* [PATCH v15 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag
2026-09-16 19:52 [PATCH v15 0/5] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 19:52 ` Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 19:52 ` [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active Ashish Kalra
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2026-09-16 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86, hpa, seanjc, peterz,
thomas.lendacky, herbert, davem, ardb
Cc: pbonzini, aik, Michael.Roth, KPrateek.Nayak, Tycho.Andersen,
Nathan.Fontenot, ackerleytng, jackyli, pgonda, rientjes, jacobhxu,
xin, pawan.kumar.gupta, babu.moger, dyoung, nikunj, darwi,
linux-kernel, linux-crypto, kvm, linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Add a flag indicating whether RMPOPT instruction is supported.
RMPOPT is a new instruction that reduces the performance overhead of RMP
checks for the hypervisor and non-SNP guests by allowing those checks to be
skipped when 1-GB memory regions are known to contain no SEV-SNP guest memory.
For more information on the RMPOPT instruction, see the AMD64 RMPOPT
technical documentation.
[ bp: Zap respective tools/ change. ]
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/39e9ee269a572c516a3f4e937bfe12d00697d5e6.1782841284.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index f70ee74b5f92..3b5b32d3391b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_K8 ( 3*32+ 4) /* Opteron, Athlon64 */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN5 ( 3*32+ 5) /* CPU based on Zen5 microarchitecture */
#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN6 ( 3*32+ 6) /* CPU based on Zen6 microarchitecture */
-/* Free ( 3*32+ 7) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT ( 3*32+ 7) /* Support for AMD RMPOPT instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC ( 3*32+ 8) /* "constant_tsc" TSC ticks at a constant rate */
/* free: was #define X86_FEATURE_UP ( 3*32+ 9) * "up" SMP kernel running on UP */
#define X86_FEATURE_ART ( 3*32+10) /* "art" Always running timer (ART) */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 8665a6474806..d1795ce219da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE, CPUID_EAX, 2, 0x80000022, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x80000025, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_HTR_CORES, CPUID_EAX, 30, 0x80000026, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active
2026-09-16 19:52 [PATCH v15 0/5] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 19:52 ` [PATCH v15 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 19:52 ` Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 20:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs Ashish Kalra
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2026-09-16 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86, hpa, seanjc, peterz,
thomas.lendacky, herbert, davem, ardb
Cc: pbonzini, aik, Michael.Roth, KPrateek.Nayak, Tycho.Andersen,
Nathan.Fontenot, ackerleytng, jackyli, pgonda, rientjes, jacobhxu,
xin, pawan.kumar.gupta, babu.moger, dyoung, nikunj, darwi,
linux-kernel, linux-crypto, kvm, linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
While SNP is active, every memory write is checked against the RMP to
protect SNP guest memory. A core performs these RMP checks only once
SNP has been initialized via SNP_INIT and the SNP-enable bit in SYSCFG is
set on that core; the firmware requires the SNP-enable bit to be set on
every present CPU before SNP initialization.
A core that is not SNP-enabled and not SNP-initialized performs no RMP
checks at all, so there is no valid configuration with SNP active and any
CPU exempt from RMP checks.
The firmware determines which CPUs are present from the processor and the
BIOS/UEFI configuration (e.g. SMT disabled in the BIOS) and enumerates
them at SNP init; it is not aware of the OS bringing CPUs online or
offline afterwards.
SNP_INIT fails unless SnpEn is set on all CPUs, so a CPU that is offline
when SNP_INIT is issued, does not have SnpEn set, SNP_INIT fails, and
there can be no SNP guest memory. OS CPU hotplug can thus diverge from
the firmware's expectations and break SNP.
Tie CPU hotplug to the SNP-enable bit: disable it in snp_prepare() before
SNP is enabled, and re-enable it in snp_shutdown() once the firmware has
disabled SNP.
If snp_prepare() fails before enabling SNP it re-enables hotplug itself;
once SNP is enabled hotplug stays disabled, including across a failed
SNP_INIT and across the legacy SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX path, both of which leave
SNP enabled.
A kexec target that boots with SNP already enabled, disables hotplug once
in snp_rmptable_init(), since snp_prepare() bails when SNP is already
enabled.
With CPU hotplug now disabled while SNP is active, the online CPU mask is
stable, so the cpus_read_lock() previously taken in snp_prepare() to
iterate it is redundant. Drop cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() here.
Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index cff285d8ad8e..558f7924a3f8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -513,7 +513,6 @@ static void clear_hsave_pa(void *arg)
int snp_prepare(void)
{
- int ret;
u64 val;
/*
@@ -526,14 +525,18 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
clear_rmp();
- cpus_read_lock();
+ /*
+ * No CPU may come online without SnpEn while SNP is active; disable
+ * hotplug here and re-enable it in snp_shutdown().
+ */
+ cpu_hotplug_disable();
if (!cpumask_equal(cpu_online_mask, cpu_present_mask)) {
- ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ cpu_hotplug_enable();
pr_warn("SNP init failed: not all CPUs online. (%*pbl online <-> %*pbl present masks).\n",
cpumask_pr_args(cpu_online_mask),
cpumask_pr_args(cpu_present_mask));
- goto unlock;
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
@@ -548,12 +551,7 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
/* SNP_INIT requires MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA to be cleared on all CPUs. */
on_each_cpu(clear_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
- ret = 0;
-
-unlock:
- cpus_read_unlock();
-
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
@@ -567,6 +565,13 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
clear_rmp();
on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, NULL, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * The firmware has disabled SNP (SnpEn is clear), so re-enable CPU
+ * hotplug. A legacy SNP shutdown returns above with SnpEn still set and
+ * leaves hotplug disabled.
+ */
+ cpu_hotplug_enable();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
@@ -577,6 +582,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
*/
int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
{
+ u64 val;
+
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
return -ENOSYS;
@@ -586,6 +593,15 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
if (!setup_rmptable())
return -ENOSYS;
+ /*
+ * On a kexec boot SNP may already be enabled (legacy firmware leaves
+ * SnpEn set across shutdown), in which case snp_prepare() bails without
+ * disabling CPU hotplug, so disable it here.
+ */
+ rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+ if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+ cpu_hotplug_disable();
+
/*
* Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
* notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active
2026-09-16 19:52 ` [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 20:11 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-09-16 20:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ashish Kalra; +Cc: kvm
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] x86/sev: PM suspend bypasses cpu_hotplug_disable() leading to missing SnpEn
- [Medium] x86/sev: early return skips cpu_hotplug_disable() when SnpEn is already set
--
commit b1980431b3abd35a5fe5e83fed1107ef1f0ec745
Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active
This patch ties CPU hotplug to the SNP-enable bit to prevent CPUs from
coming online without SNP enabled and initialized. It replaces the
cpus_read_lock() previously taken in snp_prepare() with
cpu_hotplug_disable() and reenables it in snp_shutdown(). Additionally,
it disables CPU hotplug in snp_rmptable_init() for kexec boots where
SNP is already active.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index cff285d8ad8e3..558f7924a3f85 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -526,14 +525,18 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
>
> clear_rmp();
>
> - cpus_read_lock();
> + /*
> + * No CPU may come online without SnpEn while SNP is active; disable
> + * hotplug here and re-enable it in snp_shutdown().
> + */
> + cpu_hotplug_disable();
>
> if (!cpumask_equal(cpu_online_mask, cpu_present_mask)) {
[Severity: High]
Does this fully prevent secondary CPUs from coming online without SnpEn set
during power management suspend and resume?
Looking at the PM suspend path, freeze_secondary_cpus() calls _cpu_down(),
and thaw_secondary_cpus() calls _cpu_up().
Both of these internal functions bypass the cpu_hotplug_disabled counter
that is incremented by cpu_hotplug_disable().
Could a PM suspend/resume cycle successfully offline and online secondary
CPUs, causing them to resume without SnpEn set and bypassing hardware RMP
checks?
[ ... ]
> @@ -577,6 +582,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
> */
> int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
> {
> + u64 val;
> +
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
> return -ENOSYS;
>
> @@ -586,6 +593,15 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
> if (!setup_rmptable())
> return -ENOSYS;
>
> + /*
> + * On a kexec boot SNP may already be enabled (legacy firmware leaves
> + * SnpEn set across shutdown), in which case snp_prepare() bails without
> + * disabling CPU hotplug, so disable it here.
> + */
> + rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
> + if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
> + cpu_hotplug_disable();
[Severity: Medium]
Could this leave CPU hotplug enabled if an early initialization step fails
during a kexec boot where legacy firmware leaves SnpEn set?
If setup_rmptable() fails and returns false, the function returns -ENOSYS
early.
Because the check for MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN and the call to
cpu_hotplug_disable() happen after these early returns, CPU hotplug would
remain enabled.
Newly onlined CPUs might lack SnpEn as a result, creating a mixed hardware
state. Should the hotplug disablement happen before these early returns?
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1789586444.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs
2026-09-16 19:52 [PATCH v15 0/5] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 19:52 ` [PATCH v15 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 19:52 ` [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 19:53 ` Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 20:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown Ashish Kalra
4 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2026-09-16 19:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86, hpa, seanjc, peterz,
thomas.lendacky, herbert, davem, ardb
Cc: pbonzini, aik, Michael.Roth, KPrateek.Nayak, Tycho.Andersen,
Nathan.Fontenot, ackerleytng, jackyli, pgonda, rientjes, jacobhxu,
xin, pawan.kumar.gupta, babu.moger, dyoung, nikunj, darwi,
linux-kernel, linux-crypto, kvm, linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
The new RMPOPT instruction helps manage per-CPU RMP optimization
structures inside the CPU. It takes a 1GB-aligned physical address
and either returns the status of the optimizations or tries to enable
the optimizations.
Per-CPU RMPOPT tables support at most 2 TB of addressable memory for
RMP optimizations.
Initialize the per-CPU RMPOPT table base to the starting physical
address. This enables RMP optimization for up to 2 TB of system RAM on
all CPUs.
Add snp_enable_rmpopt() to program RMPOPT once SNP is enabled and
initialized.
Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
Changes in v15:
- Rename snp_setup_rmpopt() to snp_enable_rmpopt().
- Program each core's RMPOPT_BASE only when it is not already set.
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 3 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 3a8e51a0c9e8..1635e2e1c576 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -761,6 +761,9 @@
#define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_RMP_SEGMENT_SHIFT(x) (((x) & GENMASK_ULL(13, 8)) >> 8)
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE 0xc0010139
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE_BIT 0
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_SVSM_CAA 0xc001f000
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 9e7a077c445d..fa81aa004e8b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
}
int snp_prepare(void);
+void snp_enable_rmpopt(void);
void snp_shutdown(void);
#else
static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
@@ -680,6 +681,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
static inline int snp_prepare(void) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_enable_rmpopt(void) {}
static inline void snp_shutdown(void) {}
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 558f7924a3f8..f458128b9864 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -124,6 +124,8 @@ static void *rmp_bookkeeping __ro_after_init;
static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
+static phys_addr_t rmpopt_pa_start;
+
static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
@@ -575,6 +577,40 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
+static bool rmpopt_capable(void)
+{
+ return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) &&
+ cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+}
+
+static void rmpopt_program_base(void *arg)
+{
+ u64 base;
+
+ /* Only program a core whose RMPOPT_EN is not already set. */
+ rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE, base);
+ if (!(base & MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE))
+ wrmsrq(MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE,
+ rmpopt_pa_start | MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE);
+}
+
+void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
+{
+ if (!rmpopt_capable())
+ return;
+
+ rmpopt_pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn), SZ_1G);
+
+ /*
+ * Per-CPU RMPOPT tables cover at most 2 TB. Program each core's
+ * RMPOPT_BASE with the start of RAM to optimize up to 2 TB. The MSR
+ * can only be written after SNP is enabled, so this runs from the ccp
+ * SNP init path (and again on guest teardown) rather than an initcall.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_program_base, NULL, 1);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp");
+
/*
* Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
* described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
@@ -699,13 +735,21 @@ static bool probe_segmented_rmptable_info(void)
bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
{
- if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP))
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP)) {
rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_RMP_CFG, rmp_cfg);
- if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
- return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();
- else
- return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
+ if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
+ return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Segmented RMP is either not supported on the platform or is
+ * disabled by the firmware. RMPOPT is not supported without
+ * segmented RMP.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT);
+
+ return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index f833cb7e4da3..5c996ab63895 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
sev_es_tmr_size = SNP_TMR_SIZE;
+ snp_enable_rmpopt();
+
return 0;
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 20:06 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-09-16 20:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ashish Kalra; +Cc: kvm
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] x86/sev: missing X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT cleanup on probe failure
--
commit 1564212e828a7dee0758e1b6a358828053507df5
Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs
This commit initializes the per-CPU RMPOPT table base to enable RMP
optimizations for up to 2 TB of addressable memory. It introduces
snp_enable_rmpopt() to program the RMPOPT MSR once SNP is enabled and modifies
snp_probe_rmptable_info() to clear the RMPOPT capability if segmented RMP is
unavailable.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index 558f7924a3f85..f458128b9864f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -699,13 +735,21 @@ static bool probe_segmented_rmptable_info(void)
>
> bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
> {
> - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP))
> + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP)) {
> rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_RMP_CFG, rmp_cfg);
>
> - if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
> - return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();
> - else
> - return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
> + if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
> + return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();
[Severity: Low]
If probe_segmented_rmptable_info() fails and returns false, does this early
return bypass the setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) cleanup below?
If the BIOS or firmware enables Segmented RMP but provides an invalid
configuration (e.g., missing RMP_BASE or out-of-bounds segment size), this
could leave the X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT CPU capability flag erroneously set.
Consequently, later initcalls might unnecessarily allocate resources for
RMPOPT, even though SEV-SNP initialization will subsequently fail.
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * Segmented RMP is either not supported on the platform or is
> + * disabled by the firmware. RMPOPT is not supported without
> + * segmented RMP.
> + */
> + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT);
> +
> + return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
> }
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1789586444.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com?part=3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously
2026-09-16 19:52 [PATCH v15 0/5] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 19:53 ` Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 20:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown Ashish Kalra
4 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2026-09-16 19:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86, hpa, seanjc, peterz,
thomas.lendacky, herbert, davem, ardb
Cc: pbonzini, aik, Michael.Roth, KPrateek.Nayak, Tycho.Andersen,
Nathan.Fontenot, ackerleytng, jackyli, pgonda, rientjes, jacobhxu,
xin, pawan.kumar.gupta, babu.moger, dyoung, nikunj, darwi,
linux-kernel, linux-crypto, kvm, linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
When SNP is enabled, all writes to memory are checked to ensure memory
integrity. This imposes performance overhead on the whole system.
RMPOPT is a new instruction that minimizes the performance overhead of
RMP checks on the hypervisor and on non-SNP guests by allowing RMP
checks to be skipped for 1GB regions of memory that are known not to
contain any SNP guest memory.
Add support for performing RMP optimizations asynchronously using a
dedicated per-CPU workqueue. The workqueue is allocated from an initcall,
and snp_enable_rmpopt() queues the optimization pass.
Shortly after SNP initialization, run an optimization pass over all
physical memory (up to 2TB of system RAM, starting from the lowest
physical memory address aligned down to a 1GB boundary), skipping RMP
checks for 1GB regions that do not contain SNP guest memory (excluding
preassigned pages such as the RMP table and firmware pages).
As SNP guests are launched, RMPUPDATE assigns their private pages to
guest-owned state; when such a page falls within an optimized 1GB
region, the hardware clears that region's RMPOPT optimization and RMP
checks resume there to protect the guest memory.
Since launching SNP guests clears these optimizations, perform them
again asynchronously using the dedicated workqueue.
Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
Changes in v15:
- Move the workqueue allocation and the (fixed) optimization range
computation to an initcall; snp_enable_rmpopt() now only programs the
RMPOPT_BASE MSRs and queues the optimization pass.
- Gate rmpopt_capable() on a static rmpopt_enabled bool set when the
workqueue is allocated, instead of an if (rmpopt_wq) check, and drop
rmpopt_wq_mutex.
- Queue both the initial and the teardown pass with mod_delayed_work().
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index f458128b9864..54520d4cf280 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <linux/iommu.h>
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <asm/sev.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -124,7 +125,25 @@ static void *rmp_bookkeeping __ro_after_init;
static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
-static phys_addr_t rmpopt_pa_start;
+static u64 rmpopt_pa_start, rmpopt_pa_end;
+
+enum rmpopt_op_type {
+ RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS,
+ RMPOPT_OP_REPORT_STATUS
+};
+
+static struct workqueue_struct *rmpopt_wq;
+static struct delayed_work rmpopt_delayed_work;
+static bool rmpopt_enabled;
+
+/*
+ * Delay, in milliseconds, before the RMP re-optimization pass runs after an SNP
+ * guest is torn down, passed as the delay to mod_delayed_work(). This coalesces
+ * a burst of teardowns into a single scan and gives each guest's pages time to
+ * be converted back to the shared, hypervisor-owned state. The 10 second value
+ * is a heuristic trading re-optimization latency against scanning too eagerly.
+ */
+#define RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT (10 * MSEC_PER_SEC)
static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
@@ -557,6 +576,12 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
+static void rmpopt_disable(void)
+{
+ if (rmpopt_wq)
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rmpopt_delayed_work);
+}
+
void snp_shutdown(void)
{
u64 syscfg;
@@ -565,6 +590,8 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
if (syscfg & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
return;
+ rmpopt_disable();
+
clear_rmp();
on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, NULL, 1);
@@ -580,8 +607,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
static bool rmpopt_capable(void)
{
return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) &&
- cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+ cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && rmpopt_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RMPOPT optimizations skip RMP checks at 1GB granularity if this range of
+ * memory does not contain any SNP guest memory.
+ *
+ * @pa is a system physical address; RMPOPT operates on the containing 1GB.
+ */
+static void rmpopt(u64 pa)
+{
+ enum rmpopt_op_type op = RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS;
+ u64 pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, SZ_1G);
+
+ /* Supported by binutils 2.48+ */
+ asm volatile(".byte 0xf2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfc"
+ :: "a" (pa_start), "c" (op)
+ : "memory", "cc");
+}
+
+static void rmpopt_scan_range(void *arg)
+{
+ u64 pa;
+
+ for (pa = rmpopt_pa_start; pa < rmpopt_pa_end; pa += SZ_1G)
+ rmpopt(pa);
+}
+
+static void do_rmpopt_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ /*
+ * Warm up the RMPOPT cache on this pinned per-CPU worker with interrupts
+ * enabled, so the IRQ-disabled fan-out below only issues cache-hit RMPOPTs.
+ */
+ rmpopt_scan_range(NULL);
+
+ on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_scan_range, NULL, true);
+}
+
+static int __init rmpopt_init(void)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT))
+ return 0;
+
+ rmpopt_wq = alloc_workqueue("rmpopt_wq", WQ_PERCPU, 1);
+ if (!rmpopt_wq) {
+ pr_err("Failed to allocate RMPOPT workqueue\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&rmpopt_delayed_work, do_rmpopt_work);
+
+ /* The optimization range is fixed at boot; compute it once. */
+ rmpopt_pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn), SZ_1G);
+ rmpopt_pa_end = ALIGN(PFN_PHYS(max_pfn), SZ_1G);
+ if ((rmpopt_pa_end - rmpopt_pa_start) > SZ_2T)
+ rmpopt_pa_end = rmpopt_pa_start + SZ_2T;
+
+ rmpopt_enabled = true;
+
+ return 0;
}
+device_initcall(rmpopt_init);
static void rmpopt_program_base(void *arg)
{
@@ -599,8 +687,6 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
if (!rmpopt_capable())
return;
- rmpopt_pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn), SZ_1G);
-
/*
* Per-CPU RMPOPT tables cover at most 2 TB. Program each core's
* RMPOPT_BASE with the start of RAM to optimize up to 2 TB. The MSR
@@ -608,6 +694,11 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
* SNP init path (and again on guest teardown) rather than an initcall.
*/
on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_program_base, NULL, 1);
+
+ mod_delayed_work(rmpopt_wq, &rmpopt_delayed_work,
+ msecs_to_jiffies(RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT));
+
+ pr_info_once("RMPOPT optimizations enabled\n");
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp");
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 20:09 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-09-16 20:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ashish Kalra; +Cc: kvm
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] x86/sev: missing output constraint in RMPOPT asm causes infinite loop
- [High] ccp: race condition in SEV-SNP shutdown causes RMPOPT #UD panic
- [High] x86/sev: per-CPU RMPOPT cache warmup logic causes massive NMI lockups
--
commit c0d06ab160baf82951effc37ee61ce7592ca6b50
Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously
Add support for performing RMP optimizations asynchronously using a
dedicated per-CPU workqueue. The workqueue is allocated from an initcall,
and snp_enable_rmpopt() queues the optimization pass.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> index f458128b9864f..54520d4cf2803 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -565,6 +590,8 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
> if (syscfg & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
> return;
>
> + rmpopt_disable();
[Severity: High]
Does canceling the delayed work here leave a race window that could cause an
invalid opcode panic?
The SEV-SNP shutdown sequence sends the SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX command to the
firmware (e.g. from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() in
drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c), which clears the SYSCFG.SNPEn MSR and disables
SNP enforcement in hardware.
By the time snp_shutdown() is called here and confirms the MSR is cleared, the
hardware feature is already disabled. If the delayed workqueue is executing
concurrently on another CPU during this window, could it attempt to execute the
RMPOPT instruction while SNP is disabled, triggering an Invalid Opcode (#UD)?
[ ... ]
> @@ -580,8 +607,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
> static bool rmpopt_capable(void)
> {
> return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) &&
> - cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
> + cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && rmpopt_enabled;
> }
[Severity: High]
Does checking static boot attributes rather than dynamic state here allow
subsequent caller sequences to bypass the capability check after a shutdown?
Because cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) reflects boot state, if SNP is
dynamically disabled during a shutdown or kexec, rmpopt_capable() could still
return true, allowing the workqueue to be improperly re-armed or the
MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE to be rewritten after a shutdown.
> +/*
> + * RMPOPT optimizations skip RMP checks at 1GB granularity if this range of
> + * memory does not contain any SNP guest memory.
> + *
> + * @pa is a system physical address; RMPOPT operates on the containing 1GB.
> + */
> +static void rmpopt(u64 pa)
> +{
> + enum rmpopt_op_type op = RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS;
> + u64 pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, SZ_1G);
> +
> + /* Supported by binutils 2.48+ */
> + asm volatile(".byte 0xf2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfc"
> + :: "a" (pa_start), "c" (op)
> + : "memory", "cc");
[Severity: Critical]
Is an output constraint missing for %rax here?
The RMPOPT instruction evaluates a physical memory region and returns a status
code in %rax. The inline assembly passes pa_start via the "a" constraint
(placing it in %rax) but doesn't declare %rax as an output or clobber.
When rmpopt() is inlined into rmpopt_scan_range(), the compiler might place the
loop variable pa in %rax, assuming it is preserved. After the assembly executes,
the hardware overwrites %rax with the status code (e.g., 0 for success).
Could this cause the loop to increment the status code by SZ_1G instead of the
original physical address, resulting in an infinite loop?
> +}
> +
> +static void rmpopt_scan_range(void *arg)
> +{
> + u64 pa;
> +
> + for (pa = rmpopt_pa_start; pa < rmpopt_pa_end; pa += SZ_1G)
> + rmpopt(pa);
> +}
> +
> +static void do_rmpopt_work(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Warm up the RMPOPT cache on this pinned per-CPU worker with interrupts
> + * enabled, so the IRQ-disabled fan-out below only issues cache-hit RMPOPTs.
> + */
> + rmpopt_scan_range(NULL);
> +
> + on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_scan_range, NULL, true);
[Severity: High]
Is this per-CPU warmup logic sufficient to prevent cache-miss latencies on all
other CPUs?
Because RMPOPT tables and their caches are strictly per-CPU (as configured via
MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE), warming up the cache on a single worker CPU does not
populate the caches on the other CPUs.
When on_each_cpu_mask() broadcasts the scan with interrupts disabled (true),
won't every other primary thread execute up to 2048 cold-cache RMPOPT
instructions in hardirq context, potentially triggering NMI watchdog lockups?
> +}
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1789586444.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com?part=4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown
2026-09-16 19:52 [PATCH v15 0/5] Add RMPOPT support Ashish Kalra
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 19:53 ` Ashish Kalra
2026-09-16 20:06 ` sashiko-bot
4 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread
From: Ashish Kalra @ 2026-09-16 19:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: tglx, mingo, bp, dave.hansen, x86, hpa, seanjc, peterz,
thomas.lendacky, herbert, davem, ardb
Cc: pbonzini, aik, Michael.Roth, KPrateek.Nayak, Tycho.Andersen,
Nathan.Fontenot, ackerleytng, jackyli, pgonda, rientjes, jacobhxu,
xin, pawan.kumar.gupta, babu.moger, dyoung, nikunj, darwi,
linux-kernel, linux-crypto, kvm, linux-coco
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
The RMPOPT table is a per-CPU table which indicates whether 1GB regions
of physical memory are entirely hypervisor-owned.
When performing host memory accesses in hypervisor mode as well as
non-SNP guest mode, the processor may consult the RMPOPT table to
potentially skip an RMP access and improve performance.
Normal guest events disable RMP optimizations: pages are converted from
shared to private as SNP guests are launched, and large pages are split
and collapsed during guest operation -- both disable the RMPOPT
optimizations for the affected 1GB regions.
When guests are torn down, their pages are converted back to shared, so
those regions may become eligible for RMPOPT optimization again. Without
some intervention, all RMP optimizations would eventually be lost, so
re-optimize all of physical memory on SNP guest teardown by calling
snp_enable_rmpopt().
snp_enable_rmpopt() performs the re-optimization after a delay, using
mod_delayed_work() so that the delay timer is reset on each call. This
batches multiple guest terminations into a single pass: the
re-optimization runs 10 seconds after the *last* termination rather than
after the first. mod_delayed_work() also re-queues work that is already
in-flight, so a re-scan request during an active scan is not silently
dropped.
Guest teardown is currently the only event that returns guest memory to
hypervisor ownership: SNP guests do not support ballooning or memory
hotplug, so pages freed during a guest's lifetime remain guest-owned.
It is therefore the only point at which memory becomes eligible for RMP
re-optimization, which is why re-optimization is driven by guest
teardown rather than by a periodic scan.
Reviewed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
Changes in v15:
- Call snp_enable_rmpopt() on guest teardown instead of a separate
snp_rmpopt_all_physmem(); the delayed re-optimization now lives in
snp_enable_rmpopt().
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 5705723f1f41..4d5e30af1ade 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3032,6 +3032,8 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
*/
if (snp_decommission_context(kvm))
return;
+
+ snp_enable_rmpopt();
} else {
sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index 54520d4cf280..0f000cc89573 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
pr_info_once("RMPOPT optimizations enabled\n");
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp");
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp,kvm-amd");
/*
* Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown
2026-09-16 19:53 ` [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown Ashish Kalra
@ 2026-09-16 20:06 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-09-16 20:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ashish Kalra; +Cc: kvm
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] kvm: system-wide synchronous IPI broadcast on every SNP guest teardown defeats batching
--
commit 23bdc9ba80b8a413abe236834cbaf2ae517ee599
Author: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown
The RMPOPT table indicates whether 1GB regions of physical memory are
entirely hypervisor-owned. When SNP guests are torn down, this patch
re-optimizes all of physical memory by calling snp_enable_rmpopt(). This
process is intended to be batched using a delayed work queue to avoid
overhead during multiple guest terminations.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 0a887f8e05d3a..e05adec44d0aa 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -3032,6 +3032,8 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
> */
> if (snp_decommission_context(kvm))
> return;
> +
> + snp_enable_rmpopt();
[Severity: High]
The commit message mentions that using mod_delayed_work() batches multiple
guest terminations into a single pass.
However, doesn't calling snp_enable_rmpopt() here on every guest teardown
trigger a synchronous system-wide IPI broadcast each time?
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c:snp_enable_rmpopt() {
...
on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_program_base, NULL, 1);
mod_delayed_work(rmpopt_wq, &rmpopt_delayed_work, ...);
...
}
Could this unbatched IPI broadcast cause severe performance degradation and
latency spikes across the system when multiple guests are torn down rapidly,
defeating the batching intent?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1789586444.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com?part=5
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread