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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: jon@nutanix.com, d.riley@proxmox.com,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK
Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2026 07:09:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260428110946.11466-2-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260428110946.11466-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>

From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>

EPT exit qualification bit 6 is used when mode-based execute control
is enabled, and reflects user executable addresses. Rework name to
reflect the intention and add to EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK, which allows
simplifying the return evaluation in
tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending a pinch.

Rework handling in __vmx_handle_ept_violation to unconditionally clear
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC until MBEC is implemented, as suggested by
Sean [1].

Note: Intel SDM Table 29-7 defines bit 6 as:
  If the "mode-based execute control" VM-execution control is 0, the
  value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is the
  logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used to
  translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the EPT
  violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
  address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aCJDzU1p_SFNRIJd@google.com/

Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Message-ID: <20251223054806.1611168-2-jon@nutanix.com>
Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 5 +++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h  | 9 +++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c     | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 37080382df54..b2291a766e3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -608,10 +608,11 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ		BIT(3)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE	BIT(4)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC		BIT(5)
-#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN BIT(6)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC	BIT(6)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK		(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ  | \
 					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
-					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
+					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC  | \
+					 EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID	BIT(7)
 #define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED	BIT(8)
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
index 412d0829d7a2..adf925500b9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -94,8 +94,13 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
 	/* Is it a fetch fault? */
 	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
 		      ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
-	/* ept page table entry is present? */
-	error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
+	/*
+	 * ept page table entry is present?
+	 * note: unconditionally clear USER_EXEC until mode-based
+	 * execute control is implemented
+	 */
+	error_code |= (exit_qualification &
+		       (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK & ~EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC))
 		      ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
 
 	if (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 04ce321ebdf3..30cd5b19ecf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1845,7 +1845,7 @@ static inline bool tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcp
 	if (eeq_type != TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION)
 		return false;
 
-	return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK) && !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN);
+	return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK);
 }
 
 static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-- 
2.52.0



  reply	other threads:[~2026-04-28 11:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-28 11:09 [PATCH v4 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-29  7:58   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: set CR0.WP=1 for shadow NPT MMU Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-29 13:05 ` [PATCH v4 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support David Riley
2026-04-29 13:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 10:28   ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 12:08     ` David Riley
2026-05-05  1:14       ` Jon Kohler
2026-05-05  5:31         ` Paolo Bonzini
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini

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