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From: "Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
To: <sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/20] KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 14:54:45 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <36b8ed8d-7e44-4e8b-9d2e-e46c8db51c5d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260720182042.9D1731F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>

On 7/20/2026 11:20 AM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> 
>>      The register restore path is placed after SPEC_CTRL is restored, so as
>>      to avoid any mis-speculation into EGPR accesses when APX is disabled.
> 
> [Severity: Medium]
> Does the placement in the code match this description?
> 
> Looking at __vmx_vcpu_run() in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S, the EGPR load
> sequence is placed before RESTORE_GUEST_SPEC_CTRL_BODY, which contradicts
> this statement and could expose the host to speculative execution using
> guest EGPR values.

"Register restore" could be imprecise. While the point may stand here 
along with the code change, rewording to "register saving" can help for 
the clarity.

>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_APX
>> +	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lload_egprs_done", "", X86_FEATURE_APX
>> +	testl	$KVM_ENTER_EGPR_SWITCH, (%_ASM_SP)
>> +	jz	.Lload_egprs_done
> 
> [Severity: High]
> Does taking this jump create a speculative information leak?
> 
> If the guest disabled APX, we skip loading guest EGPRs but do not clear
> the host's values from the physical registers.
> 
> While the guest architecturally cannot read these registers without
> triggering a #UD, could it execute an APX instruction speculatively before
> the #UD is recognized, potentially exfiltrating sensitive host kernel data?

Today the host kernel does not use APX internally, so there is no host 
EGPR state to leak. If in-kernel APX usage is introduced in the future, 
the point may need to be revisited.

>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_APX
>> +	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lclear_egprs_done", "", X86_FEATURE_APX
>> +	test	$KVM_ENTER_EGPR_SWITCH, %_ASM_BX
>> +	jz	.Lclear_egprs_done
> 
> [Severity: High]
> Are guest EGPRs left in physical registers during the VM-Exit speculation
> window?

I think this code still follows the same entry/exit assumptions as the 
existing GPR handling -- clearing after the guest state saved before the 
return.

>> +	/*
>> +	 * Unlike legacy GPRs, saving could be conditional here on VM-Fail,
>> +	 * which however isn't in fastpath. Instead, simply saving EGPRs always.
>> +	 */
>> +	STORE_REGS %_ASM_DI, VMX_vcpu_arch_regs, \
>> +		   %r16, %r17, %r18, %r19, %r20, %r21, %r22, %r23, \
>> +		   %r24, %r25, %r26, %r27, %r28, %r29, %r30, %r31
>> +	CLEAR_REGS %r16d, %r17d, %r18d, %r19d, %r20d, %r21d, %r22d, %r23d, \
>> +		   %r24d, %r25d, %r26d, %r27d, %r28d, %r29d, %r30d, %r31d
> 
> [Severity: Critical]
> Will this cause data corruption of the EGPR state across live migration?
> 
> Because hardware EGPRs are zeroed here, KVM's subsequent host XSAVES in
> fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate() will commit zeroes into the guest's FPU state buffer
> (vcpu->arch.guest_fpu).

No. The VCPU register cache is the authoritative copy of the guest EGPR 
state. Clearing the hardware registers after saving them does not affect 
migration state.

>> @@ -991,6 +991,19 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_enter_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
>>   	    kvm_vcpu_can_access_host_mmio(&vmx->vcpu))
>>   		flags |= KVM_ENTER_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS_FOR_MMIO;
>>   
>> +	/*
>> +	 * KVM intercepts XSETBV and thus always tracks the guest XCR0. EGPR
>> +	 * save/restore is gated by this flag. The resulting behavior is:
>> +	 *
>> +	 *  - When the guest enables APX, KVM restores EGPRs (initially zeroed).
>> +	 *  - When the guest disables APX, EGPRs are preserved in the VCPU cache.
>> +	 *  - When APX is re-enabled, the saved state is restored, which matches
>> +	 *    architectural expectations.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_APX) && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_APX) &&
>> +	    vmx->vcpu.arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_APX)
>> +		flags |= KVM_ENTER_EGPR_SWITCH;
>> +
> 
> [Severity: Critical]
> Can an unprivileged guest crash the host by clearing XCR0[APX]?
> 
> Host XCR0 is restored only after executing a significant amount of
> compiler-generated C code. For example, in arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:
> 
> vcpu_enter_guest() {
>      ...
>      exit_fastpath = kvm_x86_call(vcpu_run)(vcpu, run_flags);
>      ...
>      kvm_load_xfeatures(vcpu, false);
>      ...
> }
> 
> If the host kernel is compiled with APX support, the compiler may emit EGPR
> instructions in these generic C exit handlers (like vmx_vcpu_run).

Not with the current kernel build assumptions. Unless the kernel itself 
is compiled with -mapxf (or -march=native on an APX-capable build host 
[*]), the compiler will not emit APX instructions in these paths.

[*] this fix is work-in-progress right now.

Thanks,
Chang

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-22 21:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-20 17:19 [PATCH v5 00/20] KVM: x86: Enable APX for guests Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 01/20] KVM: x86: Extend VCPU registers for EGPRs Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 02/20] KVM: VMX: Save guest EGPRs in VCPU cache Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:20   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:54     ` Chang S. Bae [this message]
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 03/20] KVM: x86: Support APX state for XSAVE ABI Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:22   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:54     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 04/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor VMX instruction information access Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 05/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor instruction information decoding Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 06/20] KVM: VMX: Remove unused control-register access defines Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 07/20] KVM: VMX: Refactor register index retrieval from exit qualification Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 08/20] KVM: VMX: Support instruction information extension Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:54     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 09/20] KVM: nVMX: Propagate extended instruction information Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 10/20] KVM: x86: Support EGPR accessing and tracking for emulator Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 11/20] KVM: x86: Handle EGPR index and REX2-incompatible opcodes Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:18   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 12/20] KVM: x86: Support REX2-prefixed opcode decode Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 13/20] KVM: x86: Reject EVEX-prefixed instructions Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:11   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 14/20] KVM: x86: Move KVM_SUPPORTED_{XCR0,XSS} into kvm_x86_vendor_init() Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 15/20] KVM: x86: Guard valid XCR0.APX settings Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 16/20] KVM: x86: Add APX in supported XCR0 Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 17/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX foundation feature to userspace Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:12   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 18/20] KVM: x86: Expose APX sub-features " Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:10   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 19/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state and ABI test Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 18:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 21:55     ` Chang S. Bae
2026-07-20 17:19 ` [PATCH v5 20/20] KVM: x86: selftests: Add APX state handling and XCR0 sanity checks Chang S. Bae
2026-07-21  7:09 ` [PATCH v5 00/20] KVM: x86: Enable APX for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-07-22 22:01   ` Chang S. Bae

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