From: Jun Miao <jun.miao@intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jun.miao@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Block TSC multiplier writes for protected guest TSC
Date: Tue, 12 May 2026 07:18:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260512111830.1295437-1-jun.miao@intel.com> (raw)
Commit d5a4e408e69b ("KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for secure TSC")
added the guest_tsc_protected flag to prevent KVM from changing the
TSC offset/multiplier of vCPUs whose TSC is managed by a confidential
computing module (e.g. TDX, SEV-SNP Secure TSC). However only the TSC
offset write path was guarded; kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier() was
left unprotected.
As a result, userspace can still change the TSC scaling ratio of a
TDX vCPU via the KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ ioctl path:
KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ
-> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl()
-> kvm_set_tsc_khz()
-> set_tsc_khz()
-> kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier() <-- not guarded
and similarly during kvm_arch_vcpu_create() -> kvm_set_tsc_khz()
which can reset the multiplier to default_tsc_scaling_ratio.
Make kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier() symmetric with
kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() by skipping the update when
guest_tsc_protected is set. This single chokepoint covers all
existing callers (set_tsc_khz() in both ioctl and vCPU create paths).
Fixes: d5a4e408e69b ("KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for secure TSC")
Signed-off-by: Jun Miao <jun.miao@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 0a1b63c63d1a..e935fe33d9c2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -2736,6 +2736,9 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_offset)
static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_multiplier(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 l1_multiplier)
{
+ if (vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected)
+ return;
+
vcpu->arch.l1_tsc_scaling_ratio = l1_multiplier;
/* Userspace is changing the multiplier while L2 is active */
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-11 13:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-12 11:18 Jun Miao [this message]
2026-05-12 1:12 ` [PATCH] KVM: x86: Block TSC multiplier writes for protected guest TSC Huang, Kai
2026-05-12 1:29 ` Miao, Jun
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