_KERNEL_IRQ, &ret_to_kernel, 3);
>  	old_ex = handle_exception(fault_vector,
>  				  restore_exec_to_jmpbuf_exception_handler);
> diff --git a/lib/x86/usermode.h b/lib/x86/usermode.h
> index 04e358e2..7eca9079 100644
> --- a/lib/x86/usermode.h
> +++ b/lib/x86/usermode.h
> @@ -20,11 +20,18 @@ typedef uint64_t (*usermode_func)(void);
>   * Supports running functions with up to 4 arguments.
>   * fault_vector: exception vector that might get thrown during the function.
>   * raised_vector: outputs true if exception occurred.
> + * ex_handler: optiona handler to call when handling @fault_vector exceptions
                  ^^^^^^^ optional

>   *
>   * returns: return value returned by function, or 0 if an exception occurred.
>   */
> -uint64_t run_in_user(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
> -		uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2, uint64_t arg3,
> -		uint64_t arg4, bool *raised_vector);
> +uint64_t run_in_user_ex(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
> +			uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2, uint64_t arg3,
> +			uint64_t arg4, bool *raised_vector, handler ex_handler);
>  
> +static inline uint64_t run_in_user(usermode_func func, unsigned int fault_vector,
> +				   uint64_t arg1, uint64_t arg2, uint64_t arg3,
> +				   uint64_t arg4, bool *raised_vector)
> +{
> +	return run_in_user_ex(func, fault_vector, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, raised_vector, NULL);
> +}
>  #endif
> diff --git a/x86/cet.c b/x86/cet.c
> index 74d3f701..7ffe234b 100644
> --- a/x86/cet.c
> +++ b/x86/cet.c
> @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
> -
>  #include "libcflat.h"
>  #include "x86/desc.h"
>  #include "x86/processor.h"
> @@ -85,6 +84,8 @@ static uint64_t cet_ibt_func(void)
>  #define CET_ENABLE_SHSTK			BIT(0)
>  #define CET_ENABLE_IBT				BIT(2)
>  #define CET_ENABLE_NOTRACK			BIT(4)
> +#define CET_IBT_SUPPRESS			BIT(10)

CET_IBT_SUPPRESS isn't needed (not used in the code), but doesn't hurt
either to have it.

> +#define CET_IBT_TRACKER_WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH	BIT(11)
>  
>  static void test_shstk(void)
>  {
> @@ -132,9 +133,31 @@ static void test_shstk(void)
>  	report(vector == GP_VECTOR, "MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP alignment test.");
>  }
>  
> +static void ibt_tracker_cp_fixup(struct ex_regs *regs)
> +{
> +	u64 cet_u = rdmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET);
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Switch the IBT tracker state to IDLE to have a clean state for
> +	 * following tests.
> +	 */
> +	if (cet_u & CET_IBT_TRACKER_WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH) {
> +		cet_u &= ~CET_IBT_TRACKER_WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH;
> +		printf("CET: suppressing IBT WAIT_FOR_ENDBRANCH state at RIP: %lx\n",
> +		       regs->rip);
> +		wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, cet_u);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static uint64_t ibt_run_in_user(usermode_func func, bool *got_cp)
> +{
> +	return run_in_user_ex(func, CP_VECTOR, 0, 0, 0, 0, got_cp,
> +			      ibt_tracker_cp_fixup);
> +}

Ahh, yeah. Nice indirection, helps making the code less cluttered :)

> +
>  static void test_ibt(void)
>  {
> -	bool rvc;
> +	bool got_cp;
>  
>  	if (!this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
>  		report_skip("IBT not supported");
> @@ -144,8 +167,8 @@ static void test_ibt(void)
>  	/* Enable indirect-branch tracking (notrack handling for jump tables) */
>  	wrmsr(MSR_IA32_U_CET, CET_ENABLE_IBT | CET_ENABLE_NOTRACK);
>  
> -	run_in_user(cet_ibt_func, CP_VECTOR, 0, 0, 0, 0, &rvc);
> -	report(rvc && exception_error_code() == CP_ERR_ENDBR,
> +	ibt_run_in_user(cet_ibt_func, &got_cp);
> +	report(got_cp && exception_error_code() == CP_ERR_ENDBR,
>  	       "Indirect-branch tracking test");
>  }
>  
LGTM!

Thanks,
Mathias

  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-15  5:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-14 20:50 [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 00/18] x86: Improve CET tests Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 01/18] x86: cet: Pass virtual addresses to invlpg Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 02/18] x86: cet: Remove unnecessary memory zeroing for shadow stack Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 03/18] x86: cet: Directly check for #CP exception in run_in_user() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 04/18] x86: cet: Validate #CP error code Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 05/18] x86: cet: Use report_skip() Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 06/18] x86: cet: Drop unnecessary casting Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 07/18] x86: cet: Validate writing unaligned values to SSP MSR causes #GP Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 08/18] x86: cet: Validate CET states during VMX transitions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 09/18] x86: cet: Make shadow stack less fragile Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 10/18] x86: cet: Simplify IBT test Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 11/18] x86: cet: Use symbolic values for the #CP error codes Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 12/18] x86: cet: Test far returns too Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 13/18] x86: Avoid top-most page for vmalloc on x86-64 Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 14/18] x86: cet: Run SHSTK and IBT tests as appropriate if either feature is supported Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 15/18] x86: cet: Drop the "intel_" prefix from the CET testcase Sean Christopherson
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 16/18] x86: cet: Enable NOTRACK handling for IBT tests Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  5:30   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-14 20:50 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 17/18] x86: cet: Reset IBT tracker state on #CP violations Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  5:40   ` Mathias Krause [this message]
2025-11-14 20:51 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 18/18] x86: cet: Add testcases to verify KVM rejects emulation of CET instructions Sean Christopherson
2025-11-15  6:15   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-17  7:32   ` Mathias Krause
2025-11-18 22:26 ` [kvm-unit-tests PATCH v4 00/18] x86: Improve CET tests Sean Christopherson

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