From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Sean Christopherson" <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/18] KVM: SEV: Mark vCPU RUNNABLE after AP_CREATE, even if VMSA is unusable
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2026 21:10:17 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260709211018.60D131F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709204948.1988414-4-seanjc@google.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [High] KVM incorrectly executes VMRUN with a dummy unmeasured host VMSA instead of failing KVM_RUN when a vCPU's initial AP_CREATE VMSA load fails.
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] sev_snp_reload_vmsa() bypasses the MMU notifier invalidation retry protocol, leading to a Use-After-Free of a physical page if a concurrent guest_memfd invalidation occurs.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH v4 03/18] KVM: SEV: Mark vCPU RUNNABLE after AP_CREATE, even if VMSA is unusable ---
commit ca23b8314664c0ed691814678164a510162e2299
Author: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
KVM: SEV: Mark vCPU RUNNABLE after AP_CREATE, even if VMSA is unusable
This commit marks a vCPU as RUNNABLE after responding to an AP_CREATE
request, even if the guest-specified VMSA is unusable. This prevents the
vCPU from hanging in a non-running state and instead allows KVM_RUN to
return an error to userspace. It also enables retrying the VMSA load in
the future.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index d8ed00f76aa31..30792adcfc8e5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4028,9 +4028,6 @@ static void sev_snp_reload_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa)
> svm->sev_es.snp_guest_vmsa_gpa = gpa;
> svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does sev_snp_reload_vmsa() bypass the
MMU notifier invalidation retry protocol here?
If a concurrent PUNCH_HOLE occurs on the guest_memfd while
sev_snp_reload_vmsa() fetches and installs a guest VMSA, this could lead
to a use-after-free of the physical page.
sev_snp_reload_vmsa() resolves the PFN via kvm_gmem_get_pfn() and directly
installs it into svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa without holding kvm->mmu_lock
or checking mmu_invalidate_retry_gfn(). It then drops the page reference.
If the page is subsequently freed by guest_memfd, KVM would retain the
stale physical address in vmsa_pa, and the hardware could write guest state
to the freed page during VMRUN.
> - /* Mark the vCPU as runnable */
> - kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE);
> -
[ ... ]
> @@ -4062,6 +4059,15 @@ static void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> svm->sev_es.snp_pending_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
>
> sev_snp_reload_vmsa(vcpu, gpa);
> +
> + /*
> + * Mark the vCPU as runnable for CREATE requests, indicated by a valid
> + * VMSA GPA, even if installing the VMSA failed, so that KVM_RUN will
> + * fail instead of blocking indefinitely and hanging the vCPU, e.g. if
> + * the backing guest_memfd page is unavailable.
> + */
> + if (VALID_PAGE(gpa))
> + kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE);
[Severity: High]
Does this allow KVM to incorrectly execute VMRUN with a dummy unmeasured
host VMSA when the initial AP_CREATE VMSA load fails?
If a guest issues an AP_CREATE request with an invalid VMSA (such as having
no backing guest_memfd page) for a vCPU that has not yet successfully loaded
a guest VMSA, marking it RUNNABLE is intended to make pre_sev_run() fail
KVM_RUN.
However, because snp_has_guest_vmsa remains false on failure,
sev_es_init_vmcb() overwrites the INVALID_PAGE state with the KVM-allocated
fallback VMSA physical address:
if (!svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa) {
if (svm->sev_es.vmsa)
svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
else
svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
}
Because of this, pre_sev_run() will see a valid vmsa_pa and pass:
if (is_sev_es_guest(vcpu) && !VALID_PAGE(svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa))
return -EINVAL;
Will this result in a hardware RMP violation or guest state corruption when
KVM attempts VMRUN with the dummy VMSA?
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260709204948.1988414-1-seanjc@google.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-09 21:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-09 20:49 [PATCH v4 00/18] KVM: SEV: Fix RMP #PF due to freeing in-use VMSA Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 01/18] KVM: SEV: Track the GPA of the guest-controlled VMSA used for SNP guests Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-10 0:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 02/18] KVM: SEV: Extract loading of guest-provided VMSA to a separate helper Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 03/18] KVM: SEV: Mark vCPU RUNNABLE after AP_CREATE, even if VMSA is unusable Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:10 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 04/18] KVM: SEV: Wire up kvm_x86_ops.gmem_xxx() if and only if CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Sean Christopherson
2026-07-10 0:11 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-10 0:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 05/18] KVM: x86: Serialize writes to disabled_quirks using kvm->lock Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 06/18] KVM: x86: Ensure runtime reads of disabled_quirks are resolved once Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 07/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Fold kvm_mmu_zap_memslot() into kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot() Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 08/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Split kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast() into "front" and "back" halves Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 09/18] KVM: x86/mmu: Use split "zap all fast" helpers when invalidating memslot Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 10/18] KVM: SEV: Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA if its backing gmem page is zapped Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-10 0:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 11/18] KVM: SEV: Mark vCPU has having guest-provided VMSA even if its invalid Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 12/18] KVM: x86: Guard .gmem_prepare() declarations with HAVE_KVM_GMEM_PREPARE=y Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 13/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Pass GPA, not GFN, to prepare() hook Sean Christopherson
2026-07-10 0:36 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-10 22:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-10 22:43 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-10 23:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 14/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Drop the redundant printk on arch gmem_prepare() failure Sean Christopherson
2026-07-10 0:18 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 15/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Fold __kvm_gmem_prepare_folio() into its sole caller Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-10 0:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 16/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Explicitly pass number of pages to kvm_arch_gmem_prepare() Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-10 0:23 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 17/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Align the gfn as well as the pfn when "preparing" a folio Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 21:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-10 0:29 ` Ackerley Tng
2026-07-10 0:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-07-09 20:49 ` [PATCH v4 18/18] KVM: guest_memfd: Combine .gmem_prepare()+.gmem_invalidate() into .gmem_convert() Sean Christopherson
2026-07-10 0:34 ` Ackerley Tng
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