From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 02/20] KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 03:26:18 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260902032618.A76FC1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260902021804.718676-3-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Host kernel data in Extended General Purpose Registers (EGPRs) is leaked to a malicious guest via speculative execution when the guest operates with APX disabled.
--
commit 70442dd137e1b61dbdd5b674afc21cfb7948b2b6
Author: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache
This commit saves and restores the guest EGPRs on VM exit/entry if the
system supports Advanced Performance Extensions (APX). It skips loading the
EGPR state for guests that do not set XCR0[APX], and places the register
saving path after SPEC_CTRL is restored.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/adPRA4ZhnvbaXSn0@google.com
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> index 00d807505fc88..02308fb36f0f5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
[ ... ]
> @@ -46,6 +47,16 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
> /* Reload @vmx, _ASM_ARG1 may be modified by vmx_update_host_rsp(). */
> mov WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_APX
> + ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lload_egprs_done", "", X86_FEATURE_APX
> + testl $KVM_ENTER_EGPR_SWITCH, (%_ASM_SP)
> + jz .Lload_egprs_done
> + LOAD_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
> + %r16, %r17, %r18, %r19, %r20, %r21, %r22, %r23, \
> + %r24, %r25, %r26, %r27, %r28, %r29, %r30, %r31
> +.Lload_egprs_done:
> +#endif
[Severity: High]
In __vmx_vcpu_run(), when a guest runs with APX disabled,
KVM_ENTER_EGPR_SWITCH is clear and this branch skips loading the guest's
EGPRs. Are the host's physical %r16 through %r31 register values left
intact upon entering the guest when this happens?
If so, could a malicious guest with APX disabled speculatively execute APX
instructions before the architectural #UD exception retires, allowing it to
read the host's %r16 through %r31 values and leak them via a cache
side-channel?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260902021804.718676-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-02 3:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-02 2:17 [PATCH v7 00/20] KVM: x86: Enable APX for guests Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 01/20] KVM: x86: Extend VCPU registers for EGPRs Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 02/20] KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:26 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 03/20] KVM: x86: Support APX state for XSAVE ABI Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:08 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 04/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor VMX instruction information access Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 05/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor instruction information decoding Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 06/20] KVM: VMX: Remove unused control-register access defines Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 07/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor register index retrieval from exit qualification Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 08/20] KVM: VMX: Support instruction information extension Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 09/20] KVM: nVMX: Propagate extended instruction information Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 10/20] KVM: x86: Support EGPR accessing and tracking for emulator Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 11/20] KVM: x86: Handle EGPR index and REX2-incompatible opcodes Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 12/20] KVM: x86: Support REX2-prefixed opcode decode Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 13/20] KVM: x86: Reject EVEX-prefixed instructions Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:59 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 14/20] KVM: x86: Move KVM_SUPPORTED_{XCR0,XSS} into kvm_x86_vendor_init() Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:17 ` [PATCH v7 15/20] KVM: x86: Guard valid XCR0.APX settings Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 16/20] KVM: x86: Add APX to supported XCR0 Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 17/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX foundation feature to userspace Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 18/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX sub-features " Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 19/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state and ABI test Chang S. Bae
2026-09-02 3:07 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-02 2:18 ` [PATCH v7 20/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks Chang S. Bae
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