From: Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 0/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS virtualization support
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 20:50:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5d04e5d6-6a8f-4bc1-afe9-195310bae909@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260806011536.4172258-1-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
On 8/5/26 6:15 PM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) is a security feature that blocks
> accesses across the user/kernel boundary based on bit 63 of the linear
> address alone, before any page walk is performed. Host support for LASS
> has been merged [1][2]. This series adds the KVM virtualization support.
>
I tested this series on Sierra Forest, using the QEMU support linked
below to expose LASS to the guest.
Covered:
- Guest enumeration of LASS and enabling of CR4.LASS.
- User accesses to supervisor addresses on hardware and under
the forced emulation prefix.
- Supervisor accesses to user addresses from a guest kernel module under
the forced emulation prefix: reads and writes, RFLAGS.AC suppression,
SMAP=0 behavior, implicit descriptor-table accesses, and violations at
a branch target.
- Nested VMX: VMCLEAR with a low operand address, taking a #GP at
RFLAGS.AC=0 and completing at AC=1, via get_vmx_mem_address() ->
vmx_is_lass_violation().
Not covered: the TSS I/O bitmap paths in patch 2, and ENCLS.
QEMU changes to expose LASS to guests:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260826035734.114685-1-kishen.maloor@intel.com/
Tested-by: Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-26 3:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 1:15 [PATCH v4 0/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS virtualization support Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] KVM: x86: Add an emulator flag to differentiate branch targets from fetches Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 3:19 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-19 5:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 5:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-08-19 5:26 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS violation checks during instruction emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 5:58 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] KVM: VMX: Implement LASS violation check Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 1:42 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 8:49 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] KVM: x86: Virtualize LASS and advertise support to userspace Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 9:01 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] KVM: selftests: Add coverage for LASS CPUID and CR4 handling Sohil Mehta
2026-08-20 6:01 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] selftests/x86: Add a userspace test for LASS enforcement Sohil Mehta
2026-08-20 6:36 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-26 3:50 ` Kishen Maloor [this message]
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